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Holding is one of the most commonly used real–time control strategies in transit operations. Given a transit network and its operations plan, the holding problem is to decide at a given time at a control station, which vehicle is to be held and for how long, such that the total passenger cost along the route is minimized over a time period. Previous research on the holding problem has always assumed no real–time information available. Such an assumption not only poses great difficulties in solving the problem, but also limits practical applications in a real–time, dynamic operations environment. In this paper we formulate the holding problem as a deterministic quadratic program in a rolling horizon scheme, and develop an efficient solution algorithm to solve it. Using headway data collected by an automated system, we tested the algorithm and evaluated the impact of the resulting holding policies. Important and interesting properties of the holding solution, obtained from both theoretical and computational analyses, are presented.

Previous studies report that cash holdings are more valuable for financially constrained firms than for unconstrained firms. We examine (i) why this is so and (ii) why some constrained firms appear to hold too little cash. Our results indicate that greater cash holdings are associated with higher levels of investment for constrained firms with high hedging needs and that the association between investment and value is stronger for constrained firms than for unconstrained firms. These findings imply that higher cash holdings allow constrained firms to undertake value-increasing projects that might otherwise be bypassed. We further find that some constrained firms exhibit low cash holdings because of persistently low cash flows. Overall, our findings support the view that greater cash holdings of constrained firms are a value-increasing response to costly external financing. The Author 2009. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of The Society for Financial Studies. All rights reserved. For Permissions, please e-mail: journals.permissions@oxfordjournals.org., Oxford University Press.

In many countries holders of patents must pay an annual renewal fee in order to keep their patents in force. This paper uses data on the proportion of patents renewed, and the renewal fees faced by, post World War II cohorts of patents in France, the United Kingdom, and Germany, in conjunction with a model of patent holders' renewal decisions, to estimate the returns earned from holding patents in these countries. Since patents are often applied for at a nearly stage in the innovation process, the model allows agents to be uncertain about the sequence of returns that will be earned if the patent is kept inforce. Formally, then, the paper presents and solves a discrete choice optimal stochastic control model, derives the implications of the model on aggregate behaviour, and then estimates the parameters of the model from aggregate data. The estimates enable a detailed description of the evolution of the distribution of returns earned from holding patents over their life spans,and calculations of both; the annual returns earned from holding the patents still in force (or the patent stocks) in the alternative countries, and the distribution of the discounted value of returns earned from holding the patents in a cohort.

ABSTRACT We examine the relation between institutional holdings and payout policy in U.S. public firms. We find that payout policy affects institutional holdings. Institutions avoid firms that do not pay dividends. However, among dividend‐paying firms they prefer firms that pay fewer dividends. Our evidence indicates that institutions prefer firms that repurchase shares, and regular repurchasers over nonregular repurchasers. Higher institutional holdings or a concentration of holdings do not cause firms to increase their dividends, their repurchases, or their total payout. Our results do not support models that predict that high dividends attract institutional clientele, or models that predict that institutions cause firms to increase payout.

ABSTRACT Agency theories predict that the value of corporate cash holdings is less in countries with poor investor protection because of the greater ability of controlling shareholders to extract private benefits from cash holdings in such countries. Using various specifications of the valuation regressions of Fama and French (1998) , we find that the relation between cash holdings and firm value is much weaker in countries with poor investor protection than in other countries. In further support of the importance of agency theories, the relation between dividends and firm value is weaker in countries with stronger investor protection.

Building on an inductive, qualitative study of independent workers—people not affiliated with an organization or established profession—this paper develops a theory about the management of precarious and personalized work identities. We find that in the absence of organizational or professional membership, workers experience stark emotional tensions encompassing both the anxiety and fulfillment of working in precarious and personal conditions. Lacking the holding environment provided by an organization, the workers we studied endeavored to create one for themselves through cultivating connections to routines, places, people, and a broader purpose. These personal holding environments helped them manage the broad range of emotions stirred up by their precarious working lives and focus on producing work that let them define, express, and develop their selves. Thus holding environments transformed workers’ precariousness into a tolerable and even generative predicament. By clarifying the process through which people manage emotions associated with precarious and personalized work identities, and thereby render their work identities viable and their selves vital, this paper advances theorizing on the emotional underpinnings of identity work and the systems psychodynamics of independent work.