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The primary way to establish and compare competencies in foundation and generative AI models has shifted from peer-reviewed literature to press releases and company blog posts, where model builders highlight results on selected benchmarks. These artifacts now largely define the state of the art for researchers and the public. Despite their prominence, which benchmarks model builders choose to highlight, and what they communicate through this selection, is underexamined. To investigate, we introduce and open-source Benchmarking-Cultures-25, a dataset of 231 benchmarks highlighted across 139 model releases in 2025 from 11 major AI builders, alongside an interactive tool to explore the data. Our analysis reveals a fragmented evaluation landscape with limited cross-model comparability: 63.2% of highlighted benchmarks are used by a single builder, and 38.5% appear in just one release. Few achieve widespread use (e.g., GPQA Diamond, LiveCodeBench, AIME 2025). Moreover, benchmarks are attributed different competencies by different builders, depending on their narrative. To disentangle these conflicting presentations, we develop a unified taxonomy mapping diverging terminology to a shared

This study investigates the rapid centralization of the Ethereum builder market under the Proposer-Builder Separation (PBS) architecture. We argue that existing research, by focusing predominantly on influential order flows, lacks a comprehensive evaluation of order flow behavioral patterns and economic purposes. To address this gap, we analyze Ethereum transactions from September 2023 to August 2025 to characterize Exclusive Order Flows (EOFs) and non-atomic Maximal Extractable Value (MEV) -- the missing components corresponding to these behavioral and economic dimensions, respectively. We introduce a novel exclusivity metric based on Kullback-Leibler divergence and employ supervised learning to identify 75 EOFs and 322 non-atomic MEV flows, which account for 71\% and 23\% of trading-related builder revenue. A longitudinal analysis of builder strategies across these dimensions delineates the market's evolution into four distinct eras, revealing that while EOFs were instrumental in establishing early dominance, incumbents have since decoupled market share from immediate EOF dependency by leveraging entrenched network effects. Ultimately, we conclude that builder centralization is a

Ethereum, as a representative of Web3, adopts a novel framework called Proposer Builder Separation (PBS) to prevent the centralization of block profits in the hands of institutional Ethereum stakers. Introducing builders to generate blocks based on public transactions, PBS aims to ensure that block profits are distributed among all stakers. Through the auction among builders, only one will win the block in each slot. Ideally, the equilibrium strategy of builders under public information would lead them to bid all block profits. However, builders are now capable of extracting profits from private order flows. In this paper, we explore the effect of PBS with private order flows. Specifically, we propose the asymmetry auction model of MEV-Boost auction. Moreover, we conduct empirical study on Ethereum blocks from January 2023 to May 2024. Our analysis indicates that private order flows contribute to 54.59% of the block value, indicating that different builders will build blocks with different valuations. Interestingly, we find that builders with more private order flows (i.e., higher block valuations) are more likely to win the block, while retain larger proportion of profits. In retu

To address the risks of validator centralization, Proposer-Builder Separation (PBS) was introduced in Ethereum to divide the roles of block building and block proposing, fostering a more equitable and decentralized block production environment. PBS creates a two-sided market in which searchers submit valuable bundles to builders for inclusion in blocks, while builders compete in auctions for block proposals. In this paper, we formulate and analyze a role-selection game that models how profit-seeking participants in PBS strategically choose between acting as searchers or builders, using a co-evolutionary framework to capture the complex interactions and payoff dynamics in this market. Through agent-based simulations, we demonstrate that agents' optimal role-acting as searcher or builder-responds dynamically to the probability of conflict between bundles. Our empirical game-theoretic analysis quantifies the equilibrium frequencies of role selection under different market conditions, revealing that low conflict probabilities lead to equilibria dominated by searchers, while higher probabilities shift equilibrium toward builders. Additionally, bundle conflicts have non-monotonic effects

In blockchain systems operating under the Proof-of-Stake (PoS) consensus mechanism, fairness in transaction processing is essential to preserving decentralization and maintaining user trust. However, with the emergence of Maximal Extractable Value (MEV), concerns about economic centralization and content manipulation have intensified. To address these vulnerabilities, the Ethereum community has introduced Proposer Builder Separation (PBS), which separates block construction from block proposal. Later, enshrined Proposer Builder Separation (ePBS) was also proposed in EIP-7732, which embeds PBS directly into the Ethereum consensus layer. Our work identifies key limitations of ePBS by developing a formal framework that combines mathematical analysis and agent-based simulations to evaluate its auction-based block-building mechanism, with particular emphasis on MEV dynamics. Our results reveal that, although ePBS redistributes responsibilities between builders and proposers, it significantly amplifies profit and content centralization: the Gini coefficient for profits rises from 0.1749 under standard PoS without ePBS to 0.8358 under ePBS. This sharp increase indicates that a small numbe

The current Proposer-Builder Separation (PBS) equilibrium has several builders with different backgrounds winning blocks consistently. This paper considers how that equilibrium will shift when transactions are sold privately via order flow auctions (OFAs) rather than forwarded directly to the public mempool. We discuss a novel model that highlights the augmented value of private order flow for integrated builder searchers. We show that private order flow is complementary to top-of-block opportunities, and therefore integrated builder-searchers are more likely to participate in OFAs and outbid non integrated builders. They will then parlay access to these private transactions into an advantage in the PBS auction, winning blocks more often and extracting higher profits than non-integrated builders. To validate our main assumptions, we construct a novel dataset pairing post-merge PBS outcomes with realized 12-second volatility on a leading CEX (Binance). Our results show that integrated builder-searchers are more likely to win in the PBS auction when realized volatility is high, suggesting that indeed such builders have an advantage in extracting top-of-block opportunities. Our findin

Maximal extractable value (MEV) in which block proposers unethically gain profits by manipulating the order in which transactions are included within a block, is a key challenge facing blockchains such as Ethereum today. Left unchecked, MEV can lead to a centralization of stake distribution thereby ultimately compromising the security of blockchain consensus. To preserve proposer decentralization (and hence security) of the blockchain, Ethereum has advocated for a proposer-builder separation (PBS) in which the functionality of transaction ordering is separated from proposers and assigned to separate entities called builders. Builders accept transaction bundles from searchers, who compete to find the most profitable bundles. Builders then bid completed blocks to proposers, who accept the most profitable blocks for publication. The auction mechanisms used between searchers, builders and proposers are crucial to the overall health of the blockchain. In this paper, we consider PBS design in Ethereum as a game between searchers, builders and proposers. A key novelty in our design is the inclusion of future block proposers, as all proposers of an epoch are decided ahead of time in proof-

We propose a degree-preserving variant of the Builder--Chooser clique game of Pettie, Tardos, and Walczak. In each round, Builder chooses a matching, performs a degree-preserving growth (DPG) step by replacing the chosen edges with edges incident to a new vertex. Then partitions the entire edge set into two parts, and Chooser keeps one part. We begin the study of this game with the first nontrivial target, namely forcing a triangle. For triangle-free initial graphs we prove an exact one-round criterion, derive an exact one-round threshold on paths and exact forcing times on cycles, and identify the $5$-cycle as the first genuine two-round example. We then formulate a one-round criterion for larger cliques, prove a sharp exact result for forcing $K_4$ from triangle-free seeds. We establish general lower bounds on clique-forcing times from clique-free seeds, and isolate a conjectural template-amplifier lemma which, if proved, would imply that every clique is forceable from some triangle-free seed.

Blockchains protect an ecosystem worth more than $500bn with strong security properties derived from the principle of decentralization. Is today's blockchain decentralized? In this paper, we empirically studied one of the least decentralized parts of Ethereum, its builder market. The builder market was introduced to fairly distribute Maximal Extractable Value (MEV) among validators and avoid validator centralization. As of the time of writing, two builders produced more than 85% of blocks in Ethereum, creating a concerning centralization factor. However, a common belief is that such centralization "is okay," arguing that builder centralization will not lead to validator centralization. In this empirical study, we quantify the significant proposer losses within the centralized builder market and challenge the belief that this is acceptable. The significant proposer losses, if left uncontrolled, could undermine the goal of PBS. Moreover, MEV mitigation solutions slated for adoption are affected too because they rely on the builder market as an "MEV oracle," which is made inaccurate by centralization. Our investigation reveals the incentive issue within the current MEV supply chain an

We present the Data Quality Report Builder toolkit, DQRbuild, a suite of data quality tools that have been developed to vet gravitational-wave events in preparation for the fourth LIGO-Virgo-KAGRA observing run. We explain the main functionality and the many scientific tests that we support. To validate the performance of the tools included in the toolkit, we run a series of tests on all significant candidates shared as public alerts in the third observing run to compare against what was manually reported using human intervention. We find that these automated tools can now identify 96% of the problems identified by humans during this previous observing run, with a 24% false alarm rate. We conclude with a commentary on the prospects and potential challenges for fully automating the process of vetting the data quality for gravitational-wave events identified in future observing runs.

We study the impact of the order flow auction (OFA) in the context of the proposer-builder separation (PBS) mechanism in blockchains through a game-theoretic perspective. The OFA is designed to improve user welfare by redistributing maximal extractable value (MEV) to the users, in which two sequential auctions take place: the order flow auction and the block-building auction. We formulate the OFA as a multiplayer game, and establish the existence of a Nash equilibrium, and in the two-player case derive a closed-form solution (and prove its uniqueness) via a quartic equation. Our result shows that the builder with a competitive advantage pays a lower cost, leading to a higher revenue, and adding to centralization in the builder space. In contrast, the proposer's shares evolve as a martingale process, which implies decentralization in the proposer/validator space. Our analyses rely on various tools from stochastic processes, convex optimization, and polynomial equations. We also conduct numerical studies to corroborate our findings, and to bring out other features of the OFA under the PBS mechanism.

Recent advances in generative AI systems have dramatically reduced the cost of digital production, fueling narratives that widespread participation in software creation will yield a proliferation of viable companies. This paper challenges that assumption. We introduce the Builder Saturation Effect, formalizing a model in which production scales elastically but human attention remains finite. In markets with near-zero marginal costs and free entry, increases in the number of producers dilute average attention and returns per producer, even as total output expands. Extending the framework to incorporate quality heterogeneity and reinforcement dynamics, we show that equilibrium outcomes exhibit declining average payoffs and increasing concentration, consistent with power-law-like distributions. These results suggest that AI-enabled, democratised production is more likely to intensify competition and produce winner-take-most outcomes than to generate broadly distributed entrepreneurial success. Contribution type: This paper is primarily a work of synthesis and applied formalisation. The individual theoretical ingredients - attention scarcity, free-entry dilution, superstar effects, pre

Reliable Docker-based environment construction is a dominant bottleneck for scaling execution-grounded training and evaluation of software engineering agents. We introduce DockSmith, a specialized agentic Docker builder designed to address this challenge. DockSmith treats environment construction not only as a preprocessing step, but as a core agentic capability that exercises long-horizon tool use, dependency reasoning, and failure recovery, yielding supervision that transfers beyond Docker building itself. DockSmith is trained on large-scale, execution-grounded Docker-building trajectories produced by a SWE-Factory-style pipeline augmented with a loop-detection controller and a cross-task success memory. Training a 30B-A3B model on these trajectories achieves open-source state-of-the-art performance on Multi-Docker-Eval, with 39.72% Fail-to-Pass and 58.28% Commit Rate. Moreover, DockSmith improves out-of-distribution performance on SWE-bench Verified, SWE-bench Multilingual, and Terminal-Bench 2.0, demonstrating broader agentic benefits of environment construction.

In this work we investigate a class of random walks that interacts with its environment called Tree Builder Random Walk (TBRW). In our settings, at each step, the walker adds a random number of vertices to its position sampled according to a distribution $Q$. Previous works showed that the walker is ballistic with a well-defined speed, and that the TBRW admits a renewal structure, meaning that the process can be split into i.i.d epochs. We show that the first renewal time has exponential tail. Moreover, we show two consequences of the light tail of the first renewal time: an exponential upper bound for the empirical speed of the walker, and, for the case in which the walker adds only one vertex with probability $p$, we show that the limiting speed is an analytic function of the parameter $p$. In some of our proofs, we apply techniques from bond percolation, which consist of extending probabilities to the complex numbers and using the Weierstrass $M$-test.

The goal of this paper is to rigorously interrogate conventional wisdom about centralization in block-building (due to, e.g., MEV and private order flow) and the outsourcing of block-building by validators to specialists (i.e., proposer-builder separation): 1. Does heterogeneity in skills and knowledge across block producers inevitably lead to centralization? 2. Does proposer-builder separation eliminate heterogeneity and preserve decentralization among proposers? This paper develops mathematical models and results that offer answers to these questions: 1. In a game-theoretic model with endogenous staking, heterogeneous block producer rewards, and staking costs, we quantify the extent to which heterogeneous rewards lead to concentration in the equilibrium staking distribution. 2. In a stochastic model in which heterogeneous block producers repeatedly reinvest rewards into staking, we quantify, as a function of the block producer heterogeneity, the rate at which stake concentrates on the most sophisticated block producers. 3. In a model with heterogeneous proposers and specialized builders, we quantify, as a function of the competitiveness of the builder ecosystem, the extent to whi

Currently, over 90% of Ethereum blocks are built using MEV-Boost, an auction that allows validators to sell their block-building power to builders who compete in an open English auction in each slot. Shortly after the merge, when MEV-Boost was in its infancy, most block builders were neutral, meaning they did not trade themselves but rather aggregated transactions from other traders. Over time, integrated builders, operated by trading firms, began to overtake many of the neutral builders. Outside of the integrated builder teams, little is known about which advantages integration confers beyond latency and how latency advantages distort on-chain trading. This paper explores these poorly understood advantages. We make two contributions. First, we point out that integrated builders are able to bid truthfully in their own bundle merge and then decide how much profit to take later in the final stages of the PBS auction when more information is available, making the auction for them look closer to a second-price auction while independent searchers are stuck in a first-price auction. Second, we find that latency disadvantages convey a winner's curse on slow bidders when underlying values

Initially introduced to Ethereum via Flashbots' MEV-boost, Proposer-Builder Separation allows proposers to auction off blockspace to a market of transaction orderers, known as builders. PBS is currently available to validators through the aforementioned MEV-boost, but its unregulated and relay-dependent nature has much of the Ethereum community calling for its enshrinement. Providing a protocol-integrated PBS marketspace and communication channel for payload outsourcing is termed PBS enshrinement. Although ePBS potentially introduces native MEV mitigation mechanisms and reduces validator operation costs, fears of multiparty collusion and chain stagnation are all too real. In addition to mitigating these potential drawbacks, PBS research pursues many tenets revered by Web3 enthusiasts, including but not limited to, censorship resistance, validator reward equity, and deflationary finance. The subsequent SoK will identify current PBS mechanisms, the need for enshrinement, additions to the ePBS upgrade, and the existing or potential on-chain socioeconomic implications of each.

Digital twins (DTs) are increasingly utilized to monitor, manage, and optimize complex systems across various domains, including civil engineering. A core requirement for an effective DT is to act as a fast, accurate, and maintainable surrogate of its physical counterpart, the physical twin (PT). To this end, machine learning (ML) is frequently employed to (i) construct real-time DT prototypes using efficient reduced-order models (ROMs) derived from high-fidelity simulations of the PT's nominal behavior, and (ii) specialize these prototypes into DT instances by leveraging historical sensor data from the target PT. Despite the broad applicability of ML, its use in DT engineering remains largely ad hoc. Indeed, while conventional ML pipelines often train a single model for a specific task, DTs typically require multiple, task- and domain-dependent models. Thus, a more structured approach is required to design DTs. In this paper, we introduce DesCartes Builder, an open-source tool to enable the systematic engineering of ML-based pipelines for real-time DT prototypes and DT instances. The tool leverages an open and flexible visual data flow paradigm to facilitate the specification, com

Particle Builder Online is a web-based education game designed for high school physics students. Students can play against an AI opponent or peers to familiarise themselves with the Standard Model of Particle Physics. The game is aimed at a high school level and tailored to the International Baccalaureate and the Australian Curriculum. Students from four schools in Canberra took pre/post-tests and a survey while completing a lesson where they played Particle Builder. Students' understanding of particle physics concepts improved significantly. Students found the game more enjoyable and effective than regular classroom lessons.