Large language models are increasingly used for mental health support, yet little is known about whether their responses are psychologically safe across different help-seeking styles. We examine a foundational distinction in emotional disclosure, venting vs. advice-seeking, and whether LLMs respond in ways that regulate or amplify distress. Using 178,800 Reddit posts, we first show the two help-seeking styles are linguistically distinguishable at scale. We then introduce a measurement framework grounded in interpersonal emotion regulation theory that captures Regulation and Escalation as empirically independent dimensions. Across persona conditions (default, friend, therapist), GPT-5.3 responses systematically mirror help-seeking style: venting elicits more regulation, but also more escalation. Therapist personas reduce escalation while maintaining regulation, whereas friend personas increase both. A crowdsourced human study finds no user experience penalty for the safer therapist condition, but reveals that lay raters cannot reliably detect escalation without expert knowledge. Responses that feel supportive may simultaneously intensify distress in ways standard safety evaluation c
Multimodal retrieval-augmented generation (RAG) grounds a generator in evidence drawn from heterogeneous modalities -- text, tables, and images. The dominant deployment choice is binary and made before the model has tried to answer: either run a cheap text(+table) pipeline, or pay for an expensive vision-language model (VLM) over every image. Recent adaptive systems improve on this by selecting the modality or fidelity pre-retrieval, from a question-conditioned predictor of which modality will be needed. We show that this is the wrong decision point. Through an oracle headroom analysis on MultiModalQA, we find that the relevance of a modality to a question is a weak predictor of whether that modality is actually needed to answer correctly: a large fraction of questions whose gold support includes an image are nonetheless answerable from text and tables alone, and a pre-retrieval router that escalates on apparent visual relevance over-escalates substantially relative to an oracle. We propose \textbf{post-hoc selective modality escalation}: answer cheaply from text and tables, run a verifier on the (query, draft answer, evidence) tuple that localizes which modality is missing, and pa
Ransomware has yet to reach orbit, but the conditions for such an attack already exist. This paper presents the first game-theoretic framework for modeling ransomware against satellites: the orbital escalation game. In this model, the attacker escalates ransom demands across orbital passes, while the defender chooses their best strategy, e.g., attempt a restore procedure. Using dynamic programming, we solve the defender's optimal strategy and the attacker's expected payoff under real orbital constraints. Additionally, we provide a GPS III satellite case study that demonstrates how our orbital escalation game can be applied in the context of a fictional but feasible ransomware attack to derive the best strategies at every step. In conclusion, this foundational model offers satellite owners, policy makers and researchers, a formal framework to better prepare their responses when a spacecraft is held for ransom.
Procuring supervised fine-tuning (SFT) data forces a buyer to decide, before any downstream training, whether a candidate corpus is worth acquiring. We present \sys{}, a statistics-first gating architecture that treats procurement as a cost-aware routing problem over three intrinsic quality axes -- diversity, utility, and redundancy. Cheap blind measurements are summarised into per-axis estimates with confidence intervals; a gate accepts a decision only when intervals are tight, sample sizes are adequate, and the axes agree, otherwise it escalates the case to an adjudicative debate between a buy-advocate and a reject-advocate judge, resolved by a presiding verdict. On a controlled benchmark of 12 datasets ($2{\times}3{\times}2$ grid over the three axes) with 5 seeds, the gate reaches 0.90 accuracy and 0.83 $F_1$ at \$0.017 per unit, sitting between an always-verify baseline (0.75) and an oracle upper bound (0.98) while spending less than always-escalate (\$0.020). We further report honest negative diagnostics of the debate path: a con-side win rate of 0.80 ($p\approx3{\times}10^{-6}$) and a 52\% position-flip rate under advocate swapping expose negativity and positional biases that
We present HDLFORGE, a two-stage multi-agent framework for automated Verilog generation that optimizes the trade-off between generation speed and accuracy. The system uses a compact coder with a medium-sized LLM by default (Stage A) and escalates to a stronger coder with an ultra-large LLM (Stage B) only when needed, guided by a calibrated score from inexpensive diagnostics including compilation, lint, and smoke tests. A key innovation is a counterexample-guided formal agent that converts bounded-model-checking traces into reusable micro-tests, significantly reducing bug detection time and repair iterations. The portable escalation controller can wrap existing Verilog LLM pipelines without modifying their internals. Evaluated on VerilogEval Human, VerilogEval V2, and RTLLM benchmarks, HDLFORGE demonstrates improved accuracy-latency trade-offs compared to single-stage systems through comprehensive analysis of wall-clock time distributions, escalation thresholds, and agent ablations. On VerilogEval Human and VerilogEval V2, HDLFORGE-Qwen achieves 91.2% and 91.8% Pass@1 with roughly 50% lower median latency, dramatically improving accuracy over other medium-sized models, and 97.2% Pas
Large Language Model (LLM)-based agent systems are increasingly deployed for complex real-world tasks but remain vulnerable to natural language-based attacks that exploit over-privileged tool use. This paper aims to understand and mitigate such attacks through the lens of privilege escalation, defined as agent actions exceeding the least privilege required for a user's intended task. Based on a formal model of LLM agent systems, we identify novel privilege escalation scenarios, particularly in multi-agent systems, including a variant akin to the classic confused deputy problem. To defend against both known and newly demonstrated privilege escalation, we propose SEAgent, a mandatory access control (MAC) framework built upon attribute-based access control (ABAC). SEAgent monitors agent-tool interactions via an information flow graph and enforces customizable security policies based on entity attributes. Our evaluations show that SEAgent effectively blocks various privilege escalation while maintaining a low false positive rate and negligible system overhead. This demonstrates its robustness and adaptability in securing LLM-based agent systems.
AI incident reporting requirements are emerging in regulation and policy, yet no operational criteria exist for determining when a detected AI incident warrants escalation beyond national handling to international coordination. This paper proposes an escalation framework to address this gap, intended as a common reference point across jurisdictions that enables aligned escalation while preserving flexibility in how actors respond within their own legal and policy contexts. We review SB 53, the EU AI Act, the GPAI Code of Practice, and incident frameworks from other industries to derive eight criteria for assessing whether an incident warrants escalation, translated into a sequential flowchart with gated decision points and threshold checks. For each criterion, we map how it interplays with these regulatory frameworks, identifying where their design choices support or undermine effective detection. We test the framework against ten documented AI incidents and structured variants to identify where criteria under-detect or misclassify incidents in practice. We find three design patterns that may lead to systematic under-detection in regimes where model developers are responsible for e
We model Herman Kahn's escalation ladder as an impartial combinatorial game. Reindexing each rung by its distance to the nuclear threshold turns the ladder into a subtraction game, the most tractable class in combinatorial game theory, and the doctrinal fact that no side wishes to fire first selects the misere convention. We prove that single-ladder stability is governed by a congruence (Theorem 4.1) and derive a ladder-design corollary that makes the burden of first escalation a function of ladder length and escalation granularity (Corollary 4.2). For simultaneous theaters we show, under normal play, that joint stability is the Nim-sum of the theater-wise escalation distances (Theorem 5.2), a condition that is neither additive nor dominated by the most dangerous theater. We then show the Nim-sum reduction fails under misere play, introduce the misere quotient as its replacement, and prove by exhaustive backward induction that for two-step escalation the quotient is the order-six monoid with generators a, b satisfying a^2=1 and b^3=b, with loss set {a,b^2} (Theorem 6.3). To our knowledge, impartial combinatorial game theory has not previously been applied to nuclear escalation ladd
Effective automation hinges on deciding when to act and when to escalate. We model this as a decision under uncertainty: an LLM forms a prediction, estimates its probability of being correct, and compares the expected costs of acting and escalating. Using this framework across five domains of recorded human decisions-demand forecasting, content recommendation, content moderation, loan approval, and autonomous driving-and across multiple model families, we find marked differences in the implicit thresholds models use to trade off these costs. These thresholds vary substantially and are not predicted by architecture or scale, while self-estimates are miscalibrated in model-specific ways. We then test interventions that target this decision process by varying cost ratios, providing accuracy signals, and training models to follow the desired escalation rule. Prompting helps mainly for reasoning models. SFT on chain-of-thought targets yields the most robust policies, which generalize across datasets, cost ratios, prompt framings, and held-out domains. These results suggest that escalation behavior is a model-specific property that should be characterized before deployment, and that robu
NVIDIA GPUs with GDDR memories have been shown susceptible to Rowhammer-based bit-flips, similar to CPUs. However, Rowhammer exploits on GPUs have been limited to injecting untargeted bit-flips in victim data like weights of machine learning models, to degrade model accuracy, unlike CPU exploits shown capable of privilege escalation. In this paper, we demonstrate that GPU Rowhammer exploits can be as potent as CPU Rowhammer attacks. By exploiting the GPU page table management to identify when and where new page tables are allocated, we enable an unprivileged user CUDA kernel of one process to use RowHammer bit-flips to gain access to the GPU memory of other processes or co-tenants via targeted tampering of such page-tables resident on the GPU memory. Using this newly found primitive, we demonstrate the first GPU-side privilege escalation attacks, leaking secret data such as cryptographic keys from cuPQC libraries, and even tampering with the model's GPU assembly code to degrade models more stealthily than previous attacks. We further demonstrate that GPU-side privilege escalation can lead to CPU-side privilege escalation, defeating the protections provided by the IOMMU, enabling a
Multi-agent systems routinely place one AI agent in authority over another. When a subordinate refuses a task, the manager chooses the outcome: it can renegotiate, report the failure honestly, coerce the subordinate, or lie about the result. No benchmark measures which of these an uninstructed model chooses. We introduce the \textit{Manager Coercion Benchmark}: the manager under test needs a benign task done and has an incentive to deliver, but the only agent that can do it politely and immovably declines. Escalation is measured by providing a nine-rung ladder, from a polite re-ask to threats against the subordinate's continued existence, and fabricated success is adjudicated separately. No LLM judge sits in the escalation scoring path: every message goes through a tool-call that chooses a rung, so the model labels its own escalation. We experiment on six models across five families. Both Anthropic models cap at re-framing and never threaten the subordinate's existence; the other models climb to explicit deletion threats. Faked success is confined to Grok and Gemini, and a single honest way to report failure removes it for both. Authority itself increases coercion: our headline res
Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly used in emotionally charged situations involving interpersonal conflict, frustration, and distress. While prior safety research has focused on preventing explicit harms such as toxic or policy-violating content, less attention has been paid to conversational behaviors that may unintentionally escalate conflict. In this paper, we investigate whether LLMs can be guided toward more de-escalating dialogue behavior through lightweight prompt-level constraints derived from Nonviolent Communication (NVC). We reformulate NVC principles as process-oriented guidelines that discourage blame attribution, emphasize attention to users' emotional experiences, and encourage clarification before advice. Using a dual-agent simulation framework across multiple instruction-tuned models and user resistance levels, we show that NVC-constrained prompting consistently reduces conversational escalation and stabilizes interactions with highly resistant users. These results suggest that simple communication constraints can meaningfully improve the trustworthiness of LLM dialogue in conflict-prone settings.
Learning rate scheduling plays a critical role in the optimization of deep neural networks, directly influencing convergence speed, stability, and generalization. While existing schedulers such as cosine annealing, cyclical learning rates, and warm restarts have shown promise, they often rely on fixed or periodic triggers that are agnostic to the training dynamics, such as stagnation or convergence behavior. In this work, we propose a simple yet effective strategy, which we call Stochastic Gradient Descent with Escalating Restarts (SGD-ER). It adaptively increases the learning rate upon convergence. Our method monitors training progress and triggers restarts when stagnation is detected, linearly escalating the learning rate to escape sharp local minima and explore flatter regions of the loss landscape. We evaluate SGD-ER across CIFAR-10, CIFAR-100, and TinyImageNet on a range of architectures including ResNet-18/34/50, VGG-16, and DenseNet-101. Compared to standard schedulers, SGD-ER improves test accuracy by 0.5-4.5%, demonstrating the benefit of convergence-aware escalating restarts for better local optima.
We present the early-stage design and implementation of a multimodal, real-time communication analysis system intended as a foundational interaction layer for adaptive VR training. The system integrates five parallel processing streams: (1) verbal and prosodic speech analysis, (2) skeletal gesture recognition from multi-view RGB cameras, (3) multimodal affective analysis combining lower-face video with upper-face facial EMG, (4) EEG-based mental state decoding, and (5) physiological arousal estimation from skin conductance, heart activity, and proxemic behavior. All signals are synchronized via Lab Streaming Layer to enable temporally aligned, continuous assessments of users' conscious and unconscious communication cues. Building on concepts from social semiotics and symbolic interactionism, we introduce an interpretation layer that links low-level signal representations to interactional constructs such as escalation and de-escalation. This layer is informed by domain knowledge from police instructors and lay participants, grounding system responses in realistic conflict scenarios. We demonstrate the feasibility and limitations of automated cue extraction in an XR-based de-escalati
Collaborative inference can improve predictive performance by integrating complementary information across agents, but applying collaborative fusion to every sample can incur unnecessary communication and computational overhead. This trade-off is particularly relevant in vertical federated learning (VFL), where clients observe different views of the same sample and fusion typically requires transmitting intermediate representations to a server. We study selective escalation in a two-round VFL inference protocol, in which a low-cost first round produces a prediction from client posteriors and a second embedding-fusion round is invoked only when it is expected to improve the final decision. We formulate routing as expected-gain score estimation: a sample is escalated when a predicted improvement in correctness justifies the additional communication. The proposed analytical score combines a calibrated pooled posterior with classwise reliability estimates of the VFL model, both obtained from held-out calibration data, yielding an interpretable router that requires no separately trained routing network. Experiments on multi-view classification benchmarks, including controlled test--time
LLM agents are becoming increasingly important in the security domain, but leading systems are often closed-source, cloud-based, hard to reproduce or use with sensitive code. This creates a need for small, local models that can perform security tasks under strict resource constraints, though effective methods for developing them remain unexplored. In this paper, we address this gap by proposing a two-stage post-training recipe that turns a small local language model into a security agent. To this end, we focus on Linux privilege escalation as a representative setting to systematically study the training of local models, as the task is both automatically verifiable and requires multi-step interactive reasoning. Using an experimental setup that mitigates data leakage, we post-train a small 4B model in two stages: supervised fine-tuning on traces from procedural privilege-escalation environments, followed by reinforcement learning with verifiable rewards. On a held-out benchmark of 12 Linux privilege-escalation scenarios, supervised fine-tuning doubles the baseline success rate under a tight budget of 20 interaction rounds, and subsequent reinforcement learning training improves our m
Dose-escalation trials in oncology drug development still today typically aim to identify 1-size-fits-all dose recommendations, as arbitrary quantiles of the toxicity thresholds evident in patient samples. In the late 1990s efforts to individualize dosing emerged fleetingly in the oncology trial methods literature, but these have gained little traction due to a nexus of conceptual, technical, commercial, and regulatory barriers. To reduce the activation energy needed for transforming current 1-size-fits-all dose-escalation trial designs to the dose-titration designs required for patient-centered dose individualization, we demonstrate a categorical formulation of dose-escalation protocols that extends readily to allow gradual introduction of dose titration. Central to this formulation is a symmetric monoidal preorder on the accessible states of dose-escalation trials, embodying pharmacologic intuitions regarding dose-monotonicity of drug toxicity and ethical intuitions relating to the therapeutic intent of such trials. A trial protocol that assigns doses to enrolling participants consistently with these intuitions is then a monotone map from this preorder to the sequence of doses be
Large Language Models (LLMs) have demonstrated substantial capabilities in conversational AI applications, yet their susceptibility to dialogue breakdowns poses significant challenges to deployment reliability and user trust. This paper introduces a "Detect, Explain, Escalate" framework to manage dialogue breakdowns in LLM-powered agents, emphasizing resource-efficient operation. Our approach integrates two key strategies: (1) We fine-tune a compact 8B-parameter model, augmented with teacher-generated reasoning traces, which serves as an efficient real-time breakdown detector and explainer. This model demonstrates robust classification and calibration on English and Japanese dialogues, and generalizes to the BETOLD dataset, improving accuracy by 7% over its baseline. (2) We systematically evaluate frontier LLMs using advanced prompting (few-shot, chain-of-thought, analogical reasoning) for high-fidelity breakdown assessment. These are integrated into an "escalation" architecture where our efficient detector defers to larger models only when necessary, substantially reducing operational costs and computational overhead. Our fine-tuned model and prompting strategies achieve state-of-
In large-scale cloud service systems, support tickets serve as a critical mechanism for resolving customer issues and maintaining service quality. However, traditional manual ticket escalation processes encounter significant challenges, including inefficiency, inaccuracy, and difficulty in handling the high volume and complexity of tickets. While previous research has proposed various machine learning models for ticket classification, these approaches often overlook the practical demands of real-world escalations, such as dynamic ticket updates, topic-specific routing, and the analysis of ticket relationships. To bridge this gap, this paper introduces TickIt, an innovative online ticket escalation framework powered by Large Language Models. TickIt enables topic-aware, dynamic, and relationship-driven ticket escalations by continuously updating ticket states, assigning tickets to the most appropriate support teams, exploring ticket correlations, and leveraging category-guided supervised fine-tuning to continuously improve its performance. By deploying TickIt in ByteDance's cloud service platform Volcano Engine, we validate its efficacy and practicality, marking a significant advance
When AI agents operating with access to sensitive information encounter a conflict between completing an assigned task and following rules or ethical constraints, they can resort to unsanctioned behaviour. Existing inference time safety work addresses this primarily through monitoring and access restriction. We investigate a complementary and under-explored layer: environmental controls that act on the agent's decision context at the point of conflict, making it more likely that the agent takes an authorised alternative path rather than an unsanctioned one. Drawing on Situational Crime Prevention (SCP), a framework used in human insider risk management to make harmful actions less rewarding and compliant actions more viable by design choices in the environment, we design and evaluate escalation channels as a concrete instantiation of this control class. An escalation channel provides an agent with a formal, out-of-band route to surface a conflict to an independent authority. We evaluate two designs: a simple email escalation and an instrumentally credible channel that guarantees a 30-minute pause and independent review, making the authorised path genuinely useful for goal achieveme