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Abstract Xi Jinping has been pushing to make his thought a major addition to China’s ideology, which guides China’s direction of travel. No other Chinese leader apart from Mao Zedong had their theoretical contributions elevated to this status. This book provides a contextualized reading of Xi Jinping Thought and examines how it has been implemented in practice. While China’s political system remains a Leninist party-state, how it operates has been substantially modified following the introduction of Xi Thought. What has happened is akin to replacing the operating system of a computer. This book conceptualizes the modified system as a Sino-centric consultative Leninist system. The Chinese Communist Party is being reinvigorated as a Leninist machine, by which the Party leads everything. A new de facto social contract is offered to the Chinese people, who are being indoctrinated by Xi Thought so they will think like “one patriotic people.” China’s economy is being restructured following Xi’s vision of a “socialist market economy,” while its interactions with the rest of the world, his reconstruction of the ancient tianxia, or all-under-heaven, world order, which commits to a “China First” principle. The end goal set in Xi Thought is the fulfillment of “the China Dream of national rejuvenation” by 2050 at the latest. Whether this will come to pass or not, the introduction of Xi Thought has already changed China, with significant implications for the rest of the world.

X i Jinping's full report to the 19 th Chinese Communist Party (CCP) Congress in October 2017 seeks to "ensure and improve living standards through sustainable development;" China's relatively slow growth rate since 2009 has required a rebalancing of its economy away from investment-led growth and towards a more consumption-driven economy, "the new normal." This phrase has been commonly used in China to indicate the importance of this recalibration. Some argue the recalibration has "stalled" due to the persistence of corruption, a volatile domestic stock market, and the challenges of crucial reforms in the stateowned sector. At the same time, power is tightly held by the one-party system, and the underlying values of this ideology create an intriguing context for examining tension-points in the contested space over global influence between China and the US, with the latter remaining (for the moment) the world's biggest economy. Now that the National People's Congress amended the Constitution to remove presidential term limits (enabling General-Secretary Xi to retain power indefinitely), Xi holds more power than any Chinese leader before him except perhaps Mao Zedong. Significantly, the People's Liberation Army (PLA) backed the NPC's move, giving Xi a "tight grip on the gun against potential political backlash and popular dissent." In 2017, the 19 th Party Congress officially incorporated "Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era" (Xi Jinping xin shidai zhongguo tese shehui zhuyi sixiang ) into the CCP constitution. (4) Xi Jinping Thought (Xi Jinping sixiang ), as it is simply known, is based on his "Four-Pronged Comprehensive Strategy" (si ge quanmian zhanle buju ; hereafter "Four Comprehensives"). The Four Comprehensives encompasses the interrelated narratives of 1. Building a moderately prosperous society, 2. Deepening reform, 3. Governing the nation according to law, and 4. Tightening party discipline. The purpose of the Four Comprehensives is to continue building socialism with Chinese characteristics. This strategy's grand aims to "build a moderately prosperous society, deepen reform, govern the nation according to law, and tighten Party discipline" Further, the four interrelated prongs represent a key to Xi Jinping Thought; together, the prongs position the CCP at the centre of every aspect of economic development, social cohesion, law, and governance, and as a totalising discourse, give little room for dissent. This paper's purpose is to describe the "four-pronged comprehensives strategy," and to critically appraise key tension points and obstacles to its implementation.

An overview of the political and persona career of China's current present Xi Jinping, his career, political outlook and diplomacy.<br/>China has become the powerhouse of the world economy, its incredible boom overseen by the elite members of the secretive and all-powerful communist party. But since the election of Xi Jinping as General Secretary, life at the top in China has changed. Under the guise of a corruption crackdown, which has seen his rivals imprisoned, Xi Jinping has been quietly building one of the most powerful leaderships modern China has ever seen. In CEO China, the noted China expert Kerry Brown reveals the hidden story of the rise of the man dubbed the 'Chinese Godfather'. Brown investigates his relationship with his revolutionary father, who was expelled by Mao during the Cultural Revolution, his business dealings and allegiances in China's regional power struggles and his role in the internal battle raging between the old men of the Deng era and the new super-rich 'princelings'. Xi Jinping's China is powerful, aggressive and single-minded and this book will become a must-read for the Western world.

Chinese politics are at a crossroads as President Xi Jinping amasses personal power and tests the constraints of collective leadership. In the years since he became general secretary of the Chinese Communist Party in 2012, Xi Jinping has surprised many people in China and around the world with his bold anti-corruption campaign and his aggressive consolidation of power. Given these new developments, we must rethink how we analyze Chinese politics—an urgent task as China now has more influence on the global economy and regional security than at any other time in modern history. Chinese Politics in the Xi Jinping Era examines how the structure and dynamics of party leadership have evolved since the late 1990s and argues that “inner-party democracy," the concept of collective leadership that emphasizes deal-making based on accepted rules and norms, may pave the way for greater transformation within China's political system. Xi's legacy will largely depend on whether he encourages or obstructs this trend of political institutionalization in the governance of the world's most populous and increasingly pluralistic country. Cheng Li addresses the recruitment and composition of the political elite, a central concern in Chinese politics. China analysts will benefit from the meticulously detailed biographical information of the 376 members of the 18th Central Committee, including tables and charts detailing their family background, education, occupation, career patterns, and mentor–patron ties

During 2013-2015 an expansion of the China JinPing underground Laboratory (CJPL) will be undertaken along a main branch of a bypass tunnel in the JinPing tunnel complex. This second phase of CJPL will increase laboratory space to approximately 96,000 m3, which can be compared to the existing CJPL-I volume of ∼ 4,000 m3. One design configuration has eight additional hall spaces, each over 60 m long and approximately12 m in width, with overburdens of about 2.4 km of rock, oriented parallel to and away from the main water transport and auto traffic tunnels. There are additional possibilities for further expansions at a nearby second bypass tunnel and along the entrance and exit branches of both bypass tunnels, potentially leading to an expanded CJPL comparable in size to Gran Sasso. Concurrent with the excavation activities, planning is underway for dark matter and other rare-event detectors, as well as for geophysics/engineering and other coupled multi-disciplinary sensors. In the town meeting on 8 September, 2013 at Asilomar, CA, associated with the 13th International Conference on Topics in Astroparticle and Underground Physics (TAUP), presentations and panel discussions addressed plans for one-ton expansions of the current CJPL germanium detector array of the China Darkmatter EXperiment (CDEX) collaboration and of the duel-phase xenon detector of the Panda-X collaboration, as well as possible new detector initiatives for dark matter studies, low-energy solar neutrino detection, neutrinoless double beta searches, and geoneutrinos. JinPing was also discussed as a site for a low-energy nuclear astrophysics accelerator. Geophysics/engineering opportunities include acoustic and micro-seismic monitoring of rock bursts during and after excavation, coupled-process in situ measurements, local, regional, and global monitoring of seismically induced radon emission, and electromagnetic signals. Additional ideas and projects will likely be developed in the next few years, driven by China's domestic needs and by international experiments requiring access to very great depths.

1. Factors Behind Xi Jinping's Rise: Factional Intrigue and Controversies Over the Future of Reform 2. The Making of a New Helmsman 3. Xi Jinping's Ideology and Politics 4. Economics vs. Politics: Beijing's Uphill Battle to Retool the China Model 5. China's Great Leap Outward 6 Conclusion: Xi Jinping and the Closing of the Chinese Mind

Abstract China Jinping Underground Laboratory (CJPL) is ideal for studying solar, geo-, and supernova neutrinos. A precise measurement of the cosmic-ray background is essential in proceeding with R&amp;D research for these MeV-scale neutrino experiments. Using a 1-ton prototype detector for the Jinping Neutrino Experiment (JNE), we detected 264 high-energy muon events from a 645.2-day dataset from the first phase of CJPL (CJPL-I), reconstructed their directions, and measured the cosmic-ray muon flux to be cm s . The observed angular distributions indicate the leakage of cosmic-ray muon background and agree with simulation data accounting for Jinping mountain's terrain. A survey of muon fluxes at different laboratory locations, considering both those situated under mountains and those down mine shafts, indicates that the flux at the former is generally a factor of larger than at the latter, with the same vertical overburden. This study provides a convenient back-of-the-envelope estimation for the muon flux of an underground experiment.

China's domestic politics and foreign policy have evolved considerably under President Xi Jinping. Domestically the regime has actively promoted the idea of the ‘China dream’ to restore optimism and enthusiasm about its future, particularly among young people. Yet it has also sought to differentiate the socialist China dream from any resemblance to the American dream. Its main emphasis is on making China ‘strong and powerful’ again. In foreign policy, the leadership has become more active. While China has pursued a more robust policy in the South China Sea, it has also launched two extremely ambitious long-term projects to expand land and maritime transport links between China and Europe, termed the ‘one belt, one road’ initiative. They aim to promote development of western China, but if successful, they should also help to transform economic relations across large parts of Eurasia. In geopolitical terms, they will expand China's shadow over regions of the world where hitherto its presence has been relatively modest. They should strengthen links with Europe, as well as with other countries along the routes, to counterbalance potentially conflictual relations with the US. However, success will require active and enthusiastic cooperation from many neighbours. For that reason the risks are as great as the ambition.

This article discusses the rationale for, and progress to date of, creating a National Security Commission in China, a move first announced in late 2013. Central impulses for the Commission's establishment are to help better coordinate a very fragmented bureaucracy and to advance Xi Jinping's drive to consolidate his personal power over the internal and external coercive and diplomatic arms of the governing structure. The Commission is a work in progress and its full institutional maturation will take a protracted period. In the midst of the Commission's construction, there is considerable confusion among subordinates in the foreign policy and security areas about lines of authority and ultimate objectives. Beyond Xi Jinping, it is difficult to discern an authoritative voice. It is an open question as to whether this institutional attempt to achieve coordination will improve, or further complicate, China's long-standing coordination problem, some recent foreign policy achievements notwithstanding. The Commission's focus is heavily weighted toward internal and periphery security, but it also is an institution-building response to new global and transnational issues. It is not self-evident that Xi, or any single individual, can effectively manage the span of control he is constructing.

Time Line of the People's Republic of ChinaIntroduction: China's New Leadership in Domestic and International PoliticsJo Inge Bekkevold and Robert S. RossPart 1. Domestic Challenges for the Chinese Leadership1. China's Fifth-Generation Leaders: Characteristics of the New Elite and Pathways to LeadershipBo Zhiyue2. The Development of China's Formal Political StructuresZheng Yongnian and Weng Cuifen3. The Challenges of Economic Growth and ReformBarry Naughton4. The Challenges of Stability and LegitimacyJoseph FewsmithPart II: International Challenges to Rising China5. Xi Jinping's Grand Strategy: From Vision to ImplementationStig Stenslie and Chen Gang6. Domestic Actors and the Fragmentation of China's Foreign PolicyLinda Jakobson7. China's Rise and International Regimes: Does China Seek to Overthrow Global Norms?Andrew J. Nathan8. China's Rise and Economic InterdependenceHelge Hveem and T. J. Pempel9. Xi Jinping and the Challenges to Chinese SecurityRobert S. Ross and Mingjiang LiConclusion: New Leaders, Stronger China, Harder ChoicesJo Inge Bekkevold and Robert S. RossContributors Index

Monitoring and prediction of rockburst remain to be worldwide challenges in geotechnical engineering. In hydropower, transportation and other engineering fields in China, more deep, long and large tunnels have been under construction in recent years and underground caverns are more evidently featured by “long, large, deep and in group”, which bring in many problems associated with rock mechanics problems at great depth, especially rockburst. Rockbursts lead to damages to not only underground structures and equipments but also personnel safety. It has been a major technical bottleneck in future deep underground engineering in China. In this paper, compared with earthquake prediction, the feasibility in principle of monitoring and prediction of rockbursts is discussed, considering the source zones, development cycle and scale. The authors think the feasibility of rockburst prediction can be understood in three aspects: (1) the heterogeneity of rock is the main reason for the existence of rockburst precursors; (2) deformation localization is the intrinsic cause of rockburst; and (3) the interaction between target rock mass and its surrounding rock mass is the external cause of rockburst. As an engineering practice, the application of microseismic monitoring techniques during tunnel construction of Jinping II Hydropower Station was reported. It is found that precursory microcracking exists prior to most rockbursts, which could be captured by the microseismic monitoring system. The stress concentration is evident near structural discontinuities (such as faults or joints), which shall be the focus of rockburst monitoring. It is concluded that, by integrating the microseismic monitoring and the rock failure process simulation, the feasibility of rockburst prediction is expected to be enhanced.

In the space of a few years, China’s global image with regard to environmental matters has significantly improved. Particularly since Xi Jinping’s coming-to-power in 2012 China’s reputation in the global climate change regime has improved markedly and it has gained accolades for a new determination to reverse environmental degradation at home. China’s incipient green transformation is partly due to a new actor constellation in environmental governance, a striking feature of which is the prominence of ad hoc campaigns that offer quick results but that may undermine the creation of law-based enforcement mechanisms in the long term. Another development – China’s increasing use of emerging technologies and big data analytics – has given rise to new forms of government-business alliances. These new players and innovative approaches have injected momentum into China’s environmental governance system and suggest that, contrary to conventional wisdom, authoritarian regimes can be responsive to citizen demands under certain circumstances. Yet it remains to be seen whether long-term environmental goals can be met, due to a pervasive lack of accountability, the weakening of civil society and heavy constraints on public participation.

This study examines changes in grassroots participation and repression under the Chinese leaders Hu Jintao and Xi Jinping. Under Xi, the Party-state has launched political campaigns against a range of grassroots activists and organizations. This entails a shift in state repression from fragmentation to consolidation, and it has resulted in less room for contentious participation. However, institutionalized political participation—activities by ordinary people aimed at changing government behavior through official channels—has persisted. The Hu administration presided over the development of new institutions of public participation, and there is little evidence for their decay. Despite important breaks from the past under Xi, there are noteworthy continuities in the institutions that enable grassroots participation.

China's grand strategy under Xi Jinping is clearly distinctive. It does not, however, fundamentally break with the grand strategy that China has embraced since the early 1990s—one that aims to realize what is now labeled “the dream of national rejuvenation.” Leaders in Beijing have implemented three different approaches to this strategy. In 1992, the approach to rejuvenation followed Deng Xiaoping's admonition for China to hide its capabilities and bide its time. In 1996, Beijing shifted to a more proactive approach, peaceful rise, seeking to reassure others that a stronger and wealthier China would not pose a threat. In 2012, Xi again recast the grand strategy of rejuvenation to realize the Chinese dream. His approach is distinguished by its combination of three efforts: (1) continuing earlier attempts to reassure others about the benign intentions of rising China, (2) moving China from rhetoric to action in promoting reform of an international order that has facilitated China's rise, and (3) resisting challenges to what the Chinese Communist Party defines as the country's core interests. Xi's bolder approach has further clarified China's long-standing international aspirations and triggered reactions abroad that raise doubts about the prospects for his approach to realizing the goal of national rejuvenation.

Since the leadership transition in China in November 2012, there have been significant changes in Chinese foreign policy. It has been widely observed that under the new leadership headed by President Xi Jinping, Beijing has become more assertive in international affairs. This paper ex- amines the emerging contours of China's foreign policy under Xi and the implications for the future regional order in the Asia Pacific. It argues that recent international behaviour of China is the manifestation of a new phase of Chinese foreign policy that could be defined as ‘peaceful rise 2.0’. In this analysis, while Beijing still adheres to its declared ‘peaceful development’ policy aiming to maintain a stable external environment conducive to its ascendance, the manner in which it seeks to do so are considerably different from past decades. The paper further argues that despite China's growing power, President Xi faces greater difficulties than his predecessor to achieve his foreign policy objectives. Indeed Beijing's capacity to shape the regional environment in its favour in the near future is arguably declining rather than increasing.

The China Jinping Underground Laboratory, inaugurated in 2010, is an underground research facility with the deepest rock overburden and largest space by volume in the world. The first-generation science programs include dark matter searches conducted by the CDEX and PandaX experiments. These activities are complemented by measurements of ambient radioactivity and the installation of low-background counting systems. Phase II of the facility is being constructed, and its potential research projects are being formulated. In this review, we discuss the history, key features, results, and status of this facility and its experimental programs, as well as their future evolution and plans.

China JinPing underground Laboratory (CJPL) is the deepest underground laboratory presently running in the world. In such a deep underground laboratory, the cosmic ray flux is a very important and necessary parameter for rare event experiments. A plastic scintillator telescope system has been set up to measure the cosmic ray flux. The performance of the telescope system has been studied using the cosmic ray on the ground laboratory near CJPL. Based on the underground experimental data taken from November 2010 to December 2011 in CJPL, which has effective live time of 171 days, the cosmic ray muon flux in CJPL is measured to be (2.0+-0.4)*10^(-10)/(cm^2)/(s). The ultra-low cosmic ray background guarantees CJPL's ideal environment for dark matter experiment.

In The Third Revolution, Elizabeth Economy, one of America's leading China scholars, provides an authoritative overview of contemporary China that makes sense of all of the seeming inconsistencies and ambiguities in its policies and actions.

Physics prospects of the Jinping neutrino experiment* , Beacom, John F., Chen, Shaomin, Cheng, Jianping, Doustimotlagh, Sayed N., Gao, Yuanning, Gong, Guanghua, Gong, Hui, Guo, Lei, Han, Ran, He, Hong-Jian, Huang, Xingtao, Li, Jianmin, Li, Jin, Li, Mohan, Li, Xueqian, Liao, Wei, Lin, Guey-Lin, Liu, Zuowei, McDonough, William, Šrámek, Ondřej, Tang, Jian, Wan, Linyan, Wang, Yuanqing, Wang, Zhe, Wang, Zongyi, Wei, Hanyu, Xi, Yufei, Xu, Ye, Xu, Xun-Jie, Yang, Zhenwei, Yao, Chunfa, Yeh, Minfang, Yue, Qian, Zhang, Liming, Zhang, Yang, Zhao, Zhihong, Zheng, Yangheng, Zhou, Xiang, Zhu, Xianglei, Zuber, Kai