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This paper distinguishes between two main concepts of accountability: accountability as a virtue and accountability as a mechanism. In the former case, accountability is used primarily as a normative concept, as a set of standards for the evaluation of the behaviour of public actors. Accountability or, more precisely, being accountable, is seen as a positive quality in organisations or officials. Hence, accountability studies often focus on normative issues, on the assessment of the actual and active behaviour of public agents. In the latter case, accountability is used in a narrower, descriptive sense. It is seen as an institutional relation or arrangement in which an actor can be held to account by a forum. Here, the locus of accountability studies is not the behaviour of public agents, but the way in which these institutional arrangements operate. The present paper argues that distinguishing more clearly between these two concepts of accountability can solve at least some of the current conceptual confusion and may provide some foundation for comparative and cumulative analysis.

In recent years, there has been a drive to strengthen existing public accountability arrangements and to design new ones. This prompts the question whether accountability arrangements actually work. In the existing literature, both accountability ‘deficits’ and ‘overloads’ are alleged to exist. However, owing to the lack of a cogent yardstick, the debate tends to be impressionistic and event‐driven. In this article we develop an instrument for systematically assessing public accountability arrangements, drawing on three different normative perspectives. In the democratic perspective, accountability arrangements should effectively link government actions to the ‘democratic chain of delegation’. In the constitutional perspective, it is essential that accountability arrangements prevent or uncover abuses of public authority. In the learning perspective, accountability is a tool to make governments effective in delivering on their promises. We demonstrate the use of our multicriteria assessment tool in an analysis of a new accountability arrangement: the boards of oversight of agencies.

Accountability has long been both a key theme and a key problem in constitutional scholarship. The centrality of the accountability debates in contemporary political and legal discourse is a product of the difficulty of balancing the autonomy given to those exercising public power with appropriate control. The traditional mechanisms of accountability to Parliament and to the courts are problematic because in a complex administrative state, characterized by widespread delegation of discretion to actors located far from the centre of government, the conception of centralized responsibility upon which traditional accountability mechanisms are based is often fictional. The problems of accountability have been made manifest by the transformations wrought on public administration by the new public management (NPM) revolution which have further fragmented the public sector. In this article it is argued that if public lawyers are to be reconciled to these changes then it will be through recognizing the potential for additional or extended mechanisms of accountability in supplementing or displacing traditional accountability functions. The article identifies and develops two such extended accountability models: interdependence and redundancy

Debates about globalization have centered on calls to improve accountability to limit abuses of power in world politics. How should we think about global accountability in the absence of global democracy? Who should hold whom to account and according to what standards? Thinking clearly about these questions requires recognizing a distinction, evident in theories of accountability at the nation-state level, between “participation” and “delegation” models of accountability. The distinction helps to explain why accountability is so problematic at the global level and to clarify alternative possibilities for pragmatic improvements in accountability mechanisms globally. We identify seven types of accountability mechanisms and consider their applicability to states, NGOs, multilateral organizations, multinational corporations, and transgovernmental networks. By disaggregating the problem in this way, we hope to identify opportunities for improving protections against abuses of power at the global level.

Abstract The legitimacy and accountability of polycentric regulatory regimes, particularly at the transnational level, has been severely criticized, and the search is on to find ways in which they can be enhanced. This paper argues that before developing even more proposals, we need to pay far greater attention to the dynamics of accountability and legitimacy relationships, and to how those in regulatory regimes respond to them. The article thus first seeks to develop a closer analysis of three key elements of legitimacy and accountability relationships which it suggests are central to these dynamics: The role of the institutional environment in the construction of legitimacy, the dialectical nature of accountability relationships, and the communicative structures through which accountability occurs and legitimacy is constructed. Second, the article explores how organizations in regulatory regimes respond, or are likely to respond, to multiple legitimacy and accountability claims, and how they themselves seek to build legitimacy in complex and dynamic situations. The arguments developed here are not normative: There is no “grand solution” proposed to the normative questions of when regulators should be considered legitimate or how to make them so. Rather, the article seeks to analyse the dynamics of legitimacy and accountability relationships as they occur in an attempt to build a more realistic foundation on which grander “how to” proposals can be built. For until we understand these dynamics, the grander, normative arguments risk being simply pipe dreams – diverting, but in the end making little difference.

Use of tests and assessments as key elements in five waves of educational reform during the past 50 years are reviewed. These waves include the role of tests in tracking and selection emphasized in the 1950s, the use of tests for program accountability in the 1960s, minimum competency testing programs of the 1970s, school and district accountability of the 1980s, and the standards-based accountability systems of the 1990s. Questions regarding the impact, validity, and generalizability of reported gains, and the credibility of results in high-stakes accountability uses are discussed. Emphasis is given to three issues regarding currently popular accountability systems. These are (a) the role of content standards, (b) the dual goals of high performance standards and common standards for all students, and (c) the validity of accountability models. Some suggestions for dealing with the most severe limitations of accountability are provided.

This article reviews the now extensive research literature addressing the impact of accountability on a wide range of social judgments and choices. It focuses on 4 issues: (a) What impact do various accountability ground rules have on thoughts, feelings, and action? (b) Under what conditions will accountability attenuate, have no effect on, or amplify cognitive biases? (c) Does accountability alter how people think or merely what people say they think? and (d) What goals do accountable decision makers seek to achieve? In addition, this review explores the broader implications of accountability research. It highlights the utility of treating thought as a process of internalized dialogue; the importance of documenting social and institutional boundary conditions on putative cognitive biases; and the potential to craft empirical answers to such applied problems as how to structure accountability relationships in organizations.

Introduction 1. The analytic and textual practices of the International Monetary Fund: an examination of international auditing 2. Coercive accountability: The new audit culture and its impact on Anthropology 3. Generic genius - how does it all add up? 4. Anthropology, accountability and the European Commission 5. The trickster's dilemma: ethics and the technologies of the anthropological self 6. Audited accountability and the imperative of moral responsibility: beyond the primacy of the political and the systematic and the calling of Swaraj 7. Self-accountability, ethics and 'the problem of meaning' 8. Bureaucratic rationalisation and reunification: an exploration of the ethnography and politics of accountability 9. Academia: same pressures, same conditions of work? 10. Disciples, discipline and reflection: anthropological encounters and trajectories

The effectiveness of and adherence to eHealth interventions is enhanced by human support. However, human support has largely not been manualized and has usually not been guided by clear models. The objective of this paper is to develop a clear theoretical model, based on relevant empirical literature, that can guide research into human support components of eHealth interventions. A review of the literature revealed little relevant information from clinical sciences. Applicable literature was drawn primarily from organizational psychology, motivation theory, and computer-mediated communication (CMC) research. We have developed a model, referred to as "Supportive Accountability." We argue that human support increases adherence through accountability to a coach who is seen as trustworthy, benevolent, and having expertise. Accountability should involve clear, process-oriented expectations that the patient is involved in determining. Reciprocity in the relationship, through which the patient derives clear benefits, should be explicit. The effect of accountability may be moderated by patient motivation. The more intrinsically motivated patients are, the less support they likely require. The process of support is also mediated by the communications medium (eg, telephone, instant messaging, email). Different communications media each have their own potential benefits and disadvantages. We discuss the specific components of accountability, motivation, and CMC medium in detail. The proposed model is a first step toward understanding how human support enhances adherence to eHealth interventions. Each component of the proposed model is a testable hypothesis. As we develop viable human support models, these should be manualized to facilitate dissemination.

A. ANALYTICAL PERSPECTIVES B. STUDYING ACCOUNTABILITY C. ACCOUNTABLE GOVERNANCE D. ORGANIZATIONAL ACCOUNTABILITY E. ACCOUNTABILITY MECHANISMS F. DEBATING ACCOUNTABILITY G. REFLECTIONS ON THE FUTURE OF ACCOUNTABILITY STUDIES

Abstract\nThe Rogers Commission investigation of the space shuttle Challenger accident was too narrow in its focus; an institutional analysis is needed to supplement the concentration on technical and managerial causes of the tragedy. Using an institutional perspective, we contend that the accident was, in part, a manifestation of NASA's efforts to manage the diverse expectations it faces in the American political system. Four types of accountability (legal, political, bureaucratic, and professional) are commonly used by public agencies to manage expectations of them. Yet, the presence of multiple accountability systems is not without costs. This case study shows that many of NASA's technical and managerial problems resulted from efforts to respond to legitimate institutional demands. Specifically, we contend that the pursuit of political and bureaucratic accountability distracted NASA from its strength: professional standards and mechanisms of accountability. Furthermore, agency reforms now being implemented and considered compound trends away from the professional accountability approaches used by NASA during the 1960s. Such reforms are just as likely to exacerbate the dilemmas facing NASA as they are to improve the agency's performance.

Accountability is a core concept of public administration, yet disagreement about its meaning is masked by consensus on its importance and desirability. This article proposes a five-part typology of accountability conceptions. Transparency, liability, controllability, responsibility, and responsiveness are defined as distinct dimensions of accountability, providing an improvement on the current state of conceptual fuzziness. The typology provides a vocabulary for the core argument: that conflicting expectations borne of disparate conceptions of accountability undermine organizational effectiveness. This phenomenon—labeled multiple accountabilities disorder—is illustrated with a case study. ICANN, the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers, is a nascent organization charged with administering the Domain Name System, the Internet's address directory. In its four-year history, ICANN has been the object of much criticism. Conflicting accountability expectations have been a source of difficulty for ICANN's leaders as they have steered the organization through its early years.

Purpose This paper aims to review traditional corporate governance and accountability research, to suggest opportunities for future research in this field. Design/methodology/approach The first part adopts an analytical frame of reference based on theory, accountability mechanisms, methodology, business sector/context, globalisation and time horizon. The second part of the paper locates the seven papers in the special issue in a framework of analysis showing how each one contributes to the field. The paper presents a frame of reference which may be used as a “roadmap” for researchers to navigate their way through the prior literature and to position their work on the frontiers of corporate governance research. The paper is primarily discursive and conceptual. Findings The paper encourages broader approaches to corporate governance and accountability research beyond the traditional and primarily quantitative approaches of prior research. Broader theoretical perspectives, methodological approaches, accountability mechanism, sectors/contexts, globalisation, and time horizons are identified. Research limitations/implications Greater use of qualitative research methods are suggested, which present challenges particularly of access to the “black box” of corporate boardrooms. Originality/value Drawing on the analytical framework, and the papers in the special issue, the paper identifies opportunities for further research of accountability and corporate governance.

The concepts of transparency and accountability are closely linked: transparency is supposed to generate accountability. This article questions this widely held assumption. Transparency mobilises the power of shame, yet the shameless may not be vulnerable to public exposure. Truth often fails to lead to justice. After exploring different definitions and dimensions of the two ideas, the more relevant question turns out to be: what kinds of transparency lead to what kinds of accountability, and under what conditions? The article concludes by proposing that the concept can be unpacked in terms of two distinct variants. Transparency can be either ‘clear’ or ‘opaque’, while accountability can be either ‘soft’ or ‘hard’.

Traditionally, American government has created detailed, formal procedures to ensure that its agencies and employees are accountable for finances and fairness. Now in the interest of improved performance, we are asking our front-line workers to be more responsive, we are urging our middle managers to be innovative, and we are exhorting our public executives to be entrepreneurial. Yet what is the theory of democratic accountability that empowers public employees to exercise such discretion while still ensuring that we remain a government of laws? How can government be responsive to the needs of individual citizens and still remain accountable to the entire polity? In Rethinking Democratic Accountability , Robert D. Behn examines the ambiguities, contradictions, and inadequacies in our current systems of accountability for finances, fairness, and performance. Weaving wry observations with political theory, Behn suggests a new model of accountability uwith compacts of collective, mutual responsibility uto address new paradigms for public management.

This book examines whether the mechanisms of accountability characteristic of democratic systems are sufficient to induce the representatives to act in the best interest of the represented. The first part of the volume focuses on the role of elections, distinguishing different ways in which they may cause representation. The second part is devoted to the role of checks and balances, between the government and the parliament as well as between the government and the bureaucracy. The contributors of this volume, all leading scholars in the fields of American and comparative politics and political theory, address questions such as, whether elections induce governments to act in the interest of citizens. Are politicians in democracies accountable to voters in future elections? If so, does accountability induce politicians to represent citizens? Does accountability limit or enhance the scope of action of governments? Are governments that violate campaign mandates representative? Overall, the essays combine theoretical discussions, game-theoretic models, case studies, and statistical analyses, within a shared analytical approach and a standardized terminology. The empirical material is drawn from the well established democracies as well as from new democracies.

Approaches the issue of horizontal accountability from various angles, examining non-elected, specialized bodies of oversight in government, banking, and other institutions. After discussion of conceptual and normative aspects of public accountability, and sections offer historical overviews and material on international factors. Empirical case studies provide descriptive accounts and explanatory hypotheses about the institutionalization of horizontal accountability. A concluding chapter offers general theoretical propositions on conflicts and constituencies of institutional reform. Based on papers presented at a June 1997 conference held in Vienna, Austria. Annotation c. by Book News, Inc., Portland, Or.

All health systems struggle with the issue of meeting population health needs fairly under resource constraints. Decisions about the implementation of new technologies provide a useful window into the larger issue, and a paper in this week's journal provides a valuable insight into the elements of decision making that decision makers themselves think important in trying to reach fair decisions on applying new technologies in health care.1 In mixed systems, like that in the United States, decisions whether to fund new technologies—drugs, devices, procedures—are made both by public agencies, such as the Health Care Financing Administration or the Veterans Administration, and by private indemnity insurers and managed care organisations. In the universal coverage systems of most developed countries such decisions are made by public agencies or authorities. Distrust has grown in all these settings.2,3 Clinicians, patients, and the public—propelled by the media, the internet, and direct to consumer advertising—often believe these decisions are guided solely by the “bottom line,” not patient welfare. The moral legitimacy of limits and priorities thus involves not just who has moral authority to set them, but how they are set. Some countries with universal coverage systems initially tried to address this problem of legitimacy by setting up national commissions to articulate principles that should govern the setting of priorities. Holm has argued that these principles proved too general and too unclear in practice.4 More generally, we probably lack consensus on principles capable of resolving disputes about rationing.5 A second wave of efforts to address priority setting has thus focused on developing fair, publicly acceptable processes for making these decisions. In the United States an active consumer movement has also focused on a patients' bill of rights as a vehicle for fair process. In the United Kingdom, awareness of the need for clear process is reflected in the establishment of the National Institute for Clinical Excellence (NICE) to handle some aspects of rationing.6,7 In pluralist societies we are likely to find reasonable disagreement about principles that should govern priority setting. For example, some will want to give more priority to the worst off, some less; some will be willing to aggregate benefits in ways that others are not. In the absence of consensus on principles, a fair process allows us to agree on what is legitimate and fair. Key elements of fair process will involve transparency about the grounds for decisions; appeals to rationales that all can accept as relevant to meeting health needs fairly; and procedures for revising decisions in light of challenges to them.8 Together these elements assure “accountability for reasonableness.”9 Fair procedures must also be empirically feasible. They must involve practices that can be sustained and that connect well with the goals of various stakeholders in the many institutional settings where these decisions are made. The value of the study by Singer et al in this issue is that it points to key elements of actual decision making processes that can be further improved to achieve legitimacy and fairness (p 1316).1 An ethical approach to fair process must build on their findings. A fair process requires publicity about the reasons and rationales that play a part in decisions. There must be no secrets where justice is involved, for people should not be expected to accept decisions that affect their well being unless they are aware of the grounds for those decisions. The study found that transparency was important to participants in the decisions, though it did not state whether the rationales for decisions were then made transparent to all affected by them. This broader transparency is a hallmark of fair process. Fair process also involves constraints on reasons. Fair minded people—those who seek mutually justifiable grounds for cooperation—must agree that the reasons, evidence, and rationales are relevant to meeting population health needs fairly, the shared goal of deliberation. The kinds of reasons described in the study meet this condition, but the institutions studied—committees concerned with implementing new technologies—did not face the more difficult task of comparing quite different benefits across different groups of patients under budget limits. Fair process also requires opportunities to challenge and revise decisions in light of the kinds of considerations all stakeholders may raise. Though the committees studied by Singer et al gave evidence that decisions improved—that is, became more sensitive to patient variations—through revision, there should be a mechanism for appeals to decisions by those affected by them. The fact that a single lay member of the cardiac committee did not function as effectively as the three lay members of the cancer committee is a lesson that must be taken seriously in designing fair procedures. Accountability for reasonableness makes it possible to educate all stakeholders about the substance of deliberation about fair decisions under resource constraints. It facilitates social learning about limits. It connects decision making in healthcare institutions to broader, more fundamental democratic deliberative processes. Accountability for reasonableness also occupies a middle ground in the debate between those calling for “explicit” and “implicit” rationing.10 Like implicit approaches, it does not require that principles for rationing be made explicit ahead of time. But, like explicit approaches, it does call for transparency about reasoning that all can eventually agree is relevant. Since we may not be able to construct principles that yield fair decisions ahead of time, we need a process that allows us to develop those reasons over time as we face real cases. The social learning that this approach facilitates provides our best prospect of achieving agreement over sharing medical resources fairly.

Every day automated algorithms make decisions that can amplify the power of businesses and governments. Yet as algorithms come to regulate more aspects of our lives, the contours of their power can remain difficult to grasp. This paper studies the notion of algorithmic accountability reporting as a mechanism for elucidating and articulating the power structures, biases, and influences that computational artifacts exercise in society. A framework for algorithmic power based on autonomous decision-making is proffered and motivates specific questions about algorithmic influence. Five cases of algorithmic accountability reporting involving the use of reverse engineering methods in journalism are then studied and analyzed to provide insight into the method and its application in a journalism context. The applicability of transparency policies for algorithms is discussed alongside challenges to implementing algorithmic accountability as a broadly viable investigative method.