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Evolutionary anthropology provides a powerful theoretical framework for understanding how both current environments and legacies of past selection shape human behavioral diversity. This integrative and pluralistic field, combining ethnographic, demographic, and sociological methods, has provided new insights into the ultimate forces and proximate pathways that guide human adaptation and variation. Here, we present the argument that evolutionary anthropological studies of human behavior also hold great, largely untapped, potential to guide the design, implementation, and evaluation of social and public health policy. Focusing on the key anthropological themes of reproduction, production, and distribution we highlight classic and recent research demonstrating the value of an evolutionary perspective to improving human well-being. The challenge now comes in transforming relevance into action and, for that, evolutionary behavioral anthropologists will need to forge deeper connections with other applied social scientists and policy-makers. We are hopeful that these developments are underway and that, with the current tide of enthusiasm for evidence-based approaches to policy, evolutionary anthropology is well positioned to make a strong contribution.

Abstract This chapter offers a selective survey of the contributions that evolutionary anthropology (EA) can make to research in evolutionary psychology (EP). Drawing on paleoanthropology, we underscore the importance of phylogeny in understanding adaptations, including the kludgy nature of many, and the conflicts that arise among them. This approach underscores the trait‐specific nature of environments of evolutionary adaptedness (EEAs), directing attention to the differential phylogenetic depth of different adaptations. Paleoanthropology is complemented by studies of small‐scale societies, demonstrating, for example, that social dynamics in such groups indicate that mechanisms governing human cooperation likely did not stem from kin selection and reciprocal altruism. Central to anthropology is the recognition of the variation in ecologies and social structures characteristic of humans. Such variation selects for adaptations that either facultatively adjust output in light of local environment, or facilitate cultural acquisition. We examine the parasite‐stress theory (PST) account of cross‐cultural variation in light reconstructions of past societies, arguing against a strong evoked‐culture explanation, and in favor of a transmitted‐culture account wherein learning mechanisms are hijacked by cultural evolution. We close by discussing (a) ways to interpret cross‐cultural variation or uniformity; and (b) contributions of EP to EA. Finally, we offer a brief roadmap for applying EA in EP.

The Developmental Origins of Health and Disease (DOHaD) hypothesis derives from the epidemiological and basic/mechanistic health sciences. This well-supported hypothesis holds that environment during the earliest stages of life-pre-conception, pregnancy, infancy-shapes developmental trajectories and ultimately health outcomes across the lifespan. Evolutionary anthropologists from multiple subdisciplines are embracing synergies between the DOHaD framework and developmentalist approaches from evolutionary biology. Even wider dissemination and employment of DOHaD concepts will benefit evolutionary anthropological research. Insights from experimental DOHaD work will focus anthropologists' attention on biochemical/physiological mechanisms underpinning observed links between growth/health/behavioral outcomes and environmental contexts. Furthermore, the communication tools and wide public appeal of developmentalist health scientific research may facilitate the translation/application of evolutionary anthropological findings. Evolutionary Anthropology, in turn, can increase mainstream DOHaD research's use of evolutionary theory; holistic, longitudinal, and community-based perspectives; and engagement with populations whose environmental exposures differ from those most commonly studied in the health sciences.

Comparison is fundamental to evolutionary anthropology. When scientists study chimpanzee cognition, for example, they compare chimp performance on cognitive tasks to the performance of human children on the same tasks. And when new fossils are found, such as those of the tiny humans of Flores, scientists compare these remains to other fossils and contemporary humans. Comparison provides a way to draw general inferences about the evolution of traits and has long been the cornerstone of efforts to understand biological and cultural diversity. Individual studies of fossilized remains, living species, or human populations are the essential units of analysis in a comparative study; bringing these elements into a broader comparative framework creates a means of testing adaptive hypotheses and generating new ones. With this book, Charles L. Nunn intends to ensure that evolutionary anthropologists and organismal biologists have the tools to realize the potential of comparative research. Nunn provides a wide-ranging investigation of the comparative foundations of evolutionary anthropology in past and present research, including studies of animal behavior, biodiversity, linguistic evolution, allometry, and cross-cultural variation. He also points the way to the future, exploring the new phylogeny-based comparative approaches and offering a how-to manual for scientists who wish to incorporate these new methods into their research.

Neo-Darwinian evolution is widely acknowledged as the key framework for understanding the form and function of living systems, including myriad aspects of animal behavior. Yet extensions to human behavior and society are perennially challenged; debates are vociferous and seemingly irresolvable, and evolutionary approaches to human behavior are marginalized within much of anthropology and other social sciences. This review explores this contested terrain, arguing that although many critiques of evolutionary analyses of behavior are faulty, some valid concerns must be addressed. Human agency, behavioral plasticity, and the partial autonomy of cultural and historical change present real challenges to the standard evolutionary framework. However, several additions to the standard framework currently employed by evolutionary anthropologists and others address these concerns and provide a more comprehensive understanding of human behavioral evolution and adaptation. These additions include phenotypic adaptation, cultural transmission, gene-culture coevolution, and niche construction.

The theory of punctuated equilibrium (PE) was developed a little over 50 years ago to explain long-term, large-scale appearance and disappearance of species in the fossil record. A theory designed specifically for that purpose cannot be expected, out of the box, to be directly applicable to biocultural evolution, but in revised form, PE offers a promising approach to incorporating not only a wealth of recent empirical research on genetic, linguistic, and technological evolution but also large databases that document human biological and cultural diversity across time and space. Here we isolate the fundamental components of PE and propose which pieces, when reassembled or renamed, can be highly useful in evolutionary anthropology, especially as humanity faces abrupt ecological challenges on an increasingly larger scale.

My aim in this article is to elucidate the relevance of the evolutionary paradigm to the study of kinship and marriage systems. I begin with a discussion of conceptual and methodological issues that arise in approaching human social systems from an evolutionary perspective. I then narrow the focus on key tools used in contemporary cross-cultural research within evolutionary anthropology. Next, as a case study, I provide an overview of work aimed at reconstructing the (pre)history of the nuclear family in Indo-European-speaking societies, focusing on the interplay between monogamous marriage and neolocal residence. I conclude with musings on the prospect of a biologically based social anthropology.

The coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic is responsible for the large-scale devastation experienced all over the world. This ‘invisible stranger’ interrupting our daily lives is highlighting in a new and acute way the vulnerability of the human race. Life as we knew it is being changed forever. COVID-19 also exposed the injustices embedded in social structures all over the world. What will life with and after COVID-19 look like in South Africa? The pandemic reveals that South Africa is not the fair and just society we hoped for since the transition to a democratic country in 1994. In light of this, we should be preparing ourselves for the new ‘abnormal’ as what seemed normal was problematic and therefore, truly abnormal. Seeking guidance from evolutionary anthropology, this article will explore whether the evolutionary story of Homo sapiens might offer us insights on how to successfully navigate the multiple challenges COVID-19 unmasks and also brings forth. A discussion on the evolutionary history of homo sapiens within the context of niche construction theory reveals that our unique capacity for imagination and creative collaboration made us successful as a species. It is these capacities for imagination and cooperation that might facilitate us in successfully imagining and thereafter living the new ‘abnormal’. In this article, the question of imaging the new ‘abnormal’ will be explored. Contribution: By creatively integrating the perspectives evident in this research, this article explores whether the Prophets of Israel might offer a feasible paradigm to determine coordinates for the imagined new ‘abnormal’ to be a more fair and just society.

Today, scholars from numerous and highly diverse fields are not only addressing the question of what makes us human, but also seeking input from other disciplines to inform their answers to this fundamental issue. However, for the most part, evolutionary anthropologists are not particularly prominent in this discussion, or at least not acknowledged to be. Why is this the case? One reason may be that although evolutionary anthropologists are uniquely positioned to provide valuable insight on this subject, the responses from any one of us are likely to be as different as the research specializations and intellectual experiences that we bring to the table. Indeed, one would anticipate that a paleoanthropologist would not only have different views than a primatologist, geneticist, or behavioral ecologist, but from other paleoanthropologists as well. Yet if asked by a theologian, psychologist, or political scientist, and perhaps most importantly, by any curious person outside the walls of academia, do we have a response that most evolutionary anthropologists could agree on as reflecting our contributions to the understanding of being and becoming human? Our introductory textbooks usually begin with this fundamental question, yet seldom produce a concise answer.

This paper sketches successive refinements, optional renderings, and disclaimers of the ape model of hominid evolution from its initial statement by Darwin, Huxley, and Haeckel until 1973. I suggest that of the four principal ape models that have been advanced-brachiating troglodytian; brachiating, bipedal hylobatian; knuckle-walking, brachiating troglodytian; and pristine ground ape-the hylobatian model of Morton is the most convincing. Thus, future biomechanical, experimental, and theoretic studies might be profitably focused on determination of the arboreal adaptive complexes that were fundamental to the initial divergence of the hominids and the pongid apes. The 19th-century ape model and the burgeoning research provoked by it during the past century seem to satisfy Kuhn's criteria for the establishment of a normal science. Hence we might refer to the ape paradigm as the foundation of a normal science of evolutionary anthropology, especially in the aspect which deals with the emergence and other early phases of the hominid career.

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Abstract Life‐history theory has been developed in biology to explain the variation in timing of fertility, growth, developmental rates, and death of living organisms, as well as events directly tied to these parameters. The theory is useful in explaining variations in age‐specific human fertility and mortality patterns, as well as understanding how the human life course evolved to patterns so divergent from those that characterize our close primate relatives. Surprisingly, this same theory can also be used to explain why people often ignore the long‐term consequences of behaviors that produce short‐term gain.

In psychological research, there are often assumptions about the conditions that children expect to encounter during their development. These assumptions shape prevailing ideas about the experiences that children are capable of adjusting to, and whether their responses are viewed as impairments or adaptations. Specifically, the expected childhood is often depicted as nurturing and safe, and characterized by high levels of caregiver investment. Here, we synthesize evidence from history, anthropology, and primatology to challenge this view. We integrate the findings of systematic reviews, meta-analyses, and cross-cultural investigations on three forms of threat (infanticide, violent conflict, and predation) and three forms of deprivation (social, cognitive, and nutritional) that children have faced throughout human evolution. Our results show that mean levels of threat and deprivation were higher than is typical in industrialized societies, and that our species has experienced much variation in the levels of these adversities across space and time. These conditions likely favored a high degree of phenotypic plasticity, or the ability to tailor development to different conditions. This body of evidence has implications for recognizing developmental adaptations to adversity, for cultural variation in responses to adverse experiences, and for definitions of adversity and deprivation as deviation from the expected human childhood.

The author's original aim in writing this work was to chronicle the story of a very specific debate in human evolutionary studies that took place between the late 1880s and the 1930s - the 'eolith' debate that had to do with small, natural stones whose shape and edges suggested to our earliest ancestors their use as tools. These were the most primitive of tools, thought to date to the very beginning of human cultural evolution, and therefore suited to our very earliest ancestors. The more the author researched this topic the more he realised that its explanation was rooted in a number of research questions which today are considered separate subjects, and, gradually, a book that was to be about a forgotten Palaeolithic debate became a book that was just as much about 'Morlocks', stone tools, racial difference, and the Anthropological Society of London

It is typical of much theology in the Catholic tradition to frame an understanding of humanity, and of the human being’s relationship to both the world and God, with the help of categories of nature and grace. While in Protestant thought, grace is characteristically conceived as a response to sin, in Catholic thought it is more fundamentally understood as an ‘elevation’ of nature. How more precisely to understand the relationship of grace to nature, however, has itself been a point of contestation within Catholic theology, especially in the last century. This chapter will present the understanding of grace of one particular Catholic thinker, Karl Rahner (1904–1984), setting his understanding of grace both against the background of earlier Catholic positions, and within the context of his broader theological anthropology. Rahner’s theology makes clear how difficult it is to find in a specifically theological concept of grace something that might be fruitful in empirical work – difficult, but perhaps not quite impossible.

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