Semantic classes can be either things (objects with a well-defined shape, e.g. car, person) or stuff (amorphous background regions, e.g. grass, sky). While lots of classification and detection works focus on thing classes, less attention has been given to stuff classes. Nonetheless, stuff classes are important as they allow to explain important aspects of an image, including (1) scene type; (2) which thing classes are likely to be present and their location (through contextual reasoning); (3) physical attributes, material types and geometric properties of the scene. To understand stuff and things in context we introduce COCO-Stuff1, which augments all 164K images of the COCO 2017 dataset with pixel-wise annotations for 91 stuff classes. We introduce an efficient stuff annotation protocol based on superpixels, which leverages the original thing annotations. We quantify the speed versus quality trade-off of our protocol and explore the relation between annotation time and boundary complexity. Furthermore, we use COCO-Stuff to analyze: (a) the importance of stuff and thing classes in terms of their surface cover and how frequently they are mentioned in image captions; (b) the spatial relations between stuff and things, highlighting the rich contextual relations that make our dataset unique; (c) the performance of a modern semantic segmentation method on stuff and thing classes, and whether stuff is easier to segment than things.
The most deliberate part of first-language teaching is the business of telling a child what each thing is called. We ordinarily speak of the name of a thing as if there were just one, but in fact, of course, every referent has many names. The dime in my pocket is not only a dime. It is also money, a metal object, a thing, and, moving to subordinates, it is a 1952 dime, in fact a particular 1952 dime with a unique pattern of scratches, discolorations, and smooth places. When such an object is named for a very young child how is it called? It may be named money or dime but probably not metal object, thing, 1952 dime, or particular 1952 dime. The dog out on the lawn is not only a dog but is also a boxer, a quadruped, an animate being; it is the landlord's dog, named Prince. How will it be identified for a child? Sometimes it will be called a dog, sometimes Prince, less often a boxer, and almost never a quadruped, or animate being. Listening to many adults name things for many children, I find that their choices are quite uniform and that I can anticipate them from my own inclinations. How are these choices determined and what are their consequences for the cognitive development of the child? Adults have notions about the kind of language appropriate for use with children. Especially strong and universal is the belief that children have trouble pronouncing long names and so should always be given the shortest possible names. A word is preferable to a phrase and, among words, a monosyllable is better than a polysyllable. This predicts the preference for dog and Prince over boxer, quadruped, and animate being. It predicts the choice of dime over metal object and particular 1952 dime. Zipf (10) has shown that the length of a word (in phonemes or syllables) is inversely related to its frequency in the printed language. Consequently the shorter names for any thing will usually also be the most frequently used names for that thing, and so it would seem that the choice of a name is usually predictable from either frequency or brevity. The monosyllables dog and Prince have much higher frequencies according to the Thorndike-Lorge list (8) than do the polysyllables boxer, quadruped, and animate being. It sometimes happens, however, that the frequency-brevity principle makes the wrong prediction. The thing called a pineapple is also fruit. Fruit is the shorter and more frequent term, but adults will name the thing pineapple. Similarly they will say apple, banana, orange, and even pomegranate; all of them longer and less frequent words than the perfectly appropriate fruit. Brevity seems not to be the powerful determinant we had imagined. The frequency principle can survive this kind of example, but only if it is separated from counts like the Thorndike-Lorge of over-all frequency in the printed language. On the whole the word fruit appears more often than the word pineapple (and also is shorter), but we may confidently assume that, when pineapples are being named, the word pineapple is more frequent than the word fruit. This, of course, is a kind of frequency more directly relevant to our problem. Word counts of general usage are only very roughly applicable to the prediction of what will be said when
Three meanings of “information” are distinguished: “Information-as-process”; “information-as-knowledge”; and “information-as-thing,” the attributive use of “information” to denote things regarded as informative. The nature and characteristics of “information-as-thing” are discussed, using an indirect approach (“What things are informative?”). Varieties of “information-as-thing” include data, text, documents, objects, and events. On this view “information” includes but extends beyond communication. Whatever information storage and retrieval systems store and retrieve is necessarily “information-as-thing.” These three meanings of “information,” along with “information processing,” offer a basis for classifying disparate information-related activities (e.g., rhetoric, bibliographic retrieval, statistical analysis) and, thereby, suggest a topography for “information science.” © 1991 John Wiley & Sons, Inc.
List of Illustrations and Tables Preface 1. Instrument Epistemology 2. Models: Representing Things 3. Working Knowledge 4. Encapsulating Knowledge 5. The Instrumentation Revolution 6. Thing Knowledge 7. The Thing-y-ness of Things 8. Between Technology and Science 9. Instrumental Objectivity 10. The Gift References Index
Humanity has sat at the center of philosophical thinking for too long. The recent advent of environmental philosophy and posthuman studies has widened our scope of inquiry to include ecosystems, animals, and artificial intelligence. Yet the vast majority of the stuff in our universe, and even in our lives, remains beyond serious philosophical concern. This book develops an object-oriented ontology that puts things at the center of being—a philosophy in which nothing exists any more or less than anything else, in which humans are elements but not the sole or even primary elements of philosophical interest. And unlike experimental phenomenology or the philosophy of technology, this book’s alien phenomenology takes for granted that all beings interact with and perceive one another. This experience, however, withdraws from human comprehension and becomes accessible only through a speculative philosophy based on metaphor.
To paraphrase Cole Porter's famous 1926 song, "What is this thing called pain? This funny thing called pain, just who can solve its mystery?" Pain, like love, is all consuming: when you have it, not much else matters, and there is nothing you can do about it. Unlike love, however, we are actually beginning to tease apart the mystery of pain. The substantial progress made over the last decade in revealing the genes, molecules, cells, and circuits that determine the sensation of pain offers new opportunities to manage it, as revealed in this Review series by some of the foremost experts in the field.
this paper to show that this counter-response cannot be sustained and that the original argument against identity should therefore be allowed to stand. This is no easy task since there would appear to be nothing in the immediate linguistic data to settle the question one way or the other. However, by working through the consequences of the counter-response for the rest of our language, I think it may be shown to be extremely implausible. The paper is in two main parts. The first (sections --) is largely concerned with setting up the problem. We characterize the dierent forms the identity theory can take (section ), explain how the argument in favour of non-identity might in principle break down (section ), present the most plausible versions of such arguments (section ), and then consider the most plausible counter-response to them (section ). The second part (sections --) embarks on a detailed investigation of the diculties with the counter-response. It is shown to be unable to account for a wide variety of dierent linguistic data, that is loosely classified according as to how reference to a material thing might be achieved. Four main kinds of case will be considered: those in which a sort is explicitly invoked (section ); those in which it is implicitly invoked (section \t); those in which the very notion of reference is itself used in securing reference (section ); and those in which there is reference to a plurality of things (section )
Purpose The purpose of this paper is to compare theoretical conceptions that reclaim and re‐think material practice – “the thing” in the social and personal mix – specifically in terms of work activity and what is construed to be learning in that activity. Design/methodology/approach The paper is theory‐based. Three perspectives have been selected for discussion: cultural‐historical activity theory (CHAT), actor‐network theory (ANT), and complexity theory. A comparative approach is used to examine these three conceptual framings in the context of their uptake in learning research to explore their diverse contributions and limitations on questions of agency, power, difference, and the presence of the “thing”. Findings The three perspectives bear some similarities in their conceptualization of knowledge and capabilities as emerging – simultaneously with identities, policies, practices and environment – in webs of interconnections between heterogeneous things, human and nonhuman. Yet each illuminates very different facets of the sociomaterial in work‐learning that can afford important understandings: about how subjectivities are produced in work, how knowledge circulates and sediments into formations of power, and how practices are configured and re‐configured. Each also signals, in different ways, what generative possibilities may exist for counter‐configurations and alternative identities in spaces and places of work. Originality/value While some dialogue has occurred among ANT and CHAT, this has not been developed to compare more broadly the metaphysics and approaches of these perspectives, along with complexity theory which is receiving growing attention in organizational research contexts. The paper purports to introduce the nature of these debates to work‐learning researchers and point to their implications for opening useful questions and methods for inquiry in workplace learning.
Presented as the authentic testimony of the disenfranchised, the colonised, and the oppressed, has in the last two decades emerged as one of the most significant genres of Latin America's post-boom literature. In the political battles that have taken place around the formation of the canon, the testimonio holds a special place: no other single genre of literature has taken up such a large part of current debate. Initially hailed in the 1970s as a genuine form of resistance literature, testimonio has since undergone a significant change in its critical reception. The essays in The 'Real' Thing analyse the testimonio, its history, and its place in contemporary consciousness. Although the literature of testimony arose on the margins of institutional power and its ends were in large part political change, the canonisation of testimonio by the academic Left has moved it from margin to centre, ironically bringing about the institutionalisation of its transgressive and counter-hegemonic qualities. Discussing Latin American works ranging from Salvadorian writer Roque Dalton's Miguel Marmol to I...Rigoberta Menchu, a work that earned its author a Nobel Prize, this collection explores how critical writing about testimonio has turned into discourse about the institution of academia, the canon, postmodernism and postcolonialism, and the status of Latin American studies generally. The 'Real' Thing provides a view of a particularly revealing moment in contemporary literary history and a perspective on the place of the intellectual within the academic institution. It will be of interest to scholars and students of Latin American studies, postcolonial studies, anthropology, and comparative literature. Contributors: John Beverley, Santiago Colas, Georg M. Gugelberger, Barbara Harlow, Fredric Jameson, Alberto Moreiras, Margaret Randall, Javier Sanjines, Elzbieta Sklodowska, Doris Sommer, Gareth Williams, George Yudice, and Marc Zimmerman.
In an era when much of what passes for debate is merely moral posturing--traditional family values versus the cultural elite, free speech versus censorship--or reflexive name-calling--the terms and correct, are used with as much dismissive scorn by the right as reactionary and fascist are by the left--Stanley Fish would seem an unlikely lightning rod for controversy. A renowned scholar of Milton, head of the English Department of Duke University, Fish has emerged as a brilliantly original critic of the culture at large, praised and pilloried as a vigorous debunker of the pieties of both the left and right. His mission is not win the cultural wars that preoccupy the nation's attention, but rather redefine the terms of battle. In There's No Such Thing as Free Speech, Fish takes aim at the ideological gridlock paralyzing academic and political exchange in the nineties. In his witty, accessible dissections of the swirling controversies over multiculturalism, affirmative action, canon revision, hate speech, and legal reform, he neatly eviscerates both the conservatives' claim possession of timeless, transcendent values (the timeless transcendence of which they themselves have conveniently identified), and the intellectual left's icons of equality, tolerance, and non-discrimination. He argues that while conservative ideologues and liberal stalwarts might disagree vehemently on what is essential a culture, or a curriculum, both mistakenly believe that what is essential can be identified apart from the accidental circumstances (of time and history) which the essential is ritually opposed. In the book's first section, which includes the five essays written for Fish's celebrated debates with Dinesh D'Souza (the author and former Reagan White House policy analyst), Fish turns his attention the neoconservative backlash. In his introduction, Fish writes, Terms that come us wearing the label 'apolitical'--'common values', 'fairness', 'merit', 'color blind', 'free speech', 'reason'--are in fact the ideologically charged constructions of a decidedly political agenda. I make the point not in order level an accusation, but remove the sting of accusation from the world 'politics' and redefine it as a synonym for what everyone inevitably does. Fish maintains that the debate over political correctness is an artificial one, because it is simply not possible for any party or individual occupy a position above or beyond politics. Regarding the controversy over the revision of the college curriculum, Fish argues that the point is not try insist that inclusion of ethnic and gender studies is not a political decision, but to point out that any alternative curriculum--say a diet of exclusively Western or European texts--would be no less politically invested. In Part Two, Fish follows the implications of his arguments a surprising rejection of the optimistic claims of the intellectual left that awareness of the historical roots of our beliefs and biases can allow us, as individuals or as a society, escape or transcend them. Specifically, he turns the movement for reform of legal studies, and insists that a dream of a legal culture in which no one's values are slighted or declared peripheral can no more be realized than the dream of a concept of fairness that answers everyone's notions of equality and jsutice, or a yardstick of merit that is true everyone's notions of worth and substance. Similarly, he argues that attempts politicize the study of literature are ultimately misguided, because recharacterizations of literary works have absolutely no impact on the mainstream of political life. He concludes his critique of the academy with The Unbearable Ugliness of Volvos, an extraordinary look at some of the more puzzing, if not out-and-out masochistic, characteristics of a life in academia. Penetrating, fearless, and brilliantly argued, There's No Such Thing as Free Speech captures the essential Fish. It is must reading for anyone who cares about the outcome of America's cultural wars.
Abstract Most perceptions of interactivity are that it is an inherently good thing, that it will change marketing and advertising as we know it. However, though there are obvious and intuitive advantages to interactivity, it may pose a disadvantage for marketing and advertising in some conditions. In this article, we explore the nature of interactivity and its underlying processes to determine the conditions in which interactivity may be both useful and detrimental in an advertising context. We first discuss the multidimensional nature of the interactivity construct as it has appeared in the literature. We then provide a concrete conceptualization and definition of interactivity that encompasses these various dimensions. We argue that inconsistencies between the definitions and operationalizations found in previous studies make it difficult to draw firm conclusions about the role of interactivity but that these inconsistencies can be at least partly explained by a focus on the different dimensions of interactivity. Finally, drawing on theory and research in cognitive, social, and personality psychology, we suggest that the influence of interactivity on advertising effectiveness may be a function of both the person and the situation. We offer a program of research, in the form of testable propositions, to explore these boundary conditions and discuss implications for Internet advertising strategy.
We report on our experience with an approach to debriefing that emphasizes disclosing instructors' judgments and eliciting trainees' assumptions about the situation and their reasons for acting as they did. To highlight the importance of instructors disclosing their judgment skillfully, we call the approach "debriefing with good judgment." The approach draws on theory and empirical findings from a 35-year research program in the behavioral sciences on how to improve professional effectiveness through "reflective practice." This approach specifies a rigorous self-reflection process that helps trainees recognize and resolve pressing clinical and behavioral dilemmas raised by the simulation and the judgment of the instructor. The "debriefing with good judgment" approach is comprised of three elements. The first element is a conceptual model drawn from cognitive science. It stipulates that the trainees' "frames"--comprised of such things as knowledge, assumptions, and feelings--drive their actions. The actions, in turn, produce clinical results in a scenario. By uncovering the trainee's internal frame, the instructor can help the learner reframe internal assumptions and feelings and take action to achieve better results in the future. The second element is a stance of genuine curiosity about the trainee's frames. Presuming that the trainee's actions are an inevitable result of their frames, the instructor's job is that of a "cognitive detective" who tries to discover, through inquiry, what those frames are. The instructor establishes a "stance of curiosity" in which the trainees' mistakes are puzzles to be solved rather than simply erroneous. Finally, the approach includes a conversational technique designed to bring the judgment of the instructor and the frames of the trainee to light. The technique pairs advocacy and inquiry. Advocacy is a type of speech that includes an objective observation about and subjective judgment of the trainees' actions. Inquiry is a genuinely curious question that attempts to illuminate the trainee's frame in relation to the action described in the instructor's advocacy. We find that the approach helps instructors manage the apparent tension between sharing critical, evaluative judgments while maintaining a trusting relationship with trainees.
A growing body of empirical evidence in the management literature suggests that antecedent variables widely accepted as leading to desirable consequences actually lead to negative outcomes. These increasingly pervasive and often countertheoretical findings permeate levels of analysis (i.e., from micro to macro) and management subfields (e.g., organizational behavior, strategic management). Although seemingly unrelated, the authors contend that this body of empirical research can be accounted for by a meta-theoretical principle they call the too-much-of-a-good-thing effect (TMGT effect). The authors posit that, due to the TMGT effect, all seemingly monotonic positive relations reach context-specific inflection points after which the relations turn asymptotic and often negative, resulting in an overall pattern of curvilinearity. They illustrate how the TMGT effect provides a meta-theoretical explanation for a host of seemingly puzzling results in key areas of organizational behavior (e.g., leadership, personality), human resource management (e.g., job design, personnel selection), entrepreneurship (e.g., new venture planning, firm growth rate), and strategic management (e.g., diversification, organizational slack). Finally, the authors discuss implications of the TMGT effect for theory development, theory testing, and management practice.
The recent surge in the utilization of semiconductor nanostructures for solar energy conversion has led to the development of high-efficiency solar cells. Some of these recent advances are in the areas of synthesis of new semiconductor materials and the ability to tune the electronic properties through size, shape, and composition and to assemble quantum dots as hybrid assemblies. In addition, processes such as hot electron injection, multiple exciton generation (MEG), plasmonic effects, and energy-transfer-coupled electron transfer are gaining momentum to overcome the efficiency limitations of energy capture and conversion. The recent advances as well as future prospects of quantum dot solar cells discussed in this perspective provide the basis for consideration as "The Next Big Thing" in photovoltaics.
Abstract This paradox is the possibility of P(A|B) <P(A|B') even though P(A|B)≥P(A| B') both under the additional condition C and under the complement C' of that condition. Details are given on why this can happen and how extreme the inequalities can be. An example shows that Savage's sure-thing principle (“If you would definitely prefer g to f, either knowing that the event C obtained, or knowing that C did not obtain, then you definitely prefer g to f.”) is not applicable to alternatives f and g that involve sequential operations.
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Why is there so much violence in the developing countries? What does it have to do with economic development? What does it have to do with globalisation? In addressing these and other questions, Christopher Cramer takes a broad comparative approach, from recent wars, insurgencies and violence in Angola, Brazil, and Iraq to the American War, showing how wars have been paid for throughout history. He also compares post-conflict reconstruction efforts in Mozambique and Iraq with how nineteenth-century America and twentieth-century Europe rebuilt their shattered societies and economies. Civil War is Not a Stupid Thing takes issue with two common perspectives on violence and war. The first is the liberal interpretation, according to which war is exclusively negative in its effects and peace is easily achieved through democratisation and free trade. In this view, modern liberal market democracies have outgrown violence, and only resort to it in self-defence. The second is a romantic, utopian view of violence. Transposed into political rhetoric, these two views are often directly opposed, as they are nowadays in Iraq and in the 'War on Terror'. Cramer's book forges an alternative way of understanding the role of violence in the transition to capitalism and a global economy.
Don Mitchell, There's No Such Thing as Culture: Towards a Reconceptualization of the Idea of Culture in Geography, Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers, Vol. 20, No. 1 (1995), pp. 102-116
In animal breeding, Best Linear Unbiased Prediction, or BLUP, is a technique for estimating genetic merits. In general, it is a method of estimating random effects. It can be used to derive the Kalman filter, the method of Kriging used for ore reserve estimation, credibility theory used to work out insurance premiums, and Hoadley's quality measurement plan used to estimate a quality index. It can be used for removing noise from images and for small-area estimation. This paper presents the theory of BLUP, some examples of its application and its relevance to the foundations of statistics. Understanding of procedures for estimating random effects should help people to understand some complicated and controversial issues about fixed and random effects models and also help to bridge the apparent gulf between the Bayesian and Classical schools of thought.