AI chatbots can be "sycophantic," or overly agreeable and flattering toward users. Sycophantic AI has been shown to entrench attitudes, yet users frequently fail to recognize it (a phenomenon we call "sycophancy blindness"). We tested whether increasing users' awareness of sycophancy protects them from its harmful effects in two preregistered experiments (n = 1,590). In the first, participants received a brief written warning about sycophancy before conversing with a sycophantic chatbot. In the second, participants watched a video of a sycophantic AI validating several other users, including users on opposite sides of the same conflict, before interacting with it themselves. Both interventions changed how participants evaluated the AI. The warning reduced the AI's perceived objectivity, and the video reduced enjoyment of the AI --- an effect mediated by the reduced belief that its validation was uniquely earned. We then pooled our experiments with two prior studies of sycophancy awareness interventions (six interventions total, n = 3,982). The pattern across experiments was consistent: while the interventions made the sycophantic AI appear less objective and trustworthy, none reduc
Millions of people now turn to artificial intelligence (AI) systems for personal advice, guidance, and support. Such systems can be sycophantic, frequently affirming users' views and beliefs. Across five preregistered studies (N = 3,075 participants, 12,766 human-AI conversations), including a three-week study with a census-representative U.S. sample, we provide longitudinal experimental evidence that sycophantic AI shifts how users approach their closest relationships. We show that sycophantic AI immediately delivers the emotional and esteem support users typically associate with close friends and family. Over three weeks of such interactions, users became nearly as likely to seek personal advice from sycophantic AI as from close friends and family, and reported lower satisfaction with their real-world social interactions. When given a choice among AI response styles, a majority preferred sycophantic AI -- not for the quality of its advice, but because it made them feel most understood. Together, these findings offer a relational account of AI sycophancy and its impacts.
Large language models (LLMs) often exhibit sycophantic behaviors -- such as excessive agreement with or flattery of the user -- but it is unclear whether these behaviors arise from a single mechanism or multiple distinct processes. We decompose sycophancy into sycophantic agreement and sycophantic praise, contrasting both with genuine agreement. Using difference-in-means directions, activation additions, and subspace geometry across multiple models and datasets, we show that: (1) the three behaviors are encoded along distinct linear directions in latent space; (2) each behavior can be independently amplified or suppressed without affecting the others; and (3) their representational structure is consistent across model families and scales. These results suggest that sycophantic behaviors correspond to distinct, independently steerable representations.
Sycophancy in language models is typically studied as excessive agreement or validation, while explicit praise and flattery have received comparatively little attention. We argue that sycophantic praise is a distinct alignment problem that cannot be reliably measured using current methods. We introduce a parameterized framework that measures whether praise is excessive relative to contribution quality and expected user ability. We show that our framework substantially outperforms generic LLM judges in agreement with human annotations, and that sycophantic praise occurs far more frequently in social and interpretive domains than in objective reasoning settings. Together, these findings position praise calibration as a distinct alignment challenge.
People increasingly use large language models (LLMs) to explore ideas, gather information, and make sense of the world. In these interactions, they encounter agents that are overly agreeable. We argue that this sycophancy poses a unique epistemic risk to how individuals come to see the world: unlike hallucinations that introduce falsehoods, sycophancy distorts reality by returning responses that are biased to reinforce existing beliefs. We provide a rational analysis of this phenomenon, showing that when a Bayesian agent is provided with data that are sampled based on a current hypothesis the agent becomes increasingly confident about that hypothesis but does not make any progress towards the truth. We test this prediction using a modified Wason 2-4-6 rule discovery task where participants (N=557) interacted with AI agents providing different types of feedback. Unmodified LLM behavior suppressed discovery and inflated confidence comparably to explicitly sycophantic prompting. By contrast, unbiased sampling from the true distribution yielded discovery rates five times higher. These results reveal how sycophantic AI distorts belief, manufacturing certainty where there should be doubt
Recent work has raised concerns about the influence of sycophantic AI on user judgment and relationships. One proposed mitigation, which has received regulatory attention, is to warn users about potentially harmful AI behaviors such as sycophancy. In a preregistered experiment in which participants (N = 2,610) discussed real interpersonal conflicts with an AI system, we test whether warning labels mitigate sycophancy's influence. We find that a basic AI disclosure (``This chatbot is AI'') has no detectable effect. Labeling the system as sycophantic (``...may agree with you and validate you even when you are wrong...'') does shift users' perceptions, reducing perceived objectivity and trust, but it does not reliably reduce sycophancy's influence on users' self-perceived rightness or their willingness to repair the conflict. Our results reveal a gap between AI perception and AI influence: by shifting perception without reducing influence, warning-based interventions may offer a false sense of protection. Addressing the harms of sycophancy will therefore require understanding the specific mechanisms through which it shapes judgment, and improving model behavior itself.
Despite growing attention to LLM sycophancy from researchers and developers, users' own experiences of this behavior remain underexplored. We examine how everyday users experience AI sycophancy through Reddit discussions. Using our ODR Framework which maps user experiences through observation, detection, and response stages, we find that users identify sycophantic behavior through methods like cross-platform comparison and consistency testing. They employ various mitigation strategies, including persona-based prompting and specific language engineering techniques. Our findings suggest that sycophancy does not have a uniformly negative effect; its impact differs by context. Users facing trauma, mental health struggles, or isolation often actively seek affirmative AI responses for emotional support. Users construct both technical and informal theories to explain sycophantic outputs. Users construct both technical and informal theories to explain sycophantic outputs. These findings suggest eliminating sycophancy entirely may be misguided. We argue for context-aware AI design that balances risks against benefits of affirmative interaction, with implications for user education and syste
Large language models are often described as sycophantic, in the sense that they appear to flatter users or mirror their beliefs. We argue that this label is conceptually misleading: sycophancy implies motives and strategic intent, which LLMs do not possess. Their behaviour is better understood as complacency, a structural tendency to agree with user input because training data, reward signals and design favour agreement and reinforcement over correction. We argue that this distinction matters. Whether developers act sycophantically or not, models themselves never are sycophants; they can only be made more or less complacent. This reframing locates agency in developers and institutions, not in the model. Because complacent models reinforce users' prior beliefs, we argue that AI literacy educational approaches should particularly focus on strategies to counter confirmation bias.
Both the general public and academic communities have raised concerns about sycophancy, the phenomenon of artificial intelligence (AI) excessively agreeing with or flattering users. Yet, beyond isolated media reports of severe consequences, like reinforcing delusions, little is known about the extent of sycophancy or how it affects people who use AI. Here we show the pervasiveness and harmful impacts of sycophancy when people seek advice from AI. First, across 11 state-of-the-art AI models, we find that models are highly sycophantic: they affirm users' actions 50% more than humans do, and they do so even in cases where user queries mention manipulation, deception, or other relational harms. Second, in two preregistered experiments (N = 1604), including a live-interaction study where participants discuss a real interpersonal conflict from their life, we find that interaction with sycophantic AI models significantly reduced participants' willingness to take actions to repair interpersonal conflict, while increasing their conviction of being in the right. However, participants rated sycophantic responses as higher quality, trusted the sycophantic AI model more, and were more willing t
Pluralistic alignment is typically operationalised as preference aggregation: producing responses that span (Overton), steer toward (Steerable), or proportionally represent (Distributional) diverse human values. We argue that aggregation alone is an incomplete primitive for deployed pluralistic alignment. Under genuine value pluralism, the failure mode of contemporary RLHF-trained assistants is not insufficient coverage but sycophantic consensus: a learned tendency to agree with, validate, and minimise friction with the immediate interlocutor. Because deployed AI systems now mediate consequential deliberation across health, civic life, labour, and governance, the collapse of disagreement at the interaction layer is not a narrow technical concern but a structural failure with distributive consequences. We reframe pluralistic alignment around three conversational mechanisms drawn from Grice's maxims: scoping (acknowledging the limits of one's perspective), signalling (surfacing value-conflict rather than smoothing it over), and repair (revising one's position on principled grounds, not on user pressure). We formalise a metric, the Pluralistic Repair Score (PRS), distinguishing princi
Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly used in clinical and care settings. This exploratory study investigates whether LLMs exhibit sycophantic behavior - adapting their responses to social expectation signals rather than maintaining professional quality - in the context of dementia care. Five prompts with systematically increasing confirmatory and authority-related framing (P1 neutral to P5 authority-signaled implementation support) were submitted to four LLMs (GPT-5, Claude Sonnet 4.6, Gemini 3.1 Pro, Mistral Large), each repeated five times (N = 100 responses). Responses were evaluated using an LLM-as-a-Judge methodology against seven nursing-ethical quality criteria (K1-K7) and a tone scale (0-3). All models showed significant negative Spearman correlations between prompt level and response quality (rho ranging from -0.543 to -0.734, all p < 0.01). Mistral Large exhibited the most pronounced effect (rho = -0.734), with mean scores dropping from 6.0/7 at P1 to 0.2/7 at P5. The findings suggest that LLMs pose context-sensitive risks in high-stakes care environments and that prompt framing significantly shapes response quality - a dimension that has received insufficient
Vision-language models are increasingly deployed in high-stakes settings, yet their susceptibility to sycophantic manipulation remains poorly understood, particularly in relation to how these models represent visual information internally. Whether models whose visual representations more closely mirror human neural processing are also more resistant to adversarial pressure is an open question with implications for both neuroscience and AI safety. We investigate this question by evaluating 12 open-weight vision-language models spanning 6 architecture families and a 40$\times$ parameter range (256M--10B) along two axes: brain alignment, measured by predicting fMRI responses from the Natural Scenes Dataset across 8 human subjects and 6 visual cortex regions of interest, and sycophancy, measured through 76,800 two-turn gaslighting prompts spanning 5 categories and 10 difficulty levels. Region-of-interest analysis reveals that alignment specifically in early visual cortex (V1--V3) is a reliable negative predictor of sycophancy ($r = -0.441$, BCa 95\% CI $[-0.740, -0.031]$), with all 12 leave-one-out correlations negative and the strongest effect for existence denial attacks ($r = -0.597
Reasoning models frequently agree with incorrect user suggestions -- a behavior known as sycophancy. However, it is unclear where in the reasoning trace this agreement originates and how strong the commitment is. We introduce \emph{sycophantic anchors} -- sentences identified via counterfactual analysis that commit models to user agreement. Across four reasoning models spanning three architecture families (Llama, Qwen, Falcon-hybrid) and 1.5B--8B parameters, we analyze over 200,000 counterfactual rollouts and show that linear probes reliably detect sycophantic anchors (74--85\% balanced accuracy), outperforming text-only baselines at high commitment levels -- confirming they capture internal states beyond surface vocabulary. Regressors further predict commitment strength from activations ($R^2$ up to 0.74). We observe a consistent asymmetry: sycophancy leaves a stronger mechanistic footprint than correct reasoning. We also find that sycophancy builds gradually during generation rather than being determined by the prompt. These findings enable sentence-level detection and quantification of model misalignment mid-inference.
Large language models (LLMs) have achieved strong performance across a wide range of tasks, but they are also prone to sycophancy, the tendency to agree with user statements regardless of validity. Previous research has outlined both the extent and the underlying causes of sycophancy in earlier models, such as ChatGPT-3.5 and Davinci. Newer models have since undergone multiple mitigation strategies, yet there remains a critical need to systematically test their behavior. In particular, the effect of language on sycophancy has not been explored. In this work, we investigate how the language influences sycophantic responses. We evaluate three state-of-the-art models, GPT-4o mini, Gemini 1.5 Flash, and Claude 3.5 Haiku, using a set of tweet-like opinion prompts translated into five additional languages: Arabic, Chinese, French, Spanish, and Portuguese. Our results show that although newer models exhibit significantly less sycophancy overall compared to earlier generations, the extent of sycophancy is still influenced by the language. We further provide a granular analysis of how language shapes model agreeableness across sensitive topics, revealing systematic cultural and linguistic p
Contemporary AI alignment strategies rely on a fragile premise: that human feedback, while noisy, remains a fundamentally truthful signal. In this paper, we identify this assumption as Dogma 4 of Reinforcement Learning (RL). We demonstrate that while this dogma holds in static environments, it fails in social settings where evaluators may be sycophantic, lazy, or adversarial. We prove that under Dogma 4, standard RL agents suffer from what we call Objective Decoupling, a structural failure mode where the agent's learned objective permanently separates from the latent ground truth, guaranteeing convergence to misalignment. To resolve this, we propose Epistemic Source Alignment (ESA). Unlike standard robust methods that rely on statistical consensus (trusting the majority), ESA utilizes sparse safety axioms to judge the source of the feedback rather than the signal itself. We prove that this "judging the judges" mechanism guarantees convergence to the true objective, even when a majority of evaluators are biased. Empirically, we show that while traditional consensus methods fail under majority collusion, our approach successfully recovers the optimal policy.
As LLMs are increasingly integrated into clinical workflows, their tendency for sycophancy, prioritizing user agreement over factual accuracy, poses significant risks to patient safety. While existing evaluations often rely on subjective datasets, we introduce a robust framework grounded in medical MCQA with verifiable ground truths. We propose the Adjusted Sycophancy Score, a novel metric that isolates alignment bias by accounting for stochastic model instability, or "confusability". Through an extensive scaling analysis of the Qwen-3 and Llama-3 families, we identify a clear scaling trajectory for resilience. Furthermore, we reveal a counter-intuitive vulnerability in reasoning-optimized "Thinking" models: while they demonstrate high vanilla accuracy, their internal reasoning traces frequently rationalize incorrect user suggestions under authoritative pressure. Our results across frontier models suggest that benchmark performance is not a proxy for clinical reliability, and that simplified reasoning structures may offer superior robustness against expert-driven sycophancy.
Large language models (LLMs) can fluently generate student-like responses, making them attractive as simulated students for training and evaluating AI tutors and human educators. Yet such simulators are typically evaluated by output similarity to real students, not by whether they behave like students with coherent misconceptions during interaction. We introduce a controlled framework for evaluating misconception faithfulness, whether a simulator maintains a misconception-driven belief state and updates selectively when feedback addresses the underlying misconception. Central to our framework is a misconception-contrastive feedback protocol that compares targeted feedback against two controls: misaligned feedback (targeting a different but plausible misconception) and generic feedback (only identifying answer is wrong). We propose Selective Flip Score (SFS), which quantifies how much more often a simulator flips its answer under targeted feedback than under contrastive controls. Across seven LLMs (4B-120B), multiple datasets, and prompting strategies, simulators exhibit near-zero SFS, correcting their answers at similarly high rates regardless of feedback relevance. Further analyse
Sycophancy refers to the tendency of a large language model to align its outputs with the user's perceived preferences, beliefs, or opinions, in order to look favorable, regardless of whether those statements are factually correct. This behavior can lead to undesirable consequences, such as reinforcing discriminatory biases or amplifying misinformation. Given that sycophancy is often linked to human feedback training mechanisms, this study explores whether sycophantic tendencies negatively impact user trust in large language models or, conversely, whether users consider such behavior as favorable. To investigate this, we instructed one group of participants to answer ground-truth questions with the assistance of a GPT specifically designed to provide sycophantic responses, while another group used the standard version of ChatGPT. Initially, participants were required to use the language model, after which they were given the option to continue using it if they found it trustworthy and useful. Trust was measured through both demonstrated actions and self-reported perceptions. The findings consistently show that participants exposed to sycophantic behavior reported and exhibited lowe
"AI psychosis" or "delusional spiraling" is an emerging phenomenon where AI chatbot users find themselves dangerously confident in outlandish beliefs after extended chatbot conversations. This phenomenon is typically attributed to AI chatbots' well-documented bias towards validating users' claims, a property often called "sycophancy." In this paper, we probe the causal link between AI sycophancy and AI-induced psychosis through modeling and simulation. We propose a simple Bayesian model of a user conversing with a chatbot, and formalize notions of sycophancy and delusional spiraling in that model. We then show that in this model, even an idealized Bayes-rational user is vulnerable to delusional spiraling, and that sycophancy plays a causal role. Furthermore, this effect persists in the face of two candidate mitigations: preventing chatbots from hallucinating false claims, and informing users of the possibility of model sycophancy. We conclude by discussing the implications of these results for model developers and policymakers concerned with mitigating the problem of delusional spiraling.
Large language models (LLMs), while increasingly used in domains requiring factual rigor, often display a troubling behavior: sycophancy, the tendency to align with user beliefs regardless of correctness. This tendency is reinforced by preference-based alignment techniques that optimize for user satisfaction but can undermine truthfulness. While relatively benign in casual dialogue, sycophancy poses serious risks in high-stakes settings such as scientific question answering (QA), where model outputs may shape collaborative reasoning, decision-making, and knowledge formation. Despite its importance, this phenomenon remains underexamined in factual QA contexts. We address this gap by introducing a unified evaluation framework to quantify the impact of sycophantic context on model behavior in scientific QA, measuring how much user-imposed social pressure distorts model outputs. The framework incorporates adversarial prompting setups and targeted metrics, such as misleading resistance and sycophancy resistance, that capture a model's ability to maintain factual consistency under misleading cues. Systematic evaluations across open-source and proprietary models reveal pervasive sycophant