Disturbances of consciousness and cognition that happen during the perioperative period remain a critical challenge in anesthesiology, manifested as intraoperative awareness, delayed emergence, and postoperative delirium. These disorders arise from complex interactions among neural connectivity, neurotransmitter dynamics, and the pharmacological modulation of cortical and subcortical circuits. The thalamocortical network, brainstem arousal centers, and frontoparietal integration systems are crucial in facilitating transitions between drug-induced unconsciousness and recovery; however, their functional disruptions are only partially comprehended. This paper synthesizes recent research that connecting consciousness neurobiology with anesthetic mechanisms, examining how dysregulated GABAergic, NMDA, and adrenergic signaling underlies perioperative neural states. It examines the dual spectrum of intraoperative awareness and postoperative cognitive disturbances through a comprehensive neurophysiological framework. Furthermore, novel diagnostic technologies, including EEG-based depth indices, functional near-infrared spectroscopy, and AI-assisted models, are analyzed for their potential in the real-time detection and prediction of states of consciousness. This study seeks to establish a comprehensive framework for understanding perioperative disturbances of consciousness and cognition by integrating mechanistic, clinical, and technological perspectives. It stresses the importance of personalized anesthetic approaches, multimodal monitoring, and neuroinformatics-informed interventions to avert cognitive sequelae and enhance neural recovery. This perspective positions anesthesiology at the intersection of neuroscience, data science, and consciousness research.
Accurate assessment of residual awareness in patients with Prolonged Disorders of Consciousness (PDoC) remains a major clinical challenge, as conventional behavioural tools can underestimate covert cognition. This study evaluates whether a structured, multi-phase motor imagery Brain-Computer Interface (MI-BCI) protocol provides objective electroencephalography (EEG)-based indicators of awareness that complement behavioural assessments. Forty-four participants (N = 44) completed repeated imagined-movement tasks using wearable EEG (PDoC: Unresponsive Wakefulness Syndrome (UWS, n = 14), Minimally Conscious State (MCS, n = 17), Locked-In Syndrome (LIS, n = 11); two able-bodied participants as benchmarks; ClinicalTrials.gov: NCT03827187; 30-01-2019). The protocol assessed sensorimotor rhythm modulation, training with and without neurofeedback, and binary question answering across phases. Standard behavioural assessments (CRS-R and WHIM) were administered at each session. Significant MI-BCI decoding accuracy (DA) is achieved by 73.8% of patients, of whom 90% progress to Q&A testing and frequently exceed the 70% usability threshold, revealing marked inter-individual heterogeneity. For significant MI-BCI runs, LIS outperform MCS (p = 0.007) and UWS (p = 0.048), while UWS exceed MCS during Q&A (p = 0.049), driven by familiar-voice stimuli. Using leave-one-subject-out cross-validation, combining predictions from DA and behavioural assessments improves balanced diagnostic accuracy to 62% (from 55%), increasing sensitivity to MCS (39% to 69%), with a modest reduction in LIS sensitivity (78% to 67%). Task-related activity over sensorimotor and parietal cortices differentiate diagnostic groups. The structured MI-BCI protocol demonstrates potential as a movement-independent, EEG-based tool for distinguishing UWS, MCS and LIS. Integrating DA and spatial patterns yields diagnostic information that may augment behavioural assessment and advance objective tools for evaluating awareness in PDoC. Some people with severe brain injuries seem unresponsive, yet their brains may still show signs of awareness. This study tested a brain-computer system that detects these signs by recording tiny electrical signals from the scalp when a person imagines moving. We worked with people in different states of consciousness and those with locked-in syndrome, a rare condition marked by complete paralysis, but intact consciousness – across hospitals, care homes, and private homes. The results showed that many could change their brain signals, suggesting intentional thinking, especially those with locked-in syndrome. These findings show that this kind of brain-computer system could help doctors detect hidden awareness in people who cannot move or speak, and may eventually assist with diagnosis and basic communication.
Converging operations allow one to home in on a construct, be this an altered state of consciousness (ASC), or trait and/or state impulsivity. Unfortunately (or, perhaps fortunately), measures that should provide converging operations for such a construct sometimes present with diverging results. Three cases are considered here: trait impulsivity, which should be positively correlated with state or cognitive impulsivity, but which can also be not correlated; the subjective experience of state absorption, which should be positively correlated with trait absorption, but sometimes is not; and trait mindfulness, which should be negatively correlated with trait impulsivity, but this may be undermined by the semantic ambiguity of a questionnaire item. It is suggested that the defining characteristic of the construct of impulsivity should be the self-report regarding trait impulsivity. Likewise, the defining characteristic of the construct of an ASC should be the report regarding subjective experience. In both cases, predominant weight is placed on the evidence supplied by one's subjective experience and appraisal. Three areas for future research and theoretical consideration are suggested: (1) Given that converging measures are not of equal standing, one should consider which measure is a defining one of the construct under investigation, and which measures are critical for delimiting its extent; (2) when a mismatch appears between measures, it is important to clarify what this means for the construct; and (3) one should consider whether the demand characteristics of a study have clouded the interpretation of the construct under investigation.
Metaphors have long played multiple roles in conceptualizing the mind and brain, guiding the development and refinement of theoretical models and empirical questions. Early analogies (comparing the brain to hydraulic systems, telephone exchanges, factories, or libraries) offered shortcuts to understanding aspects of cognition, memory, and brain dynamics. From theoretical frameworks, metaphors like the mind as a computer evolved into central scientific metaphors, shaping core theoretical frameworks, inspiring predictions, and informing research methodologies. As such, metaphors play a key role in guiding scientific inquiries. Building on that premise, we propose music as a scientific metaphor for understanding multiple brain dynamics and cognitive functions. Unlike metaphors focusing on static components or linear flows, music emphasizes continuous adaptation, context-dependence, and cultural embedding, and presents a model for simultaneous engagement with multiple layers of meaning. Integrating analytical techniques from music theory and experiential insights from performance and listening, we can deepen our understanding of mind and brain dynamics and provide fresh epistemological pathways for interdisciplinary research. Music has a hierarchical structure, temporal complexity, and capacity to integrate multiple processes that parallel key features of the brain's architecture and cognitive functions. Drawing from research on neural oscillations, plasticity, predictive coding, and emotional processing, we illustrate how the musical paradigm can capture the rich entanglement of mind and brain, from large-scale brain dynamics and developmental trajectories to the emergence of consciousness and the interplay of affective states.
Mind-wandering refers to the shift of attention towards task-unrelated thoughts. The current study aims to explore the impact of mind-wandering on learning and decision-making under uncertain circumstances. This study investigated the interplay of trait (spontaneous and deliberate) and state mind-wandering on learning and decision making using the Iowa Gambling Task. Intermittent thought probes were used to measure state mind wandering, and a standardised 8-item mind-wandering questionnaire was used to measure trait mind wandering. Results revealed that participants demonstrated enhanced learning across task trials when engaged in task-unrelated thoughts (mind-wandering). Furthermore, an interaction effect emerged between trait spontaneous mind-wandering and state mind-wandering, significantly predicting learning under uncertainty. Specifically, the beneficial impact of state mind-wandering on learning was most pronounced in individuals with moderate to high levels of spontaneous mind-wandering traits. However, there was no significant effect of mind-wandering on the percentage of risky choices. These findings suggest that spontaneous mind-wandering facilitates cognitive adaptability under uncertain environments, highlighting its adaptive role in learning processes.
The brainstem connects the forebrain to the spinal cord. It consists of three layers, the ventral basis, the intermediate tegmentum, and the dorsal tectum. Caudo-rostrally, the brainstem is divided into the medulla oblongata or myelencephalon, the metencephalon, and the mesencephalon. The tegmentum is the most conserved part of the brainstem and contains the motor and sensory nuclei of cranial nerves (CN) III-XII. They are arranged in a mediolateral direction, and, unlike the spinal cord, their afferent and efferent fibers are not macroscopically separated. The tegmental reticular formation, the brainstem core, has a lattice structure with manifold longitudinal and transverse fibers and stacked neurons. Its architecture provides maximum convergence and divergence of intrinsic and ascending/descending information from the spinal cord and forebrain. It coordinates brainstem-based vital functions, and its integrity is essential for arousal, consciousness, and goal-directed behavior. Its small aminergic and cholinergic telencephalic projection nuclei have a profound impact on mood, motivation, and cognition. Human telencephalic evolution manifests in volume increases of the cerebral crura, pons, cerebellar hemispheres, olives, pyramidal tract, and medial lemniscus. However, the spatial constraints of the posterior fossa limited the proportional expansion of the brainstem during human telencephalic evolution, rendering this evolutionarily conserved structure increasingly vulnerable to malfunction and disease.
Whether consciousness serves a biological and psychological function is a topic of intense interest. We reexamine this issue by first focussing on an objection against consciousness having a function raised amongst others by Jaegwon Kim. His argument targets a form of non-reductive physicalism stating that consciousness has causative power beyond that of the physical substrate. In contrast, we argue for a monistic conceptualization in which high-level, phenomenal representations correspond to low-level, neuronal representations, together constituting one functional entity. This neurorepresentationalist position supports a non-classical emergentism in which phenomenal consciousness and its neural substrate cannot be functionally separated. We next ask why our perceptual phenomenology is structured the way it is, making the case that conscious experiences are not accidental constructs, but are generated as a multimodal, situational survey of the brain's environment (including the body) whose features precisely function to enable deliberate, planned behaviors. This function is illustrated by, for instance, examining why we see the world 'upside up' instead of 'upside down', why multisensory integration and other forms of integration are biologically useful, and what function spatial object constancy has in the face of ongoing eye and body movements. Pathological cases of hallucination, such as Anton and Bonnet syndrome, further buttress the argument by showing how behavior can be severely impaired when conscious brain systems misrepresent reality. Finally, we compare neurorepresentationalism to other proposals on functions of consciousness, and especially point out some differences with proposals for a learning function of consciousness.
Unusual bodily experiences (UBEs) are illusory bodily perceptions that are not coherent with typical wakeful experiences, including flying or floating sensations, body distortions, and out-of-body experiences. This study examines UBEs in a controlled sleep laboratory using meditation and light stimulation to facilitate their occurrence. A total of N = 35 healthy participants underwent high-density EEG, with additional EMG, EOG, and ECG recordings. Participants signalled UBEs by performing left-right-left-right eye movements, providing an objective marker for analysis. Interviews adapted from the micro-phenomenological technique were conducted to capture detailed subjective reports and to guide subsequent sleep and EEG analyses. Of the 35 participants, N = 20 reported a total of n = 36 UBEs, occurring primarily during meditation (wakefulness) but also during sleep arousals, rapid eye-movement (REM) sleep and non-REM sleep. Spectral EEG analyses and generalized linear mixed models were used to investigate the neural correlates of these experiences, suggesting that UBEs emerge during intermediate states of consciousness combining EEG features of both wakefulness and sleep. Specifically, exploratory EEG analyses showed that UBEs across sleep and wakefulness were associated with EEG reactivation, marked by increased high-frequency activity (beta and gamma) and decreased low-frequency activity (delta and theta), with a particularly pronounced effect around temporal regions. Collectively, these results provide novel insights into the EEG correlates associated with UBEs and contribute to a deeper understanding of self-consciousness and body perception across sleep and wakefulness.
Understanding whether prefrontal cortex is necessary for conscious experience remains central to ongoing debates between global workspace and recurrent processing theories of consciousness. To dissociate neural processes underlying perceptual awareness from those related to report and access, we combined report and no-report visual masking paradigms with magnetoencephalography (MEG) to characterize the spatiotemporal and network dynamics of visual awareness. Across both report and no-report conditions, early and sustained responses emerged in occipital and temporal cortices, beginning at ∼60-70 ms post-stimulus. Posterior sensory regions consistently encoded stimulus presence and category information irrespective of reporting demands, and exhibited enhanced α-band recurrent coupling for visible stimuli, suggesting stable perceptual representations supported by local recurrent interactions. In contrast, prefrontal activity emerged only when explicit report was required, beginning at ∼100 ms and persisting thereafter. Time-resolved decoding revealed that anterior regions encoded stimulus information exclusively under report conditions and failed to represent categorical content when reporting was absent. Moreover, long-range fronto-posterior connectivity selectively increased during report, indicating task-dependent integration beyond posterior sensory processing. These findings demonstrate that posterior cortical dynamics are sufficient to support perceptual awareness, whereas prefrontal cortex contributes to report-related access and global integration. By disentangling awareness from reporting, this work provides evidence favoring posterior-centered accounts of phenomenal consciousness and clarifies the functional role of anterior cortex in conscious processing.
Mind-wandering is widely assumed to impair ongoing task performance, yet findings from creative cognition research suggest that it can be beneficial under some conditions - an inconsistency rooted in coarse mental state classifications and low-ecological-validity tasks. We tested whether mind-wandering during active creative production facilitates or impairs real-time creative output in the ecologically valid setting of live jazz improvisation. 52 musicians performed a musical improvisation task while random thought-probes sampled ongoing mental states: focused attention, mind-wandering, mind-blanking, and task-related interference. Expert judges rated each performance for creativity and overall improvisational quality. Mental states were phenomenologically distinct across dimensions of intentionality and meta-awareness, and critically, this phenomenological heterogeneity translated into functional heterogeneity in their associations with creative output. Mind-wandering predicted higher creativity than focused attention, task-related interference suppressed creativity, and mind-blanking was neutral to modestly positive. Overall quality was mainly driven by expertise. State × expertise interactions revealed that the creative benefits of mind-wandering were strongest for less- and mid-experienced improvisers. These findings show that during improvisatory creative action, mind-wandering need not derail performance. Instead, it may mark adaptive loosening of cognitive control that supports generative spontaneity and flexibility crucial to creative expression.
During sleep, the human brain transitions to a "sentinel processing mode," enabling the continued processing of environmental stimuli despite the absence of consciousness. We employed advanced information-theoretic analyses, including mutual information (MI) and co-information (co-I), alongside event-related potential (ERP) and temporal generalization analyses (TGA), to characterize auditory prediction error processing across wakefulness and sleep. We hypothesized that a shared neural code would be present across sleep stages, with deeper sleep being associated with reduced information content and increased information redundancy. Twenty-nine participants (15 women) underwent an auditory "local-global" oddball paradigm during wakefulness and an 8 h sleep opportunity monitored via polysomnography. We focused on "local" mismatch responses to a deviating fifth tone after four standards. ERP analyses showed that prediction error processing continued throughout all sleep stages (N1-N3, REM). Mutual information analyses revealed a substantial reduction in encoded prediction error information particularly during N3 and REM, although ERP amplitudes increased with deeper NREM sleep. We also observed delayed information encoding during sleep, and co-information analyses showed neural dynamics became increasingly redundant with increasing sleep depth. TGA revealed a largely shared neural code between N2 and N3, though it differed between wakefulness and sleep. We demonstrate how the neural code of the "sentinel processing mode" changes from wake to light to deep sleep and REM, characterized by delayed processing, more redundant and less rich neural information in the human cortex as consciousness wanes. This altered stimulus processing reveals how neural information evolves with variations in consciousness across the night.
The renewal of psychedelic medicine has garnered significant scientific interest, with large efforts dedicated to the understanding of the complex subjective experiences induced by these substances. The Altered States of Consciousness (ASC) questionnaire represents the most comprehensive instrument for measuring such experiences yet lacks a validated French translation despite its centrality to research. A psychometric validation of the French 5D-ASC and 11 OAV subscales was conducted using data from 777 participants recruited through online platforms. Participants completed the 94-item questionnaire based on a past naturalistic psychedelic experience induced by a classical or non-classical psychedelic substance. Confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) of established factorial structures, multiple-indicator multiple-cause (MIMIC) modeling assessing measurement invariance across substance categories, and comprehensive reliability analyses were used. The 11-subscale solution demonstrated better fit compared to higher-order structures (CFI = 0.882, RMSEA = 0.051, SRMR = 0.061), though comparative fit indices remained marginally below conventional thresholds. Internal consistency was excellent for global scores (α = 0.95) and satisfactory across individual subscales (α = 0.63-0.84). Construct validity was supported by theoretically consistent inter-scale correlations and convergent validity with single-item validators. MIMIC modeling revealed modest differential item functioning but confirmed measurement invariance, with latent factor differences aligning with known pharmacological profiles. This study provides preliminary evidence for the psychometric validity of the French 5D-ASC. These findings enable future research examining the relationship between subjective experience and therapeutic outcomes in francophone contexts, contributing to the international standardization of psychedelic research instruments.
The left angular gyrus (AG) has been implicated in the level of detail elicited during both episodic memory (EM) and episodic future thinking (EFT). This study aimed to investigate whether repetitive transcranial magnetic stimulation (rTMS) over the left lateral parietal region consistent with left AG targeting influences the level of detail reported during elicitations of EM and EFT. Thirty-six healthy adults (41.7% female, mean age = 25.36 years ± 2.52) attended four experimental sessions corresponding to four different conditions: facilitatory (20 Hz) rTMS, inhibitory (1 Hz) rTMS, active-control rTMS, and sham rTMS. Following rTMS, participants completed EM and EFT tasks. In these tasks, participants verbally detailed personal memories or future scenarios. Participants also completed a free associates task, operating as a non-episodic control. Results demonstrated a significant difference in both EM and EFT across conditions. Post-hoc analyses showed that when compared to the active-control and sham conditions, inhibitory rTMS significantly reduced the mean number of episodic details and significantly increased the mean number of external details elicited during both EM and EFT. However, there was no significant difference between the facilitatory, active-control, and sham rTMS conditions on the detail elicited in both EM and EFT tasks. Analyses also demonstrated no significant differences on the free associates task across all conditions. This study supports the role of the left lateral parietal region in the generation of episodic detail in both EM and EFT, with the potential for inhibitory rTMS to modulate both EM and EFT in healthy populations.
Insufficient sleep is a common occurrence in modern society and has severe consequences for our attention, executive functioning (EF), and affect. Mind wandering (MW) is a phenomenon where attention shifts from an external task to internal thoughts. These shifts can take on different characteristics, such as relating to specific mental content or not (mind blanking, MB), and can be engaged deliberately (D-MW) or spontaneously (S-MW). MW is related to impaired EF and worsened emotional states, yet it is unclear how these associations are influenced by sleep loss. We recruited 34 healthy adults to a partial sleep deprivation (PSD) protocol, where they slept on average 1.7 h less, compared to a period of normal sleep (NS), for 3 consecutive nights. Participants engaged in the finger-tapping random sequence generation task that provided two objective measures of EF performance, the variability in the responses and the entropy of the generated sequences. We assessed participants' momentary affect before and after the task, while subjective reports of attentional states (on-task, MW, MB, and S/D-MW) were assessed during the task. Results indicated that greater sleep loss resulted in more MW, MB, behavioural variability and negative affect, and reduced positive affect. Furthermore, MW episodes were preceded by reduced EF performance only following the PSD, but not after NS. Finally, we found that pre-task positive affect may ameliorate the unfavourable effects of sleep loss on objective and subjective measures of MW. These findings highlight the importance of sufficient sleep in maintaining sustained attention, optimal task performance, and good mood.
One of the central debates in experimental psychology concerns the extent to which information outside conscious awareness can influence behavior. This study aims to assess whether two novel approaches to unconscious perception, a regression-based Bayesian generative model and Sensitivity vs. Awareness curves derived from General Recognition Theory (GRT), produce convergent results when examining the visual processing of briefly presented masked stimuli. While both investigate "unconscious processing," they differ not only in how they define "unconscious" (chance-level discrimination vs. absence of subjective awareness) and "processing" (priming vs. detection), but also in their underlying mathematical frameworks. To investigate this, we examined the grouping of local elements into global shapes using two prime-mask stimulus onset asynchronies (SOA): a shorter baseline SOA of 40 ms (Experiment 1) and a longer SOA of 67 ms (Experiment 2). Both methods provided evidence for the unconscious processing of the primes' global shape in Experiment 2. However, while GRT analyses also supported unconscious processing at the shorter 40 ms SOA, the Bayesian generative models produced strong evidence against it. We show that discrepancies between both approaches may arise not only from their operational definitions, but also their underlying mathematical frameworks and validity. While the plausibility of the Goldstein model's assumptions remains debated, preliminary SvA simulations suggest limited robustness of the GRT-based model, warranting caution pending further validation. Although both approaches provide refined tools for studying unconscious perception, persistent methodological challenges remain, highlighting the need for clearer definitions of unconscious processing and more thorough validation of the methods employed.
Philosophical discussions of the "hard problem" often invoke "problem intuitions", as consciousness intuitions and consciousness are believed to be "closely connected" (Chalmers, 2018). Here, I challenge this assumption. In two experiments, I demonstrate that consciousness intuitions are illusory-they shift across different "problem intuitions", akin to perceptual illusions. When presented with a duplication scenario, people do not view consciousness as physical (i.e., they believe that copying one's physical body will not copy one's conscious states). But when probed about a second scenario (that of Mary in the Black-and-White Room), consciousness now seems squarely physical, as people expect Mary's novel experience of color to "show up" in a brain scan. I trace this shift to two psychological biases-intuitive Dualism and Essentialism. The shift in consciousness intuitions demonstrates that consciousness judgments are illusory, and as such, they cannot be trusted to reflect what consciousness is.
Chronic exposure to pesticide residues from large-scale agro-livestock operations remains insufficiently characterized, particularly among rural populations living near industrial pig farming facilities. This study examined the association between co-exposure to organophosphate and pyrethroid pesticide residues in soil and well water and mental health outcomes among adults residing near an industrial pig farming facility in rural Chile. A cross-sectional study was conducted with 82 adults. Peridomestic soil and well water samples were analyzed using gas chromatography–tandem mass spectrometry to detect five pesticides: chlorpyrifos, diazinon, pirimiphos-methyl, cypermethrin, and lambda-cyhalothrin. Mental health outcomes included depressive symptoms, anxiety, emotional affect, and health-related quality of life, assessed with validated instruments. Robust linear regression models were used, adjusting for age, sex, education level, and body mass index. Higher chlorpyrifos concentrations in water were associated with increased depressive symptom scores (β = 0.180; 95% CI: 0.016, 0.345) and lower mental health-related quality of life (β = −0.713; 95% CI: −1.288, − 0.137). Cypermethrin concentrations in water were associated with higher psychological distress (β = 0.324; 95% CI: 0.124, 0.525). In soil, pirimiphos-methyl was positively associated with depressive symptoms (β = 21.29; 95% CI: 1.78, 40.79), whereas cypermethrin showed an inverse association (β = −3.66; 95% CI: −6.99, − 0.33). Lambda-cyhalothrin concentrations in soil were inversely associated with overall quality of life (β = −15.13; 95% CI: −27.42, − 2.84). Male sex was positively associated with overall quality of life (β = 14.96; 95% CI: 3.14, 26.79). These findings indicate associations between environmental pesticide residues in soil and water and multiple dimensions of mental health among rural populations living near industrial pig farming operations. Longitudinal studies are needed to clarify temporal relationships and potential cumulative effects. The online version contains supplementary material available at 10.1038/s41598-026-40098-1.
Time perception is fundamental to human behavior and decision-making, yet its underlying processes remain debated. Interoception and exteroception, as channels of internal bodily and external environmental information, are both implicated in shaping duration perception, but their respective contributions have rarely been directly compared. Here, we employed a dual-task paradigm combining a heartbeat discrimination task with interval production to systematically contrast the effects of interoceptive and exteroceptive processing on timing accuracy and precision. Results revealed distinct patterns between the two channels: although interoceptive and exteroceptive timing showed comparable accuracy, the factors supporting this accuracy differed, with interoceptive perceptual accuracy linked to both perceptual and metacognitive indicators, whereas exteroceptive perceptual accuracy was not predicted by either. By contrast, the two channels diverged in temporal precision, with interoceptive timing becoming more precise at longer intervals and shaped by both metacognitive and perceptual indicators, while exteroceptive precision depended primarily on perceptual performance. These findings suggest that the brain achieves similar behavioral outcomes while relying on different patterns of perceptual and metacognitive involvement optimized for channels with different signal-to-noise profiles, consistent with predictive coding accounts. Future research should investigate the neural and computational bases of these partially separable mechanisms.
The locus coeruleus-norepinephrine (LC-NE) system plays a key role in regulating attention through phasic activation that enhances the processing of task-relevant stimuli. The present study assessed phasic activity by comparing pupil dilations across two attentional conditions: a high-demand discrimination task and a low-demand localization task, matched for visual input. The difference in response-locked peak pupil size between the two tasks served to isolate transient, task-evoked phasic related activity while minimizing baseline and perceptual confounds. To complement this paradigm with greater ecological validity, participants also completed the MOXO-d-CPT, a continuous performance task incorporating realistic visual and auditory distractors, yielding separate indices of attentiveness, impulsivity, hyperactivity, and timeliness. As expected, discrimination conditions elicited greater pupil dilation and showed increased attention demand. Exploratory correlation analysis revealed a significant association between response-locked phasic pupil responses and the MOXO attentiveness index, suggesting that individual differences in phasic LC-NE activity may relate to the ability to maintain performance under distraction. No significant associations were observed with the remaining MOXO indices; direct comparisons revealed that the attentiveness correlation differed significantly from the timeliness and hyperactivity correlations, but not from the impulsivity correlation; however, the present sample provides sufficient power only for detecting large effects. By combining two complementary paradigms, the study provides a more nuanced understanding of the functional role of phasic LC-NE activity. The findings offer initial evidence consistent with the involvement of phasic LC-NE activity in momentary attentional filtering rather than general attentional regulation, though research with larger samples is needed to establish generalizability.
Reports of Extrasensory Perception (ESP)-like experiences have been associated with altered temporal sensitivity, sense of agency, and alpha-band neural activity. However, evidence for these associations has been drawn largely from clinical or clinically enriched samples, limiting understanding of whether similar processes characterize individuals recruited outside explicitly clinical contexts who report persistent ESP-like experiences. The present study compared an ESP-like experience group, comprising individuals reporting persistent ESP-like experiences and no self-reported psychiatric diagnosis, with a non-ESP comparison group, comprising participants who did not report such experiences. Participants completed behavioural measures of temporal sensitivity (double-flash illusion) and sense of agency (judgement of agency), together with resting-state Electroencephalography (EEG) measures of posterior alpha power and Individual Alpha Frequency (IAF). A subset of participants in the ESP-like experience group also completed EEG during a self-reported active ESP-like state. Relative to the non-ESP comparison group, the ESP-like experience group showed reduced temporal sensitivity and a broader SoA window, consistent with broader temporal integration across perceptual and agentive domains. Resting-state EEG further revealed higher posterior alpha power and higher IAF in the ESP-like experience group. Multivariate analyses indicated that temporal sensitivity uniquely predicted group membership, whereas alpha measures explained shared, but not independent, variance. Exploratory within-participant analyses additionally suggested state-dependent modulation of alpha dynamics, with higher IAF during the active ESP-like state than during rest. These findings indicate that persistent ESP-like experiences in a sample recruited outside explicitly clinical contexts are associated with altered temporal integration and alpha-band dynamics.