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I. INTRODUCTION. 1. Gulf War-Infowar. The Gulf War. Information Warfare. From Chicks to Chips. 2. A Theory of Information Warfare. Information Resources. The Value of Resources. Players. The Offense. The Defense. A Dual Role. Offensive Information Warfare. Increased Availability to Offensive Player. Decreased Availability to Defensive Player. Decreased Integrity. Other Classification Schemes. Defensive Information Warfare. Types of Defense. Information Security and Information Assurance. The CIA Model and Authorization. 3. Playgrounds to Battlegrounds. Play. Motivation. Culture. More than Child's Play. Crime. Intellectual Property Crimes. Fraud. Computer Fraud and Abuse. Fighting Crime. Individual Rights. National Security. Foreign Intelligence. War and Military Conflict. Terrorism. Netwars. Protecting National Infrastructures. II. OFFENSIVE INFORMATION WARFARE. 4. Open Sources. Open Source and Competitive Intelligence. Privacy. Snooping on People Through Open Sources. Web Browsing. Privacy Regulations. Piracy. Copyright Infringement. Trademark Infringement. Dark Sides. 5. Psyops and Perception Management. Lies and Distortions. Distortion. Fabrication. Hoaxes. Social Engineering. Denouncement. Conspiracy Theories. Defamation. Harassment. Advertising. Scams. Spam Wars. Censorship. United States Restrictions. 6. Inside the Fence. Traitors and Moles. State and Military Espionage. Economic Espionage. Corporate Espionage. Privacy Compromises. Business Relationships. Visits and Requests. Fraud and Embezzlement. Bogus Transactions. Data Diddling. Inside Sabotage. Physical Attacks. Software Attacks. Penetrating the Perimeter. Physical Break-ins and Burglaries. Search and Seizure. Dumpster Diving. Bombs. 7. Seizing the Signals. Eavesdropping on Conversations. Cellular Intercepts. Pager Intercepts. Law Enforcement Wiretaps. Foreign Intelligence Intercepts. Deciphering the Messages. Traffic Analysis. Pen Registers and Trap and Trace. Location Tracking. Telecommunications Fraud. Blue Boxes. PBX and Related Fraud. Voice Mail Fraud. Calling Card Fraud. Cloned Phones and Cellular Fraud. Computer Network Monitoring. Packet Sniffers. Keystroke Monitoring. Environment Surveillance. Cameras and Video. Satellites and Imagery. Van Eck Receptors. Miscellaneous Sensors. Shoulder Surfing. Privacy and Accountability. Sabotage. Tampering with Phone Service. Jamming. Radio Frequency Weapons. Physical Attacks. 8. Computer Break-Ins and Hacking. Accounts. Getting Access. Tools and Techniques. A Demonstration. Network Scanners. Packet Sniffers. Password Crackers. Buffer Overpows and Other Exploits. Social Engineering. Covering up Tracks. Information Theft. Gathering Trophies. More than Trophies. Tampering. Web Hacks. Domain Name Service Hacks. Takedown. Remote Shutdown. Extent. 9. Masquerade. Identity Theft. Forged Documents and Messages. E-Mail Forgeries. Forgeries in Spam. E-Mail Floods. IP Spoofing. Counterfeiting. Trojan Horses. Software Trojans. Riding the Web. E-Mail Relays. Chipping. Undercover Operations and Stings. 10. Cyberplagues. Viruses. Program Viruses. Boot Viruses. Macro Viruses. Concealment Techniques. Who Writes Viruses. Prevalence. Virus Hoaxes. Worms. III. DEFENSIVE INFORMATION WARFARE. 11. Secret Codes and Hideaways. Locks and Keys. Cryptography. Digital Ciphers. Code Breaking. Generation and Distribution of Keys. Public-Key Distribution and Diffie-Hellman. Public-Key Cryptography and RSA. Key Storage and Recovery. Applications of Encryption. The Limits of Encryption. Steganography. Anonymity. Sanitization. Trash Disposal. Shielding. 12. How to Tell a Fake. Biometrics. Passwords and Other Secrets. Integrity Checksums. Digital Signatures. Public-Key Management and Certificates. Watermarks. Call Back and Call Home. Location-based Authentication. Badges and Cards. 13. Monitors and Gatekeepers. Access Controls. Authorization Policies. Access Control Monitors. Limitations. Filters. Firewalls. Junk E-Mail Filters. Web Filters. Intrusion and Misuse Detection. Workplace Monitoring. Automated Detection. Computer Intrusion and Misuse Detection. Analogy with the Human Immune System. Detecting and Eradicating Viruses and Malicious Mobile Code. 14. In a Risky World. Vulnerability Monitoring. Finding Computer and Network Security Flaws. Monitoring Security Publications. Building It Secure. The Orange Book. The ITSEC and Common Criteria. Evaluation. Commercial Criteria. ICSA Certification. Accreditation. The Capability Maturity Model. Security Awareness and Training. Avoiding Single Points of Failure. Backups. Risk Management. Risk Assessment and Asset Valuation. Insurance. Benchmarking. Due Care and Liability. Incident Handling. Investigation and Assessment. Containment and Recovery. Improving Security. Notification. In-Kind Response. Legal and Civil Remedies. Economic and Military Response. Emergency Preparedness. Obstacles. 15. Defending the Nation. Generally Accepted System Security Principles. Protecting Critical Infrastructures. President's Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection. Presidential Decision Directive. Encryption Policy. Code Making. Code Breaking. International Policies. U.S. Policy. Legal Challenges. Legislation. Encryption Policy in Perspective. Bibliography of Books. Endnotes. Index. 0201433036T04062001

Blood revenge is one of the most commonly cited causes of violence and warfare in tribal societies, yet it is largely ignored in recent anthropological theories of primitive warfare. A theory of tribal violence is presented showing how homicide, revenge, kinship obligations, and warfare are linked and why reproductive variables must be included in explanations of tribal violence and warfare. Studies of the Yanomamö Indians of Amazonas during the past 23 years show that 44 percent of males estimated to be 25 or older have participated in the killing of someone, that approximately 30 percent of adult male dealths are due to violence, and that nearly 70 percent of all adults over an estimated 40 years of age have lost a close genetic relative due to violence. Demographic data indicate that men who have killed have more wives and offspring than men who have not killed.

The deliberate use of microorganisms and toxins as weapons has been attempted throughout history. Biological warfare has evolved from the crude use of cadavers to contaminate water supplies to the development of specialized munitions for battlefield and covert use. The modern development of biological agents as weapons has paralleled advances in basic and applied microbiology. These include the identification of virulent pathogens suitable for aerosol delivery and industrial-scale fermentation processes to produce large quantities of pathogens and toxins. The history of biological warfare is difficult to assess because of a number of confounding factors. These include difficulties in verification of alleged or attempted biological attacks, the use of allegations of biological attacks for propaganda purposes, the paucity of pertinent microbiological or epidemiologic data, and the incidence of naturally occurring endemic or epidemic diseases during hostilities. Biological warfare has been renounced by 140 nations, primarily for strategic and other pragmatic reasons. International diplomatic efforts, including the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention, have not been entirely effective in preventing the enhancement and proliferation of offensive biological warfare programs. The threats posed by biological weapons are likely to continue into the future.

The deliberate use of microorganisms and toxins as weapons has been attempted throughout history. Biological warfare has evolved from the crude use of cadavers to contaminate water supplies to the development of specialized munitions for battlefield and covert use. The modern development of biological agents as weapons has paralleled advances in basic and applied microbiology. These include the identification of virulent pathogens suitable for aerosol delivery and industrial-scale fermentation processes to produce large quantities of pathogens and toxins. The history of biological warfare is difficult to assess because of a number of confounding factors. These include difficulties in verification of alleged or attempted biological attacks, the use of allegations of biological attacks for propaganda purposes, the paucity of pertinent microbiological or epidemiologic data, and the incidence of naturally occurring endemic or epidemic diseases during hostilities. Biological warfare has been renounced by 140 nations, primarily for strategic and other pragmatic reasons. International diplomatic efforts, including the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention, have not been entirely effective in preventing the enhancement and proliferation of offensive biological warfare programs. The threats posed by biological weapons are likely to continue into the future.

Drone warfare described from the perspectives of drone operators, victims of drone attacks, anti-drone activists, international law, military thinkers, and others.[A] thoughtful examination of the dilemmas this new weapon poses. -- Foreign AffairsDrones are changing the conduct of war. Deployed at presidential discretion, they can be used in regular war zones or to kill people in such countries as Yemen and Somalia, where the United States is not officially at war. Advocates say that drones are more precise than conventional bombers, allowing warfare with minimal civilian deaths while keeping American pilots out of harm's way. Critics say that drones are cowardly and that they often kill innocent civilians while terrorizing entire villages on the ground. In this book, Hugh Gusterson explores the significance of drone warfare from multiple perspectives, drawing on accounts by drone operators, victims of drone attacks, anti-drone activists, human rights activists, international lawyers, journalists, military thinkers, and academic experts.Gusterson examines the way drone warfare has created commuter warriors and redefined the space of the battlefield. He looks at the paradoxical mix of closeness and distance involved in remote killing: is it easier than killing someone on the physical battlefield if you have to watch onscreen? He suggests a new way of understanding the debate over civilian casualties of drone attacks. He maps ethical slippage over time in the Obama administration's targeting practices. And he contrasts Obama administration officials' legal justification of drone attacks with arguments by international lawyers and NGOs.

Chemical warfare agents constitute one of the greatest threats in the modern world. Among them, the neurotoxic agents are of special interest due to their high lethality and danger. Neurotoxic agents are organophosphorus compounds that act by inhibiting the enzyme acetylcholinesterase, which is fundamental for the control of transmission of nervous impulses. There are several ways of treating intoxication by organophosphorus compounds, but none of them is efficient against all the known neurotoxic agents or against all of their effects. This review focus on the use of organophosphorus compounds as neurotoxic chemical warfare agents. After a brief historical introduction, it will be done a discussion about the structural and biological characteristics of acetylcholinesterase, followed by a review of the properties of organophosphorus compounds and their application as chemical warfare agents. Finally, the ways of treatment against intoxication with these agents will be discussed, with emphasis on the oximes used for reactivating the inhibited acetylcholinesterase.

Is Information War (IW) a nascent, perhaps embryonic art, or simply the newest version of a time-honored feature of warfare? Is it a new form of conflict that owes its existence to the burgeoning global information infrastructure, or an old one whose origin lies in the wetware of the human brain but has been given new life by the information age? Is it a unified field or opportunistic assemblage? Since March 1993, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Memorandum of Policy Number 30 (MOP 30) has set forth definitions and relationships that have guided the joint community in its thinking about the related concepts of information warfare and command and control warfare. As these seminal ideas have evolved, their definitions and relationships have changed as well. MOP 30 is under revision, and both higher level policy documents for the Department of Defense and doctrinal publications of the Joint Staff and Services are either in draft form or under revision.

War is a product of its age. The tools and tactics of how we fight have always evolved along with technology. We are poised to continue this trend. Warfare in the Information Age will inevitably embody the characteristics that distinguish this age from previous ones. These characteristics affect the capabilities that are brought to battle as well as the nature of the environment in which conflicts occur. Often in the past, military organizations pioneered both the development of technology and its application. Such is not the case today. Major advances in Information Technology are being driven primarily by the demands of the commercial sector. Furthermore, Information Technology is being applied commercially in ways that are transforming business around the globe. The purposes of this book are to describe the Network Centric Warfare concept; to explain how it embodies the characteristics of the Information Age; to identify the challenges in transforming this concept into a real operational capability; and to suggest a prudent approach to meeting these challenges.

This volume was prepared for military medical educational use. The focus of the information is to foster discussion that may form the basis of doctrine and policy. Until this decade, our military forces had not faced chemical and biological weapons since World War I, and the prevailing attitude has been "out of sight, out of mind." The Persian Gulf War changed all that. Just the threat that such weapons would be used was itself an effective weapon, as it required us to expend tremendous logistical resources to supply our troops in the desert. Now we know that we must master all relevant aspects of defense against chemical and biological warfare. The Biological Weapons Convention, ratified in 1975, did not slow the massive Soviet program, which continued until early 1992, nor did it prevent the buildup in Iraq between 1985 and 1990. At this time, experts are severely questioning whether verification of compliance with the treaty can be certain. Similar concerns delayed ratification of the Chemical Weapons Convention by the U.S. Senate; nevertheless, the senate ratified the treaty on 24 April 1997. A primary value of the Textbook of Military Medicine series is to preserve the lessons of past wars and, by so doing, demonstrate how current doctrine is built on knowledge that was gained at so high a cost. Medical officers should read this volume, Medical Aspects of Chemical and Biological Warfare, and learn its lessons well. Civilians expect that we in the military will know how to manage chemical and biological casualties. Indeed, if we do not, then who will? The nation expects us to be prepared to defend against all attacks and will be unforgiving of any incapacity on our part.

Concern regarding the use of biological agents--bacteria, viruses, or toxins--as tools of warfare or terrorism has led to measures to deter their use or, failing that, to deal with the consequences. Unlike chemical agents, which typically lead to violent disease syndromes within minutes at the site of exposure, diseases resulting from biological agents have incubation periods of days. Therefore, rather than a paramedic, it will likely be a physician who is first faced with evidence of the results of a biological attack. We provide here a primer on 10 classic biological warfare agents to increase the likelihood of their being considered in a differential diagnosis. Although the resultant diseases are rarely seen in many countries today, accepted diagnostic and epidemiologic principles apply; if the cause is identified quickly, appropriate therapy can be initiated and the impact of a terrorist attack greatly reduced.

He examines every branch of warfare in its history, psychology, metallurgy, genetics, logistics, archaeology, tactics and strategy...He is as much at home in the Empire of Babylon as he is on the Somme...On every subject he has something fresh to say. His learning is staggering and his gift for exposition unequalled' Nigel Nicolson, Daily Telegraph. 'Keegan's power as a writer derives from the fact that he does not see himself merely as a chronicler of battles, but as a student of the human condition. It is the breadth of his grasp of civilisation, as well as of the soldier's art, that makes this book so formidable.' Max Hastings, Evening Standard. 'A masterpiece...One of those rare books which could still be required reading in its field a hundred years from now' New Yorker. 'Our finest military historian has produced a book of breathtaking scope...A tour de force' Niall Ferguson, Daily Mail. 'The best book I read in 1993 was A History of Warfare...A dazzling display of historical pyrotechnics' Paul Johnson, Books of the Year, Sunday Times. 'Magnificent' Sunday Telegraph.

Opinions of Chemical Warfare. The Physicochemical Properties and General Toxicology of Chemical Warfare Agents. Organophosphate Nerve Agents. Treatment and Prophylaxis of Organophosphate Nerve Agent Poisoning. A History of Human Studies with Nerve Agents by the UK and USA. Mustard Gas. Organic Arsenicals. Phosgene. Cyanides. Riot-Control Agents. Appendices. Index.

Among the Weapons of Mass Destruction, chemical warfare (CW) is probably one of the most brutal created by mankind in comparison with biological and nuclear warfare. Chemical weapons are inexpensive and are relatively easy to produce, even by small terrorist groups, to create mass casualties with small quantities. The characteristics of various CW agents, general information relevant to current physical as well as medical protection methods, detection equipment available and decontamination techniques are discussed in this review article. A brief note on Chemical Weapons Convention is also provided.

From the Publisher: Here's an advanced practitioner's guide to the latest concepts and threats associated with modern electronic warfare (EW). This new book identifies and explains the newest radar and communications threats, and provides EW and radar engineers, managers, and technical professionals with practical, how-to information on designing and implementing ECM and ECCM systems. Written by a world-renowned expert in radar and electronic warfare, the book helps you develop state-of-the-art ESM systems designed specifically to exploit the vulnerabilities of modern radar. It also identifies and evaluates the latest ESM receiving equipment, and outlines advanced ECM methods, including monopulse deception, coherent radar jamming, and high-ERP generation. Other well-structured sections cover modern ECCM countermeasure techniques, the impact of new stealth technology on ESM and ECM requirements, jammer upgrading procedures, and much more.

From the soldier's-eye view of combat to the broad social and economic structures which shaped campaigns and wars, ancient Greek warfare in all its aspects has been studied more intensively in the last few decades than ever before. This book ranges from the concrete details of conducting raids, battles and sieges to more theoretical questions about the causes, costs, and consequences of warfare in archaic and classical Greece. It argues that the Greek sources present a highly selective and idealised picture, too easily accepted by most modern scholars, and that a more critical study of the evidence leads to radically different conclusions about the Greek way of war.

Understanding cooperation and punishment in small-scale societies is crucial for explaining the origins of human cooperation. We studied warfare among the Turkana, a politically uncentralized, egalitarian, nomadic pastoral society in East Africa. Based on a representative sample of 88 recent raids, we show that the Turkana sustain costly cooperation in combat at a remarkably large scale, at least in part, through punishment of free-riders. Raiding parties comprised several hundred warriors and participants are not kin or day-to-day interactants. Warriors incur substantial risk of death and produce collective benefits. Cowardice and desertions occur, and are punished by community-imposed sanctions, including collective corporal punishment and fines. Furthermore, Turkana norms governing warfare benefit the ethnolinguistic group, a population of a half-million people, at the expense of smaller social groupings. These results challenge current views that punishment is unimportant in small-scale societies and that human cooperation evolved in small groups of kin and familiar individuals. Instead, these results suggest that cooperation at the larger scale of ethnolinguistic units enforced by third-party sanctions could have a deep evolutionary history in the human species.

We present cross‐cultural data on the existence of a pervasive institutional and ideological complex of male supremacy in band and village sociocultural systems, and we identify warfare as the most important cause of this complex. We explain the perpetuation of warfare in band and village society and its interaction with selective female infanticide as a response to the need to regulate population growth in the absence of effective or less costly alternatives. Our hypothesis is supported by a demographic analysis of 561 local band and village populations from 112 societies.

On the basis of a 14th-century account by the Genoese Gabriele de' Mussi, the Black Death is widely believed to have reached Europe from the Crimea as the result of a biological warfare attack. This is not only of great historical interest but also relevant to current efforts to evaluate the threat of military or terrorist use of biological weapons. Based on published translations of the de' Mussi manuscript, other 14th-century accounts of the Black Death, and secondary scholarly literature, I conclude that the claim that biological warfare was used at Caffa is plausible and provides the best explanation of the entry of plague into the city. This theory is consistent with the technology of the times and with contemporary notions of disease causation; however, the entry of plague into Europe from the Crimea likely occurred independent of this event.

ADVERTISEMENT RETURN TO ISSUEPREVArticleNEXTDecontamination of chemical warfare agentsYu Chu Yang, James A. Baker, and J. Richard WardCite this: Chem. Rev. 1992, 92, 8, 1729–1743Publication Date (Print):December 1, 1992Publication History Published online1 May 2002Published inissue 1 December 1992https://pubs.acs.org/doi/10.1021/cr00016a003https://doi.org/10.1021/cr00016a003research-articleACS PublicationsRequest reuse permissionsArticle Views5270Altmetric-Citations892LEARN ABOUT THESE METRICSArticle Views are the COUNTER-compliant sum of full text article downloads since November 2008 (both PDF and HTML) across all institutions and individuals. These metrics are regularly updated to reflect usage leading up to the last few days.Citations are the number of other articles citing this article, calculated by Crossref and updated daily. Find more information about Crossref citation counts.The Altmetric Attention Score is a quantitative measure of the attention that a research article has received online. Clicking on the donut icon will load a page at altmetric.com with additional details about the score and the social media presence for the given article. Find more information on the Altmetric Attention Score and how the score is calculated. Share Add toView InAdd Full Text with ReferenceAdd Description ExportRISCitationCitation and abstractCitation and referencesMore Options Share onFacebookTwitterWechatLinked InRedditEmail Other access optionsGet e-Alertsclose Get e-Alerts