搜索结果：Drug safety

Adverse drug interactions are a critical concern in pharmacovigilance, as both clinical trials and spontaneous reporting systems often lack the breadth to detect complex drug interactions. This study introduces a computational framework for adverse drug interaction detection, leveraging disproportionality analysis on individual case safety reports. By integrating the Anatomical Therapeutic Chemical classification, the framework extends beyond drug interactions to capture hierarchical pharmacological relationships. To address biases inherent in existing disproportionality measures, we employ a hypergeometric risk metric, while a Markov Chain Monte Carlo algorithm provides robust empirical p-value estimation for the risk associated to cocktails. A genetic algorithm further facilitates efficient identification of high-risk drug cocktails. Validation on synthetic and FDA Adverse Event Reporting System data demonstrates the method's efficacy in detecting established drugs and drug interactions associated with myopathy-related adverse events. Implemented as an R package, this framework offers a reproducible, scalable tool for post-market drug safety surveillance.

Safety has become the central value around which dominant AI governance efforts are being shaped. Recently, this culminated in the publication of the International AI Safety Report, written by 96 experts of which 30 nominated by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), the European Union (EU), and the United Nations (UN). The report focuses on the safety risks of general-purpose AI and available technical mitigation approaches. In this response, informed by a system safety perspective, I refl ect on the key conclusions of the report, identifying fundamental issues in the currently dominant technical framing of AI safety and how this frustrates meaningful discourse and policy efforts to address safety comprehensively. The system safety discipline has dealt with the safety risks of software-based systems for many decades, and understands safety risks in AI systems as sociotechnical and requiring consideration of technical and non-technical factors and their interactions. The International AI Safety report does identify the need for system safety approaches. Lessons, concepts and methods from system safety indeed provide an important blueprint for overcoming

In Rust, unsafe code is the sole source of potential undefined behaviors. To avoid misuse, Rust developers should clarify the safety properties for each unsafe API. However, the community currently lacks a key standard for safety documentation: existing safety comments in the source code and safety documentation can be ad hoc and incomplete. This paper presents a tag-centric methodology for auditing the consistency and completeness of safety documentation. We first derive a taxonomy of Safety Tags to formalize natural-language requirements. Second, because API soundness frequently relies on struct invariants, we propose a set of empirical rules to systematically audit the structural consistency of safety documentation. We implemented this methodology in safety-tool, a static linter that automatically enforces structural consistency between local safety annotations and callee requirements. Our approach was applied to the Rust standard library, fixing documentation issues on 27 APIs with 61 safety tags and identifying safety tags that are applicable to 96.1% of the public unsafe APIs in libstd. Furthermore, we have formalized the tagging idea through a Rust RFC to the wider community

Recent progress in generative modeling has made safety control a central challenge, yet existing approaches remain largely model-specific, requiring retraining or tailored interventions for each new architecture. In this work, we ask whether safety can be represented as a portable latent direction, learned once and reused across heterogeneous generators. We introduce the first framework for cross-model safety steering, in which a safety direction is estimated in a source LLM from paired safe-unsafe prompts, transported to a target generator through a lightweight alignment fitted on benign data alone, and applied at inference time. Crucially, our pipeline never accesses unsafe data on the target side, isolating whether safety can be transferred through shared representation geometry. Beyond a single global direction, we also identify a multi-vector extension that captures category-specific safety behaviors, enabling more selective control. We evaluate our approach in text-to-image and text-to-video generation across diverse source-target model pairs. Across models, transferred safety directions achieve ASR reduction and CLIP-Score/FID trade-offs comparable to directions learned nati

Safety lies at the core of developing and deploying large language models (LLMs). However, previous safety benchmarks only concern the safety in one language, e.g. the majority language in the pretraining data such as English. In this work, we build the first multilingual safety benchmark for LLMs, XSafety, in response to the global deployment of LLMs in practice. XSafety covers 14 kinds of commonly used safety issues across 10 languages that span several language families. We utilize XSafety to empirically study the multilingual safety for 4 widely-used LLMs, including both close-API and open-source models. Experimental results show that all LLMs produce significantly more unsafe responses for non-English queries than English ones, indicating the necessity of developing safety alignment for non-English languages. In addition, we propose several simple and effective prompting methods to improve the multilingual safety of ChatGPT by evoking safety knowledge and improving cross-lingual generalization of safety alignment. Our prompting method can significantly reduce the ratio of unsafe responses from 19.1% to 9.7% for non-English queries. We release our data at https://github.com/Jar

We develop a data-driven approach for runtime safety monitoring in flight testing, where pilots perform maneuvers on aircraft with uncertain parameters. Because safety violations can arise unexpectedly as a result of these uncertainties, pilots need clear, preemptive criteria to abort the maneuver in advance of safety violation. To solve this problem, we use offline stochastic trajectory simulation to learn a calibrated statistical model of the short-term safety risk facing pilots. We use flight testing as a motivating example for data-driven learning/monitoring of safety due to its inherent safety risk, uncertainty, and human-interaction. However, our approach consists of three broadly-applicable components: a model to predict future state from recent observations, a nearest neighbor model to classify the safety of the predicted state, and classifier calibration via conformal prediction. We evaluate our method on a flight dynamics model with uncertain parameters, demonstrating its ability to reliably identify unsafe scenarios, match theoretical guarantees, and outperform baseline approaches in preemptive classification of risk.

This paper develops a Geometric Analysis-based Route Safety Assessment (GARSA) framework to enhance the safety of marine vehicles navigating in restricted waters. Utilizing line and point geometric elements to define waterway boundaries, the framework enables the construction of a dynamic width characterization function to quantify spatial safety within complex restricted navigation spaces. An iterative method is developed to calculate the dynamic width characterization function, enabling an abstracted spatial property representation of waterways. Based on this, a navigational safety index that accounts for the overall route safety as well as the spatial constraints of local segments is created, enabling the selection of the safest waterway to pass through. Case studies in Hamburg Port and hypothetical waterways show that GARSA identifies spatial safety differences among routes. For example, GARSA assigned safety assessment values of 0.6 and 135 to two intra-port transit routes of 7,258 m and 7,845 m, respectively, with the higher value indicating a safer route. Overall, GARSA provides a quantitative basis for safety-oriented route decision-making of marine vehicles in restricted w

We propose a new framework to facilitate dynamic assurance within a safety case approach by associating safety performance measurement with the core assurance artifacts of a safety case. The focus is mainly on the safety architecture, whose underlying risk assessment model gives the concrete link from safety measurement to operational risk. Using an aviation domain example of autonomous taxiing, we describe our approach to derive safety indicators and revise the risk assessment based on safety measurement. We then outline a notion of consistency between a collection of safety indicators and the safety case, as a formal basis for implementing the proposed framework in our tool, AdvoCATE.

The role of Artificial Intelligence (AI) is growing in every stage of drug development. Nevertheless, a major challenge in drug discovery AI remains: Drug pharmacokinetic (PK) and Drug-Target Interaction (DTI) datasets collected in different studies often exhibit limited overlap, creating data overlap sparsity. Thus, data curation becomes difficult, negatively impacting downstream research investigations in high-throughput screening, polypharmacy, and drug combination. We propose xImagand-DKI, a novel SMILES/Protein-to-Pharmacokinetic/DTI (SP2PKDTI) diffusion model capable of generating an array of PK and DTI target properties conditioned on SMILES and protein inputs that exhibit data overlap sparsity. We infuse additional molecular and genomic domain knowledge from the Gene Ontology (GO) and molecular fingerprints to further improve our model performance. We show that xImagand-DKI-generated synthetic PK data closely resemble real data univariate and bivariate distributions, and can adequately fill in gaps among PK and DTI datasets. As such, xImagand-DKI is a promising solution for data overlap sparsity and may improve performance for downstream drug discovery research tasks. Code

This paper revisits three backup-based safety filters -- Backup Control Barrier Functions (Backup CBF), Model Predictive Shielding (MPS), and gatekeeper -- through a unified comparative framework. Using a common safety-filter abstraction and shared notation, we make explicit both their common backup-policy structure and their key algorithmic differences. We compare the three methods through their filter-inactive sets, i.e., the states where the nominal policy is left unchanged. In particular, we show that MPS is a special case of gatekeeper, and we further relate gatekeeper to the interior of the Backup CBF inactive set within the implicit safe set. This unified view also highlights a key source of conservatism in backup-based safety filters: safety is often evaluated through the feasibility of a backup maneuver, rather than through the nominal policy's continued safe execution. The paper is intended as a compact tutorial and review that clarifies the theoretical connections and differences among these methods.

Multimodal large language models (MLLMs) are increasingly deployed as assistants that interact through text and images, making it crucial to evaluate contextual safety when risk depends on both the visual scene and the evolving dialogue. Existing contextual safety benchmarks are mostly single-turn and often miss how malicious intent can emerge gradually or how the same scene can support both benign and exploitative goals. We introduce the Multi-Turn Multimodal Contextual Safety Benchmark (MTMCS-Bench), a benchmark of realistic images and multi-turn conversations that evaluates contextual safety in MLLMs under two complementary settings, escalation-based risk and context-switch risk. MTMCS-Bench offers paired safe and unsafe dialogues with structured evaluation. It contains over 30 thousand multimodal (image+text) and unimodal (text-only) samples, with metrics that separately measure contextual intent recognition, safety-awareness on unsafe cases, and helpfulness on benign ones. Across eight open-source and seven proprietary MLLMs, we observe persistent trade-offs between contextual safety and utility, with models tending to either miss gradual risks or over-refuse benign dialogues.

Large Language Models' safety-aligned behaviors, such as refusing harmful queries, can be represented by linear directions in activation space. Previous research modeled safety behavior with a single direction, limiting mechanistic understanding to an isolated safety feature. In this work, we discover that safety-aligned behavior is jointly controlled by multi-dimensional directions. Namely, we study the vector space of representation shifts during safety fine-tuning on Llama 3 8B for refusing jailbreaks. By studying orthogonal directions in the space, we first find that a dominant direction governs the model's refusal behavior, while multiple smaller directions represent distinct and interpretable features like hypothetical narrative and role-playing. We then measure how different directions promote or suppress the dominant direction, showing the important role of secondary directions in shaping the model's refusal representation. Finally, we demonstrate that removing certain trigger tokens in harmful queries can mitigate these directions to bypass the learned safety capability, providing new insights on understanding safety alignment vulnerability from a multi-dimensional perspec

Autonomous vehicles (AVs) have significantly advanced in real-world deployment in recent years, yet safety continues to be a critical barrier to widespread adoption. Traditional functional safety approaches, which primarily verify the reliability, robustness, and adequacy of AV hardware and software systems from a vehicle-centric perspective, do not sufficiently address the AV's broader interactions and behavioral impact on the surrounding traffic environment. To overcome this limitation, we propose a paradigm shift toward behavioral safety, a comprehensive approach focused on evaluating AV responses and interactions within traffic environment. To systematically assess behavioral safety, we introduce a third-party AV safety assessment framework comprising two complementary evaluation components: Driver Licensing Test and Driving Intelligence Test. The Driver Licensing Test evaluates AV's reactive behaviors under controlled scenarios, ensuring basic behavioral competency. In contrast, the Driving Intelligence Test assesses AV's interactive behaviors within naturalistic traffic conditions, quantifying the frequency of safety-critical events to deliver statistically meaningful safety

Humanoid robots are difficult to deploy safely because they have high-dimensional bodies, many collision constraints, and must operate near people and obstacles. Safety filters help by modifying a nominal control action when it may violate collision-avoidance constraints. Still, nominal benchmark scores do not fully show how these filters behave in harder environments. In this work, we study the robustness of SPARK humanoid safety filters through replication and stress testing. We replicate the SPARK benchmark case G1SportMode_D1_WG_SO_v1 in MuJoCo and evaluate RSSA, RSSS, SSA, CBF, PFM, and SMA under controlled random seeds. We also built a post-processing pipeline that converts raw SPARK logs into goal-tracking, minimum-distance, and collision-step metrics. Our results show that some methods track the goal more closely, while others reduce collision steps more effectively. The stress tests further indicate that safety behavior can change under obstacle crowding, noisy distance estimates, and delayed obstacle information. These findings suggest that humanoid autonomy should be evaluated beyond nominal performance, using metrics that expose failure modes before deployment.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are increasingly deployed for code generation in high-stakes software development, yet their limited transparency in security reasoning and brittleness to evolving vulnerability patterns raise critical trustworthiness concerns. Models trained on static datasets cannot readily adapt to newly discovered vulnerabilities or changing security standards without retraining, leading to the repeated generation of unsafe code. We present a principled approach to trustworthy code generation by design that operates as an inference-time safety mechanism. Our approach employs retrieval-augmented generation to surface relevant security risks in generated code and retrieve related security discussions from a curated Stack Overflow knowledge base, which are then used to guide an LLM during code revision. This design emphasizes three aspects relevant to trustworthiness: (1) interpretability, through transparent safety interventions grounded in expert community explanations; (2) robustness, by allowing adaptation to evolving security practices without model retraining; and (3) safety alignment, through real-time intervention before unsafe code reaches deployment. Across r

Aviation safety is paramount, demanding precise analysis of safety occurrences during different flight phases. This study employs Natural Language Processing (NLP) and Deep Learning models, including LSTM, CNN, Bidirectional LSTM (BLSTM), and simple Recurrent Neural Networks (sRNN), to classify flight phases in safety reports from the Australian Transport Safety Bureau (ATSB). The models exhibited high accuracy, precision, recall, and F1 scores, with LSTM achieving the highest performance of 87%, 88%, 87%, and 88%, respectively. This performance highlights their effectiveness in automating safety occurrence analysis. The integration of NLP and Deep Learning technologies promises transformative enhancements in aviation safety analysis, enabling targeted safety measures and streamlined report handling.

A system safety case is a compelling, comprehensible, and valid argument about the satisfaction of the safety goals of a given system operating in a given environment supported by convincing evidence. Since the publication of UL 4600 in 2020, safety cases have become a best practice for measuring, managing, and communicating the safety of autonomous vehicles (AVs). Although UL 4600 provides guidance on how to build the safety case for an AV, the complexity of AVs and their operating environments, the novelty of the used technology, the need for complying with various regulations and technical standards, and for addressing cybersecurity concerns and ethical considerations make the development of safety cases for AVs challenging. To this end, safety case frameworks have been proposed that bring strategies, argument templates, and other guidance together to support the development of a safety case. This paper introduces the Open Autonomy Safety Case Framework, developed over years of work with the autonomous vehicle industry, as a roadmap for how AVs can be deployed safely and responsibly.