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Measuring the perception of visual content is a long-standing problem in computer vision. Many mathematical models have been developed to evaluate the look or quality of an image. Despite the effectiveness of such tools in quantifying degradations such as noise and blurriness levels, such quantification is loosely coupled with human language. When it comes to more abstract perception about the feel of visual content, existing methods can only rely on supervised models that are explicitly trained with labeled data collected via laborious user study. In this paper, we go beyond the conventional paradigms by exploring the rich visual language prior encapsulated in Contrastive Language-Image Pre-training (CLIP) models for assessing both the quality perception (look) and abstract perception (feel) of images without explicit task-specific training. In particular, we discuss effective prompt designs and show an effective prompt pairing strategy to harness the prior. We also provide extensive experiments on controlled datasets and Image Quality Assessment (IQA) benchmarks. Our results show that CLIP captures meaningful priors that generalize well to different perceptual assessments.

Although often confused, imagining how another feels and imagining how you would feel are two distinct forms of perspective taking with different emotional consequences. The former evokes empathy; the latter, both empathy and distress. To test this claim, undergraduates listened to a (bogus) pilot radio interview with a young woman in serious need. One third were instructed to remain objective while listening; one third, to imagine how the young woman felt; and one third, to imagine how they would feel in her situation. The two imagine perspectives produced the predicted distinct pattern of emotions, suggesting different motivational consequences: Imagining how the other feels produced empathy, which has been found to evoke altruistic motivation; imagining how you would feel produced empathy, but it also produced personal distress, which has been found to evoke egoistic motivation.

The feeling of body ownership is a fundamental aspect of self-consciousness. The underlying neural mechanisms can be studied by using the illusion where a person is made to feel that a rubber hand is his or her own hand by brushing the person's hidden real hand and synchronously brushing the artificial hand that is in full view. Here we show that threat to the rubber hand can induce a similar level of activity in the brain areas associated with anxiety and interoceptive awareness (insula and anterior cingulate cortex) as when the person's real hand is threatened. We further show that the stronger the feeling of ownership of the artificial hand, the stronger the threat-evoked neuronal responses in the areas reflecting anxiety. Furthermore, across subjects, activity in multisensory areas reflecting ownership predicted the activity in the interoceptive system when the hand was under threat. Finally, we show that there is activity in medial wall motor areas, reflecting an urge to withdraw the artificial hand when it is under threat. These findings suggest that artificial limbs can evoke the same feelings as real limbs and provide objective neurophysiological evidence that the rubber hand is fully incorporated into the body. These findings are of fundamental importance because they suggest that the feeling of body ownership is associated with changes in the interoceptive systems.

Why do we feel the way we feel? How do our thoughts and emotions affect our health? Are our bodies and minds distinct from each other or do they function together as parts of an interconnected system? In her groundbreaking book Molecules of Emotion, Candace Pert -- a neuroscientist whose extraordinary career began with her 1972 discovery of the opiate receptor -- provides startling and decisive answers to these and other challenging questions that scientists and philosophers have pondered for centuries.Her pioneering research on how the chemicals inside our bodies form a dynamic information network, linking mind and body, is not only provocative, it is revolutionary. By establishing the biomolecular basis for our emotions and explaining these new scientific developments in a clear and accessible way, Pert empowers us to understand ourselves, our feelings, and the connection between our minds and our bodies -- or bodyminds -- in ways we could never have imagined before. From explaining how there is a scientific basis to popular wisdom about phenomena such as 'gut feelings, ' to making recent breakthroughs in cancer and AIDS research comprehensible, Pert provides us with an intellectual adventure of the highest order.The journey Pert takes us on in Molecules of Emotion is one of personal as well as scientific discovery. Woven into her lucid explanations of the science underlying her work is the remarkable story of how, faced with personal and professional obstacles, she has grown as a woman and a mother and how her personal and spiritual development has made possible her remarkable scientific career. Molecules of Emotion is a landmark work, full of insight and wisdom andpossessing that rare power to change the way we see the world and ourselves. Pert's striking conclusion that it is our emotions and their biological components that establish the crucial link between mind and body does not, however, serve to repudiate modern medicine's gains; rather, her findings complement existing techniques by offering a new scientific understanding of the power of our minds and our feelings to affect our health and well-being.

It is typically assumed that people always want to feel good. Recent evidence, however, demonstrates that people want to feel unpleasant emotions, such as anger or fear, when these emotions promote the attainment of their long-term goals. If emotions are regulated for instrumental reasons, people should want to feel pleasant emotions when immediate benefits outweigh future benefits, but when future benefits outweigh immediate benefits, people may prefer to feel useful emotions, even if they are unpleasant. In this article, I describe an instrumental account of emotion regulation, review empirical evidence relevant to it, and discuss its implications for promoting adaptive emotional experiences.

People experience regulatory fit (E. T. Higgins, 2000) when the strategic manner of their goal pursuit suits their regulatory orientation, and this regulatory fit feels right. Fit violation feels wrong. Four studies tested the proposal that experiences of fit can transfer to moral evaluations. The authors examined transfer of feeling wrong from fit violation by having participants in a promotion or prevention focus recall transgressions of commission or omission (Studies 1 and 2). Both studies found that when the type of transgression was a fit violation, participants expressed more guilt. Studies 3 and 4 examined transfer of feeling right from regulatory fit. Participants evaluated conflict resolutions (Study 3) and public policies (Study 4) as more right when the means pursued had fit.

Only humans can report feeling pain. In contrast, pain in animals is typically inferred on the basis of nonverbal behaviour. Unfortunately, these behavioural data can be problematic when the reliability and validity of the behavioural tests are questionable. The thesis proposed here is based on the bioengineering principle that structure determines function. Basic functional homologies can be mapped to structural homologies across a broad spectrum of vertebrate species. For example, olfaction depends on olfactory glomeruli in the olfactory bulbs of the forebrain, visual orientation responses depend on the laminated optic tectum in the midbrain, and locomotion depends on pattern generators in the spinal cord throughout vertebrate phylogeny, from fish to humans. Here I delineate the region of the human brain that is directly responsible for feeling painful stimuli. The principal structural features of this region are identified and then used as biomarkers to infer whether fish are, at least, anatomically capable of feeling pain. Using this strategy, I conclude that fish lack the necessary neurocytoarchitecture, microcircuitry, and structural connectivity for the neural processing required for feeling pain.

Cellular organization within a multicellular organism requires that a cell assess its relative location, taking in multiple cues from its microenvironment. Given that the extracellular matrix (ECM) consists of the most abundant proteins in animals and contributes both structure and elasticity to tissues, ECM probably provides key physical cues to cells. In vivo, in the vicinity of many tissue cell types, fibrous characteristics of the ECM are less discernible than the measurably distinct elasticity that characterizes different tissue microenvironments. As a cell engages matrix and actively probes, it senses the local elastic resistance of the ECM and nearby cells via their deformation, and--similar to the proverbial princess who feels a pea placed many mattresses below--the cell seems to possess feedback and recognition mechanisms that establish how far it can feel. Recent experimental findings and computational modeling of cell and matrix mechanics lend insight into the subcellular range of sensitivity. Continuity of deformation from the matrix into the cell and further into the cytoskeleton-caged and -linked nucleus also supports the existence of mechanisms that direct processes such as gene expression in the differentiation of stem cells. Ultimately, cells feel the difference between stiff or soft and thick or thin surroundings, regardless of whether or not they are of royal descent.

Tissue cells lack the ability to see or hear but have evolved mechanisms to feel into their surroundings and sense a collective stiffness. A cell can even sense the effective stiffness of rigid objects that are not in direct cellular contact - like the proverbial princess who feels a pea placed beneath soft mattresses. How deeply a cell feels into a matrix can be measured by assessing cell responses on a controlled series of thin and elastic gels that are affixed to a rigid substrate. Gel elasticity E is readily varied with polymer concentrations of now-standard polyacrylamide hydrogels, but to eliminate wrinkling and detachment of thin gels from an underlying glass coverslip, vinyl groups are bonded to the glass before polymerization. Gel thickness is nominally specified using micron-scale beads that act as spacers, but gels swell after polymerization as measured by z-section, confocal microscopy of fluorescent gels. Atomic force microscopy (AFM) is used to measure E at gel surfaces, employing stresses and strains that are typically generated by cells and yielding values for E that span a broad range of tissue microenvironments. To illustrate cell sensitivities to a series of thin-to-thick gels, the adhesive spreading of mesenchymal stem cells was measured on gel mimics of a very soft tissue (eg. brain, E ~ 1 kPa). Initial results show that cells increasingly respond to the rigidity of an underlying 'hidden' surface starting at about 10-20 microm gel thickness with a characteristic tactile length of less than about 5 microm.

Three experiments are presented that evaluate the feeling scale (FS) as a measure of affect during exercise. In Experiment 1,.subjects were instructed to check adjectives on the MAACL-R that they would associate with either a "good" or a "bad" feeling during exercise. As predicted, discriminant function analysis indicated that the good/bad dimension of the FS appears to represent a core of emotional expression. In Experiment 2, subjects rated how they felt during exercise at a rate of perceived exertion (RPE) of 11, 15, and 19. There was considerable heterogeneity in FS for each given RPE. Moreover, RPEs and FS ratings were only moderately correlated, r= - .56, suggesting that phenomenologically the two constructs are not isomorphic. Experiment 3 involved three 4-min bouts of exercise at 30, 60, and 90% V0 2 max. Assessed were pre- and post-exercise affect as. .well as RPEs, responses to the FS, V e , RR, and VO 2 . Results revealed that RPE and the FS were moderately related, but only at easy and hard workloads. FS ratings evidenced greater variability as metabolic demands increased, and RPEs consistently had stronger ties to physiologic cues than responses to the FS. The theoretical and pragmatic implications of these data are discussed.

The authors investigated whether people can feel happy and sad at the same time. J. A. Russell and J. M. Carroll's (1999) circumplex model holds that happiness and sadness are polar opposites and, thus, mutually exclusive. In contrast, the evaluative space model (J. T. Cacioppo & G. G. Berntson, 1994) proposes that positive and negative affect are separable and that mixed feelings of happiness and sadness can co-occur. The authors both replicated and extended past research by showing that whereas most participants surveyed in typical situations felt either happy or sad, many participants surveyed immediately after watching the film Life Is Beautiful, moving out of their dormitories, or graduating from college felt both happy and sad. Results suggest that although affective experience may typically be bipolar, the underlying processes, and occasionally the resulting experience of emotion, are better characterized as bivariate.

Elizabeth Wolfe Morrison, Sandra L. Robinson, When Employees Feel Betrayed: A Model of How Psychological Contract Violation Develops, The Academy of Management Review, Vol. 22, No. 1 (Jan., 1997), pp. 226-256

Common sense suggests that consumers make more satisfying decisions as they consider their options more closely. Yet we argue that such close consideration can have undesirable consequences because it may induce attachment to the options—a sense of prefactual ownership of the choice options. When consumers then select one option, they effectively lose this prefactual possession of the other, nonchosen options. This yields a feeling of discomfort (“choosing feels like losing”) and an increase in the attractiveness of the forgone option, compared to its appeal before the choice. A series of nine experiments provides evidence of this phenomenon and support for our explanation.

Abstract We review studies claiming that fish feel pain and find deficiencies in the methods used for pain identification, particularly for distinguishing unconscious detection of injurious stimuli (nociception) from conscious pain. Results were also frequently misinterpreted and not replicable, so claims that fish feel pain remain unsubstantiated. Comparable problems exist in studies of invertebrates. In contrast, an extensive literature involving surgeries with fishes shows normal feeding and activity immediately or soon after surgery. C fiber nociceptors, the most prevalent type in mammals and responsible for excruciating pain in humans, are rare in teleosts and absent in elasmobranchs studied to date. A‐delta nociceptors, not yet found in elasmobranchs, but relatively common in teleosts, likely serve rapid, less noxious injury signaling, triggering escape and avoidance responses. Clearly, fishes have survived well without the full range of nociception typical of humans or other mammals, a circumstance according well with the absence of the specialized cortical regions necessary for pain in humans. We evaluate recent claims for consciousness in fishes, but find these claims lack adequate supporting evidence, neurological feasibility, or the likelihood that consciousness would be adaptive. Even if fishes were conscious, it is unwarranted to assume that they possess a human‐like capacity for pain. Overall, the behavioral and neurobiological evidence reviewed shows fish responses to nociceptive stimuli are limited and fishes are unlikely to experience pain.

Stigmatization is defined as having a discrediting mark that leads to social discrimination and alienation. The aim of this study was to estimate the level of stigmatization experienced by patients with psoriasis. A total of 102 individuals with psoriasis were recruited and was assessed using the 6-item Stigmatization Scale and the 33-item Feelings of Stigmatization Questionnaire. In addition, quality of life, stress and depression were evaluated. The majority of patients felt that they were stigmatized by psoriasis. The most bothersome aspect was that other people stared at their skin changes. According to the 33-item questionnaire, anticipation of rejection and feelings of guilt and shame were the major aspects of stigmatization, the level of which correlated significantly with pruritus intensity, stress prior to exacerbation, depressive symptoms and quality of life. In order to decrease the stigmatization level in patients with psoriasis, greater effort is needed to raise awareness in contemporary societies that psoriasis is not contagious, but is a disease like many other chronic conditions.

When and why do power holders seek to harm other people? The present research examined the idea that aggression among the powerful is often the result of a threatened ego. Four studies demonstrated that individuals with power become aggressive when they feel incompetent in the domain of power. Regardless of whether power was measured in the workplace (Studies 1 and 4), manipulated via role recall (Study 2), or assigned in the laboratory (Study 3), it was associated with heightened aggression when paired with a lack of self-perceived competence. As hypothesized, this aggression appeared to be driven by ego threat: Aggressiveness was eliminated among participants whose sense of self-worth was boosted (Studies 3 and 4). Taken together, these findings suggest that (a) power paired with self-perceived incompetence leads to aggression, and (b) this aggressive response is driven by feelings of ego defensiveness. Implications for research on power, competence, and aggression are discussed.

Why do people's impulse controls break down during emotional distress? Some theories propose that distress impairs one's motivation or one's ability to exert self-control, and some postulate self-destructive intentions arising from the moods. Contrary to those theories, Three experiments found that believing that one's bad mood was frozen (unchangeable) eliminated the tendency to eat fattening snacks (Experiment 1), seek immediate gratification (Experiment 2), and engage in frivolous procrastination (Experiment 3). The implication is that when people are upset, they indulge immediate impulses to make themselves feel better, which amounts to giving short-term affect regulation priority over other self-regulatory goals.

Nonverbal cues are an inherent component of most persuasive appeals. We use regulatory-fit theory as a framework for understanding the effect of nonverbal cues on a message's effectiveness, and as a foundation for developing a new persuasion technique. We propose that when the nonverbal cues of a message source sustain the motivational orientation of the recipient, the recipient experiences regulatory fit and feels right, and that this experience influences the message's effectiveness. Experimental results support these predictions. Participants experiencing regulatory fit (promotion-focus participants viewing messages delivered in an eager nonverbal style, prevention-focus participants viewing messages delivered in a vigilant nonverbal style) had more positive attitudes toward a message's topic and greater intentions to behave in accordance with its recommendation than did participants experiencing nonfit. Feeling right was also greater for participants experiencing fit than for those experiencing nonfit and was associated with greater message effectiveness. Regulatory-fit theory provides a framework for making precise predictions about when and for whom a nonverbal cue will affect persuasion.

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