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Baboons are not included in the growing body of documentation on primate spatial defense. Instead, most field studies of baboons suggest that troops occupy overlapping undefended home ranges. In southwestern Africa we found defense of space by two troops living in a Namib Desert canyon and by a population of troops on the Okavango Swamp flood—plain in Botswana. Two desert troops encountered one another at contiguous ends of their linear home ranges and established a defended boundary near a waterhole. One troop also dominated a third, a smaller troop at the opposite end of its home range. In the swamp, large troops, living in a more energy and plant species—rich environment, occupied small home ranges relative to troops studied elsewhere in Africa. Here space was defended along well—defined boundaries. Size and configuration of troop space and the arrangement of resources within each space influence the likelihood of intertroop encounters and the expression of spatial defense.

Abstract This work examines support the troops discourses in the US and UK during the war on terror (2001–2010). These practices are important in their own right and a window into a broader transformation in liberal military-society relations. Few people now serve in the armed forces but gendered and sexualized cultural narratives of warfare continue to reproduce a strong connection between military service, citizenship, and normative heteromasculinity—the liberal military contract. It argues that supporting the troops reflects a gendered civilian anxiety arising from non-service in wartime, wherein normative citizenship and normative masculinity are apparently inaccessible to a large number of citizens. The book works through the ways that support the troops discourses attempt to address and resolve this anxiety by recasting support for the military as itself the hallmark of citizenship and masculinity. On that basis, supporting the troops is not really about the military at all, or even the legitimacy of war, but rather society’s maintenance of appropriate civil-military relations. Support is also increasingly transnationalized, as a seemingly apolitical vector for racialized, colonial hierarchy. Military support is the new military service—with a number of negative implications for democratic dissent. War opposition is sharply constrained, as martial obligation makes it possible to contest one war, on behalf of the troops, but not the practice of war itself. Overall, the book demonstrates the importance of gendered solidarism and loyalty, rather than solely dynamics of enmity and antagonism, in producing political community, the transnational liberal order and liberal wars.

Dengue fever (DF) was considered to be a potential cause of febrile illness in U.S. troops deployed to Somalia during Operation Restore Hope in 1992-1993. A prospective study of hospitalized troops with fever and a seroepidemiologic survey of 530 troops were conducted. Among 289 febrile troops hospitalized, 129 (45%) did not have an identified cause of their fever. Dengue (DEN) virus was recovered from 41 (43%) of 96 of these patients by inoculation of admission sera into C6/36 cell cultures. Thirty-nine (41%) of the isolates were identified as DEN-2 and two (2%) as DEN-3 by an indirect immunofluorescent antibody assay. An additional 18 (49%) of 37 culture-negative cases were shown by immunoglobulin M (IgM) antibody capture enzyme-linked immunosorbent assay to have anti-DEN virus antibody. All identified DF cases recovered within 1-2 weeks; no case of dengue hemorrhagic fever or shock syndrome was observed. A seroepidemiologic survey of a unit (n = 494) with 17 culture or serologically identified DF cases and a 13% attack rate of unidentified febrile illness revealed a 7.7% prevalence of anti-DEN virus IgM antibody. Failure to use bed nets was the only identified risk factor for DEN infection (adjusted odds ratio = 2.2, 95% confidence interval = 1.4-3.0). These data indicate that DF was an important cause of febrile illness among US troops in Somalia, and demonstrate the difficulties in preventing DEN infection in troops operating in field conditions.

This review summarizes information on the behavioural ecology of mixed-species troops (interspecific associations) formed by different species of callitrichines, small New World monkeys, in western and central Amazonia. The formation of mixed-species troops is an integral part of the biology of several species of this subfamily. Niche separation between associated species is obtained through vertical segregation which results in differences in the prey spectrum. The degree of niche separation is a predictor for the stability of mixed-species troops. Individuals may benefit from the formation of mixed-species troops through increased safety from predators, increased foraging efficiency, and/or increased resource defence. Costs of mixed-species troop formation are probably very low and mainly relate to patterns of interspecific behavioural interactions. We point to gaps in our knowledge and suggest pathways for future research into mixed-species troops.

Two Provisioned Japanese monkey troops, the Takasakiyama A and B troops have extraordinary large population sizes, consisting of about 1000 and 300 monkeys respectively. Dominance tests were conducted among identified adult females of the Takasakiyama A and B troops. Because many pairs showed indefinite dominance relationships and the linear dominance rank order was not observed, individuals were given"dominance rank by ratio".Information of the dominance tests was obtained about two other troops.Indefiniteness of the cominance relationships increased quantitatively and qualitatively with the increase of the population size of the troop. The discrepancy up to now in the reports about the process of troop divisions is related to the population size of the troops and the occurence of indefinite dominance pairs.

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A simple stochastic population model which assumes constant birth, loss (death or emigration), and immigration rates equally and independently applicable to all individuals in a theoretical population predicts at equilibrium a negative binomial distribution of population size if all three rates are strictly positive and a Poisson distribution of population size if only the birth rate is zero or if births occur at a rate independent of population size. If the theoretical population of the model is interpreted as a troop of free-ranging primates (and not necessarily as a genetic or ecological population), several species of primates appear to confirm the equilibrium predictions of the model. The observed frequency distributions of size of troops of howler monkeys approximate a truncated negative binomial except after an epidemic which removed young monkeys; the size distribution, then, is nearly truncated Poisson, as expected. In gibbons, whose troops have a birth rate independent of troop size, the observed distributions appear to be truncated Poisson. Though few data are available, colobus monkeys seem consistent with this pattern. Sizes of bisexual troops of hanuman langurs approximate a truncated negative binomial distribution. Baboon troops have approximately truncated negative binomial distributions of size, but the parameters of the distributions appear to differ more from one species to another than to the parameters of the distributions fitted to different gibbon species. The only available detailed vital statistics on a single baboon troop suggest that the simple dynamics of the stochastic model is not faithful to what actually happens, even though the equilibrium distributions are. A statistical technique apparently new to biology, called the "jackknife," indicates that the variability of the baboon data is not sufficient to account for the difference between the estimate of a parameter of the truncated negative binomial obtained by fitting the troop size distribution and the estimate of the same parameter obtained from vital statistics. Hence the innards of the model may be faulty. Both better models and better data, especially in combination, are needed.

<p>Cyber troops are government, military or political party teams committed to manipulating public opinion over social media. In this working paper, we report on specific organizations created, often with public money, to help define and manage what is in the best interest of the public. We compare such organizations across 28 countries, and inventory them according to the kinds of messages, valences and communication strategies used. We catalogue their organizational forms and evaluate their capacities in terms of budgets and staffing. This working paper summarizes the findings of the first comprehensive inventory of the major organizations behind social media manipulation.</p> <p>We find that cyber troops are a pervasive and global phenomenon. Many different countries employ significant numbers of people and resources to manage and manipulate public opinion online, sometimes targeting domestic audiences and sometimes targeting foreign publics.</p> <p>·The earliest reports of organized social media manipulation emerged in 2010, and by 2017 there are details on such organizations in 28 countries.</p> <p>·Looking across the 28 countries, every authoritarian regime has social media campaigns targeting their own populations, while only a few of them target foreign publics. In contrast, almost every democracy in this sample has organized social media campaigns that target foreign publics, while political-party-supported campaigns target domestic voters.</p> <p>·Authoritarian regimes are not the only or even the best at organized social media manipulation. The earliest reports of government involvement in nudging public opinion involve democracies, and new innovations in political communication technologies often come from political parties and arise during high-profile elections.</p> <p>·Over time, the primary mode for organizing cyber troops has gone from involving military units that experiment with manipulating public opinion over social media networks to strategic communication firms that take contracts from governments for social media campaigns.</p>

We estimate the death rate of United States troops deployed to Iraq from the beginning of the US invasion through 30 September 2006. Eighty percent of the deaths in Iraq were combat‐related. The death rate in Iraq is lower than that of the civilian population of the United States but substantially higher than that of young adults. It is much lower than the death rate of US troops in Vietnam, in part because a much smaller fraction die among those wounded in Iraq. We also estimate relative mortality levels for US troops according to numerous demographic variables through 30 November 2006. The risk of death in Iraq per deployment is shown to be highest for Marines; Naval and Air Force personnel in Iraq have lower death rates than the civilian population of comparable age. Other categories with above‐average mortality in Iraq are enlisted troops, males, younger persons, and Hispanics.

Do American troops help or hinder economic growth in other countries? We consider a newly constructed dataset of the deployment of U.S. troops over the years 1950–2000 and discover a positive relationship between deployed troops and host country economic growth, which is robust to multiple control variables. Each tenfold increase in U.S. troops is associated with a one–third percentage point increase in average host country annual growth. We explore three possible causal explanations: a Keynesian aggregate demand boost; the diffusion of institutions; and security. Extensive econometric testing, including the use of panel data, confirms the core relationship.

Metaheuristics play a critical role in solving optimization problems, and most of them have been inspired by the collective intelligence of natural organisms in nature. This paper proposes a new metaheuristic algorithm inspired by gorilla troops' social intelligence in nature, called Artificial Gorilla Troops Optimizer (GTO). In this algorithm, gorillas' collective life is mathematically formulated, and new mechanisms are designed to perform exploration and exploitation. To evaluate the GTO, we apply it to 52 standard benchmark functions and seven engineering problems. Friedman's test and Wilcoxon rank-sum statistical tests statistically compared the proposed method with several existing metaheuristics. The results demonstrate that the GTO performs better than comparative algorithms on most benchmark functions, particularly on high-dimensional problems. The results demonstrate that the GTO can provide superior results compared with other metaheuristics.

Summary Stone handling (SH), a form of solitary object play, consists of an individual manipulating stones by performing various behavioural patterns. Previous findings from the Arashiyama population of Japanese macaques suggested that SH is socially transmitted across generations as a behavioural tradition. To further test the hypothesis that SH is a traditional behaviour in this species, we present the most systematic inter-troop comparison of this behaviour from an investigation of nine troops of Macaca fuscata fuscata and one troop of M. f. yakui living at six sites in Japan. We analyzed a total 1280 video-recorded SH bouts and charted the relative frequency of occurrence of 45 SH behavioural patterns across age classes. Many SH patterns showed geographically patchy distributions and were referred to as local variants or SH traditions. In terms of behavioural complexity, we found three levels of SH culture, each level being defined by troop-dependent clusters of SH traditions. We found a positive correlation between geographic proximity and cultural similarity in SH between troops. To explain similarities in the SH repertoires between the free-ranging troops living at the same site, we discussed the phenomenon of cultural zones. We interpreted intra-group variability in the performance of SH patterns from the viewpoint of developmental factors. We found no major difference between the two subspecies in the occurrence and form of SH.

Three troops of olive baboons (Papio anubis) comprising 134 animals were captured during a translocation program. All three troops (PHG, CRIP, WBY) lived in high-altitude savannah, but two (CRIP and WBY) also frequented human settlements, where they had access to the garbage pits and vegetable gardens. The translocation offered the opportunity to compare body condition, activity patterns, and parasitism among the troops of animals. A variety of body measurements were taken, a physical examination performed, activity patterns for the previous 2 years enumerated, and blood and feces collected for virological and parasitological analyses. Body condition, as judged qualitatively by appearance and quantitatively by subcutaneous fat thickness and body weight, was lowest in PHG, the naturally foraging troop. All animals were negative for all viruses. No blood-borne parasites were found, but the feces of the majority of animals were positive for eggs of strongyles, ascarids, Trichuris spp., and Strongyloides spp. Quantification of strongyles indicated the heaviest burdens were in the non provisioned troop PHG. These results when combined with the behavioral observations that PHG spent more time foraging and less time resting or socializing than WBY suggest lowered availability and/or a poorer quality of PHG's diet. The data support the hypothesis of a causal relationship between host nutrition and helminth parasite infection but do not permit general conclusions to be drawn on mechanisms of interaction.

This essay tracks the genealogy of the contemporary call to "support the troops," a rhetoric that includes but goes beyond the strategic and argumentative use of the phrase itself. Support-the-troops rhetoric has two major functions: deflection and dissociation. Deflection involves discursive trends in play since Vietnam that have redefined war as a fight to save our own soldiers—especially the captive soldier—rather than as a struggle for policy goals external to the military. As such, this discourse directs civic attention away from the question of whether the particular war policy is just. The essay explicates these trends through an examination of the POW/MIA, war film, and the symbol of the yellow ribbon. The second trope, dissociation, quarantines the citizen from questions of military action by manufacturing distance between citizen and soldier. Dissociation often goes further to define civic deliberation and dissent as an attack on the soldier body and thus an ultimate immoral act. This essay explores this trope through executive rhetoric, an analysis of the particular phrase "support the troops," metaphor for war, and John Kerry's run for the presidency in 2004. Both deflection and dissociation work to discipline and mute public deliberation in matters of war. The essay concludes by considering strategies for reopening spaces for democratic deliberation.

An assessment was conducted of the impact of infectious diseases on the 697,000 U.S. troops deployed to the Persian Gulf during 1990-1991 in Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm. The incidence of nonbattle injuries, including infectious diseases, during this conflict was lower than during previous wars involving U.S. military personnel. The major reported causes of morbidity were generally mild cases of acute diarrheal and upper respiratory disease. The most unexpected outcome was the lack of arboviral infections, particularly sandfly fever, and the occurrence among U.S. troops of 12 cases of visceral leishmaniasis due to Leishmania tropica. The fact that infectious diseases were not a major cause of lost manpower, in sharp contrast to the experience among military personnel in World War II, can be attributed to a combination of factors: the presence of a comprehensive infrastructure of medical care, extensive preventive medicine efforts, and several fortuitous circumstances. Beneficial conditions that may not be present in future conflicts in this region include isolation of most combat troops to barren desert locations during the cooler, winter months, which provided the least favorable conditions for transmission of arthropod-borne diseases.

Click to increase image sizeClick to decrease image size Notes [1] For an overview see Waites, ‘Peoples of the Underdeveloped World’, 596–614. [2] See Burdick and Moessner, The German Prisoners-of-War in Japan; Krebs, ‘Die etwas andere Kriegsgefangenschaft’, 323–37, and Hermann Joseph Hiery, The Neglected war. [3] See Grove, ‘The First Shots of the Great War’; and Krech, Die Kampfhandlungen in den ehemaligen deutschen Kolonien. [4] See Davenport, ‘The South African Rebellion, 1914’; Garson, ‘South Africa and World War I’; Katzenellenbogen, ‘Southern Africa and the War of 1914–1918’, 107–121; and Krech, Die Kampfhandlungen in den ehemaligen deutschen Kolonien. [5] See von Lettow-Vorbeck, Meine Erinnerungen; Deppe, Mit Lettow-Vorbeck; Buhrer, L'Afrique orientale allemande; Paice, Tip and Run; Samson, Britain, South Africa and the East Africa Campaign; Anderson, The Forgotten Front; Strachan, The First World War in Africa; Gardner, German East; Bradley, ‘The 1914–18 Campaign’, 27–36; Greenstein, ‘The Impact of Military Service’; Hodges, The Carrier Corps; Krech, Die Kampfhandlungen in den ehemaligen deutschen Kolonien; Miller, Battle for the Bundu; Mundro and Savage, ‘Carrier Corps Recruitment’; Hodges, ‘African Manpower Statistics’; Iliffe, A Modern History of Tanganyika, 240–72; and Michels, ‘Askari – treu bis in den Tod?’, 171–86. [6] See Bernard, L'Afrique du Nord; Meynier, L'Algérie révélée; and Goldstein, Libération ou annexion. [7] See Michel, L'appel à l'Afrique. [8] See War Office, Statistics of the Military Effort, 772; Carrington, ‘The Empire at War’, 642; Beckett, ‘The Nation in Arms’, 13–14; Grundy, Soldiers without Politics, 54; Besson and Perreau-Pradier, L'Effort Colonial des Alliés, 121–2; Willan, ‘The South African Native Labour Contingent’; Smith, Jamaican Volunteers in the First World War; Schulze, Die Rebellion der ägyptischen Fallahin, 120–1; and Summershill, China on the Western Front; Wou, Les travailleurs chinois. [9] See Nogaro and Weil, La main-d'œuvre étrangère et coloniale; Varet, Du concours apporté à la France, 41–5; Boussenot, La France d'outre-mer, 67–73; Schor, Histoire de l'immigration en France, 40–4; Sarraut, La mise en valeur, 43; Duomg, L'Indochine pendant la Guerre de 1914–1918, 107–132; Ray, Les Marocains en France, 48–59; Meynier, L'Algérie révélé, 405–13 and 459–84; Talha, Le salariat immigré, 63–78; Ageron and Julien, Histoire de l'Algérie contemporaine, 1157–60; Stora, Ils venaient d'Algérie, 14–15; Chen, Chinese Migrations; and Wang, ‘Chinesische Kontraktarbeiter’, 440–3. [10] See Stovall, ‘The Color Line behind the Lines’. [11] See Greenhut, ‘The Imperial Reserve’; Ellinwood and Pradham, India and World War 1; Merewether and Smith, The Indian Corps in France; Willcocks, With the Indians in France. [12] See Killingray, ‘The Idea of a British Imperial African Army’. [13] Parliamentary Debates, 5th series, vol. 82, 2023–5. [14] See Smith, Jamaican Volunteers in the First World War. [15] See Pershing, My Experiences in the World War, vol. 2, 64. [16] Sarraut, La mise en valeur, 44; see also Fogarty, Race and War in France. [17] Hill, The Marcus Garvey and Universal Negro Improvement Association Papers, vol. 9, 588. [18] See Greenhut, ‘The Imperial Reserve’. [19] See Echenberg, ‘Paying the Blood Tax’; Michel, ‘Le recrutement des tirailleurs’; Clarke, West Africans at War. [20] Meynier, L'Algérie révélée, 405. [21] Michel, L'appel à l'Afrique, 84. [22] See Cornevin, La République populaire, 418–23; de Rivières, Histoire du Niger, 224–30; Michel, L'appel à l'Afrique, 50–7, 100–16, 118–20 and 127–30; Lunn, Memoirs of the Maelstrom, 33–58; Fournier, Historique du 2 e Régiment de Tirailleurs Sénégalais, 169–89; Echenberg, ‘Les Migrations militaires’; Asiwaju, ‘Migration as revolt’, 577–94; Hebert, ‘Révoltes en Haute Volta’; Garcia, ‘Les mouvements de résistance’; Johnson and Summers, ‘World War I: Conscription and Social Change in Guinea’; D'Almeida-Topor, ‘Les populations dahoméens’; Lombard, Structures de type féodal, 412–28; Suret-Canale, Schwarzafrika, vol. II, 183–91; Loth, Geschichte Afrikas, vol. II, 119–22; Kouandété, Un aspect de l'insurrection nationaliste; Mercier, Tradition, changement, histoire, 435–48; and Gnankambary, ‘La révolte bobo de 1916’. [23] See Ageron and Julien, Histoire de l'Algérie contemporaine, 1142–3 and 1150–7; Meynier, L'Algérie révélée, 569–98. [24] See Lejri, L' histoire du mouvement national, 157–63. [25] See Michel, L'appel à l'Afrique, 73–81; Margueritte, L'immense effort, 127–33. [26] Cited in Delafosse, Maurice Delafosse, 310. [27] Cited in Michel, L'appel à l'Afrique, 43. [28] Cited in Delafosse, Maurice Delafosse, 310. [29] Cited in Michel, L'appel à l'Afrique, 132. [30] Cited in Michel, L'appel à l'Afrique, 133. [31] Cited in Delafosse, Maurice Delafosse, 338. [32] See Echenberg, Colonial Conscripts, 44; Une ame de Chef, 27–8 and 264–6. [33] See Glinga, ‘Ein koloniales Paradoxon’, 21–37; Crowder, ‘Blaise Diagne and the Recruitment of African Troops’, 104–21; Lunn, Memoirs of the Maelstrom, 73–81; Michel, L'appel à l'Afrique, 223–38; idem, ‘La genèse du recrutement’. [34] See Ageron, Les Algériens musulmans, vol. 2, 1146–7. [35] Cited in Ageron, Les Algériens musulmans, 1162. [36] Ageron, Les Algériens musulmans, 1064–5. [37] See Fernand Farjenel, ‘Une armée jaune’, Revue de Paris 23 (1916): 112–37. [38] See Mangin, Lettres de Guerre, 125–6; Ageron, Les Algériens musulmans, 1164; idem, ‘Clemenceau et la question coloniale’, 80. [39] See Merewether and Smith, The Indian Corps in France; Willcocks, With the Indians in France; Greenhut, ‘The Imperial Reserve’; Omissi, The Sepoy and the Raj, 38–40, 65–6, 78–82, 114–23 and 160–2; Mason, A Matter of Honour, 412–21; Smith, Britain's Brigade of Gurkhas, 42–51 and 72–84; Tuker, Gorkha, 192–200; MacMunn, The Martial Races of India, 318–40; Farwell, The Gurkhas, 86–104; idem, Armies of the Raj, 248–66; Bolt, Gurkhas, 90–6; Trench, The Indian Army, 31–66; Mollo, The Indian Army, 139–44; Banskota, The Gurkha Connection, 122–30; History of the 5 th Royal Gurkha Rifles, 217–71 and 310–17; Besson and Perreau-Pradier, L'Effort Colonial des Alliés, 123–4; Pradhan, ‘The Indian Army and the First World War’, 49–67; idem, ‘The Sikh Soldier in the First World War’, 177–211; Ellinwood, ‘Ethnicity in a Colonial Asian Army’, 89–144; and Latter, ‘The Indian Army in Mesopotamia’, 92–102, 160–79 and 232–46. [40] See Balesi, From Adversaries to Comrades-in-Arms, 99. [41] See Bernard, L'Afrique du Nord; Horne, The Price of Glory, 111–12. Also Heather Jones's contribution to this special issue. [42] See, for example, Michel, L'appel à l'Afrique; Bekraoui, ‘Les soldats marocains’; and Kamian, Des tranchées de Verdun. [43] See, for example, Horne, The Price of Glory, 100–101; Goldstein, Libération ou annexion, 176–7; Crowder, ‘The 1914–1918 European War and West Africa’, 494. [44] See Paul Mangin, ‘Troupes noires’, Revue de France 16 (1909): 61–80 and 383–98; idem, ‘Soldats Noirs en Europe’, Questions Diplomatiques et Coloniales 13 (1909): 449–60.; idem, La Force Noire; idem, ‘Troupes noires’, Revue de Paris 18 (1911): 484–94; idem, ‘De l'emploi des troupes noires’, Revue anthropologique 21 (1911): 113–28. [45] Barbusse, Le Feu, 48–9. [46] Boussenot, France d' outre-mer, 43. [47] Cited in Michel, L'appel à l'Afrique, 323. [48] Cited in Ageron, Clemenceau et la question coloniale, 80. [49] Paul Mangin, ‘Comment finit la guerre’, Revue des Deux Mondes 57 (1920): 794. [50] See Barrows, ‘ L'influence des conquêtes algériennes et coloniales’, 111; and Lunn, ‘Kande Kamara Speaks’, 39. [51] Cited in Becker, Les Français dans la Grande Guerre, 316 as well as in Michel, L'appel à l'Afrique, 408. [52] Michel, L'appel à l'Afrique, 407–8. [53] Edouard de Martonne, ‘La Vérité sur les Tirailleurs Sénégalais’, Outre-Mer: Revue Générale de Colonisation 7 (1935): 41. [54] See Bidwell, Morocco under Colonial Rule, 297. [55] See Recham, Les musulmans algériens, 23–4. [56] Benamrane, L'émigration algérienne, 28; and Ruf, ‘Politische und ökonomische Ursachen’, 68. [57] Lunn, Memoirs of the Maelstrom, 140–7. [58] Michel, L'appel à l'Afrique, 329–30. [59] See Merewether and Smith, The Indian Corps in France, 332. [60] See Greenhut, ‘The Imperial Reserve’, 65. [61] Michel, L'appel à l'Afrique, 337. [62] See, for example, Auswärtiges Amt, Employment, Contrary to International Law, of Coloured Troops; Belius, Die farbigen Hilfsvölker. [63] See, for example, Frankreich und die Genfer Konvention, 2 vols. (1917); German Reichstag, Völkerrecht im Weltkrieg. [64] See Deroo and Champeaux, La Force Noire, 62–5. [65] Horne and Kramer, ‘German “Atrocities”’; idem, ‘War between Soldiers and Enemy Civilians’; idem, German Atrocities, 1914. [66] See Sterckx, La tête et les seins, 79–81. [67] See, for example, Marthe Bigot, ‘Armée Noire’, Humanité, 31 October 1920: 1. [68] See also Read, Atrocity Propaganda, 4. [69] See Koller, ‘Von Wilden aller Rassen niedergemetzelt’; idem, ‘Enemy Images’, 139–57; Kettlitz, Afrikanische Soldaten; Lunn, ‘“Les Races Guerrières”’; Lüsebrink, ‘“Tirailleurs Sénégalais”’, 57–71; Martin, ‘German and French Perceptions’; and Melzer, ‘The “Mise–en–Scène” of the “Tirailleurs Sénégalais”’, 213–44. [70] Auswärtiges Amt, Employment, Contrary to International Law, of Coloured Troops. [71] Rosen, England, 96 and 98; Valois, Nieder mit England!, 7; Borchardt, ‘Der Krieg und die deutsche Selbsteinkehr’, 243; Lisbeth Dill, ‘Die Gefangenenlager bei Merseburg’, Gartenlaube 63 (1915): 7–9; Ein Dutzend englischer Sünden wider das Völkerrecht: Tatsachen und Feststellungen (1916): 5; Kriegschronik. Kriegstagebuch, Soldatenbriefe, Kriegsbilder, June 1915: 48; Illustrierte Geschichte des Weltkrieges, vol. 5 (Stuttgart, 1916) 307; and Baer, Der Völkerkrieg., vol. 3, 217 and vol. 10,107. [72] Rabah Abdallah Boukabouya, L'Islam dans l'armée française (Constantinople, 1915); idem, ‘Die marokkanischen Kaids unter der französischen Herrschaft’, Korrespondenzblatt der Nachrichtenstelle für den Orient, 3 (1916): 220–2, 271–3 and 328–30; idem, ‘Der General Gourand als Generalresident von Marokko’, Korrespondenzblatt der Nachrichtenstelle für den Orient, 3 (1916): 419–20; idem, ‘Das Protektorat über Marokko. General Lyautey und seine Islampolitik’, Islamische Welt, 1, no. 3 (1917): 57–8 and 1, no. 4 (1917): 253–4; idem, ‘Die “Weissen Väter”’, Islamische Welt, 1, no. 6 (1917): 352–3; idem, ‘Der zukünftige Friede und die algerischen Muslims’, Islamische Welt, 1, no. 9 (1917): 557–9. On Boukabouya see also Müller, Islam, gihad (‘Heiliger Krieg’) und Deutsches Reich, 270, 292–6, 341–47. [73] See Höpp, Muslime in der Mark; Kahleyss, Muslime in Brandenburg; and Hinz, ‘Die deutschen “Barbaren” sind doch die besseren Menschen’, 339–61. [74] See, for example, Müller–Meiningen, Der Weltkrieg und das Völkerrecht, 68–9. Also Schütze, Englands Blutschuld gegen die weiße Rasse; and Stibbe, German Anglophobia, 38–43. [75] La Dépêche Coloniale, 18 August 1914. [76] Cited in Michel, L'appel à l'Afrique, 345. [77] See, for example, Boussenot, La France d'outre–mer, 23. [78] Alphonse Séché, ‘Les Noirs: L'âme du Sénégalais’, L'Opinion 8/41 (1915): 286–8. [79] Gaillet, Coulibaly. [80] See Gervereau, ‘De bien trop noirs desseins’. [81] Cited in Diallo, Force–Bonté, 113. [82] Cousturier, Des Inconnus chez moi, 12–13. [83] Melzer, ‘The “Mise-en-Scène” of the “Tirailleurs Sénégalais”’', 222–8. This is a play on words with the expressions teutons (Teutons, Germans) and tétons (tits). [84] Tharaud and Tharaud, La randonnée de Samba Diouf, 100. [85] ‘L'utilisation des Troupes Noires’, Revue de Paris 24 (1917): 872–94 (here 882). [86] ‘Troupes coloniales: Nos forces ignorés’, Revue de Paris 17 (1915): 265–80 (here 266). [87] ‘Les Noirs: Soldats de la civilization’, Afrique Française 27 (1917): 317–318 (here 317). [88] Meynier and Thobie, Histoire de le France Coloniale, vol. 2, 424. [89] See Vankoski, ‘Letters Home’; Koller, ‘Überkreuzende Frontlinien?’; idem, ‘Krieg, Fremdheitserfahrung und Männlichkeit’, 117–28; idem, ‘Representing Otherness’; Omissi, ‘Europe through Indian Eyes’, 371–96. [90] Omissi, Indian Voices of the Great War, 39. [91] Omissi, Indian Voices of the Great War, 33–4. [92] Omissi, Indian Voices of the Great War, 96–7. [93] Diallo, Force-Bonté. On Diallo see also Midiohouan, ‘Le tirailleur sénégalais’, 133–51; Riesz, ‘The Tirailleur Sénégalais’; idem, ‘Die Probe aufs Exempel’, 433–54. [94] Lunn, Memoirs of the Maelstrom. See also idem, ‘Kande Kamara Speaks’; Koller, ‘“Pourquoi pleurer pour des fils ingrats?”’. [95] See Nelson, ‘Black Horror on the Rhine’; Marks, ‘Black Watch on the Rhine’; Lebzelter, ‘Die “Schwarze Schmach”’; Koller, “Von Wilden aller Rassen niedergemetzelt”; idem, ‘Die “Schwarze Schmach”’, 155–69. [96] Boelcke, Kriegspropaganda, 130. [97] See Scheck, Hitler's African Victims. [98] de Coquet, Nous sommes les occupants, 107. [99] See, for example, Deroo, La Force Noire, 203–11.

This study reports results of psychological assessment among military participants in Operation Desert Storm, a more diverse ethnic and gender mix of American troops than has been mobilized for previous military operations. Symptoms of current psychological distress, including negative mood states, somatic complaints, and posttraumatic stress disorder, in addition to personal and trauma characteristics, were measured in 653 Persian Gulf war-zone-exposed and 259 stateside-duty troops to test the hypothesis that ethnic minority status and female gender are associated with greater levels of psychological distress following war-zone duty. Findings point to potentially negative sequelae to war-zone stress in a portion of troops and suggest that ethnic minorities, but not necessarily women, may be more vulnerable to psychological risk.

Daytime and seasonal patterns of roaring and spacing are described for the red howler monkey, Alouatta seniculus. A seasonal difference in howling at midday during the dry season is correlated with high temperature and high insolation. Interacting troops come closer to each other and roar more during the dry season, when they often meet around fruiting figs, than during the wet season. It is suggested that during the dry season food is more patchily distributed, which results in more intense competition between the groups. Smaller or lower quality food patches may be available to A. seniculus than to A. palliata of Central America. The limited data support the hypothesis that howlers minimize the costs of travel by forming smaller troops when smaller or lower quality food patches are available.

During the Gulf War, U.S. media portrayed Vietnam-era protesters as having treated American soldiers shamefully during the Vietnam War. Even Gulf War protesters lent credence to this historical interpretation. By “supporting the troops,” dissenters distanced themselves from their counterparts during the Vietnam era and its “remembered” anti-troop sentiments. But after analysis of Vietnam era media, we find that the media of the time—consistent with most subsequent published accounts—did not report the movement as “anti-troop.” Although policymakers frequently attempted to imply that protesters were anti-troop, we find virtually no instances of protesters themselves being reported as targeting the troops. Our findings show that the memory of protester-troop antagonism is not so much the product of conflict between these two groups, but rather of a selectively remembered and edited past. Just as it hamstrung the anti-war movement during the Gulf War, the current recollection may endure as part of the conditions facing opponents of future military actions.