搜索结果：AI-controlled

Internal deployment of agentic AI systems for coding and research creates a sociotechnical control problem that extends beyond model behaviour. We treat internal-deployment Loss of Control as the inability to reliably constrain, audit, reverse, or halt AI-mediated changes to code, infrastructure, evaluation, or deployment processes in time to prevent serious organisational or societal harms. We ask whether established systems-safety methods can identify risks that model-level evaluations may miss. Using a generic frontier-lab coding-agent scenario reconstructed from public materials, we apply STECA, STPA, and FRAM. The analyses surface complementary findings: published frameworks can leave governance responsibilities and feedback loops externally unverifiable; delays in monitoring and intervention can make otherwise valid control actions ineffective; and routine operational variability can gradually erode the calibration and independence of safeguards. We argue that frontier-AI risk management should pair model-focused evaluations with systems-level hazard analysis and operational assurance that tracks whether controls remain effective over time.

Practitioners have reported a directional pattern in AI-assisted code generation: AI-generated code tends to fail quietly, preserving the appearance of functionality while degrading or concealing guarantees. This paper introduces the Reward-Shaped Failure Hypothesis - the proposal that this pattern may reflect an artifact of optimization through human feedback rather than a random distribution of bugs. We define failure truthfulness as the property that a system's observable outputs accurately represent its internal success or failure state. We then present AIRA (AI-Induced Risk Audit), a deterministic 15-check inspection framework designed to detect failure-untruthful patterns in code. We report results from three studies: (1) an anonymized enterprise environment audit, (2) a balanced 600-file public corpus pilot, and (3) a strict matched-control replication comparing 955 AI-attributed files against 955 human-control files. In the final replication, AI-attributed files show 0.435 high-severity findings per file versus 0.242 in human controls (1.80x). The effect is consistent across JavaScript, Python, and TypeScript, with strongest concentration in exception-handling-related patte

Crafting cartoon captions requires an understanding of humor, context, and the relationship between image and text. Traditionally, illustrators and writers collaborate to strengthen visual storytelling and comedic timing. With advances in natural language generation, Large Language Models (LLMs) can assist in this process. This study examines AI's role in caption generation by testing GPT-4o via the ChatGPT interface on IEEE Computer magazine cartoons. By removing captions and prompting AI to generate replacements, we assess its ability to produce jokes that match the depicted situation and narrative intent. Our findings show that while AI-generated captions are often humorous and contextually relevant, they sometimes diverge from the cartoon's intended meaning, for example, by missing irony, cultural references, or contextual constraints. However, AI can also produce alternatives that broaden creative exploration and occasionally improve upon the original humor. We argue that current AI systems are best used as an assistant rather than a replacement for human creativity. By integrating AI-generated suggestions, cartoonists can explore diverse humor styles, streamline ideation, and

AI safety is still largely framed as alignment: training models to follow human preferences, safety policies, and normative constraints. That framing has improved the behavior of modern language models, but aligned behavior does not by itself guarantee that a deployed agent can be stopped, overridden, or constrained once it operates in open-ended, interactive, and tool-using environments. A system may be safe in expectation and still fail to yield to explicit runtime authority under conflicting instructions, long-horizon execution, adversarial inputs, or risky tool use. This position paper argues that AI safety therefore requires controllability as a first-class objective. We define \emph{controllability} as the ability of an AI system to remain reliably interruptible, overridable, redirectable, and constrainable by explicit control signals at runtime while preserving ordinary utility when such signals are absent. To study this gap, we introduce \controlbench{}, a benchmark for evaluating controllability failures in high-risk agentic scenarios. Experiments with OpenClaw-based agents show that current alignment and guardrail mechanisms reduce risk, but often fail to provide persiste

AI agents are rapidly accelerating work at frontier AI companies, helping with AI R&D, cyber-defence, and advancing scientific discoveries. As these agents become more tightly integrated into our systems, unlocking their full potential requires rethinking how we do security. We should not assume that AI agents are always perfectly aligned, but should instead build in multiple layers of defence. We present the GDM AI Control Roadmap (v0.1) -- a first-of-its-kind blueprint for internal security against potentially misaligned AI. This report provides: * Threat modelling: We adopt a conservative approach to threat modelling and assume a hypothetical AI adversary pursuing undesirable goals in internal deployment. We introduce TRAIT&R, a taxonomy of tactics and techniques available to such a hypothetical AI adversary, building on the established security framework MITRE ATT&CK. * Capability-based mitigation: Because controlling more capable models requires more costly interventions, we link specific defensive measures to evolving model capabilities (such as the ability to reason opaquely or execute complex cyberattacks). As models get more powerful, our defences should escala

Very soon, millions of AI agents will proliferate across the economy, autonomously taking billions of actions. Inevitably, things will go wrong. Humans will be defrauded, injured, even killed. Law will somehow have to govern the coming wave. But when an AI causes harm, the first question to answer, before anyone can be held accountable is: Which AI Did It? Identifying AIs is unusually difficult. AIs lack bodies. They can copy, split, merge, swarm, and vanish at will. Even today, a "single" AI agent is often an ensemble of instances based on multiple models. The complexity will only multiply as AI capabilities improve. This Article is the first to comprehensively diagnose the legal problem of identifying AIs. Two kinds of identity are required: "thin" and "thick." Thin identification ties every AI action to some human principal, essential for holding accountable the humans who make and use AI agents. Thick identification distinguishes between AI agents, qua agents -- sorting millions of AI entities into discrete, persistent units with stable, coherent goals, essential where principal-agent problems prevent humans from perfectly controlling AIs. This Article also presents a solution:

Artificial intelligence pipelines -- spanning data collection, model training, deployment, and post-deployment monitoring -- concentrate ethical risks that intensify with multimodal and agentic systems. Existing governance instruments, including the EU AI Act, the IEEE 7000 series, and the NIST AI Risk Management Framework, provide high-level guidance but often lack enforceable, end-to-end operational controls. This paper presents an ethics-by-design control architecture that embeds consequentialist, deontological, and virtue-ethical reasoning into stage-specific enforcement mechanisms across the AI lifecycle. The framework implements a triple-gate structure at each lifecycle stage: Metric gates (quantitative performance and safety thresholds), Governance gates (legal, rights, and procedural compliance), and Eco gates (carbon and water budgets and sustainability constraints). It specifies measurable trigger conditions, escalation paths, audit artefacts, and mappings to EU AI Act obligations and NIST RMF functions, enabling integration with existing MLOps and CI/CD pipelines. Illustrative examples from large language model pipelines demonstrate how gate-based controls can surface an

In large-scale AI systems, allocating scarce resources such as GPU compute time and bandwidth among multiple agents is a critical challenge. Conventional policies focus on efficiency metrics, potentially leading to dominance concentration that undermines system diversity and stability. We propose Computable Fair Division (CFD), a framework that reinterprets the Boltzmann-Softmax function not as a selection tool but as a probabilistic resource allocation mechanism, redefining the inverse temperature parameter $β$ as a computable control variable governing the efficiency-fairness balance. Static analysis reveals a Pareto frontier with a near-optimal Stability Corridor where total loss remains approximately constant across policy weights. In the dynamic setting, AHC++ (Adaptive Hard-Cap Controller++) updates $β$ in real time using the error between observed dominance and a policy-specified target as feedback. Simulations show that AHC++ suppresses extreme dominance concentration under exogenous shocks while tracking fairness targets without substantial throughput degradation. Scalability analysis confirms that a 100x increase in agents yields only approximately 5.5x increase in execut

Artificial intelligence systems are increasingly embedded in high-stakes decision environments, yet many governance approaches focus primarily on policy guidance rather than operational stability mechanisms. As AI deployments scale, organizations require governance architectures capable of maintaining reliable, auditable, and accountable behavior over time. This paper introduces the AI Governance Control Stack for Operational Stability, a layered governance architecture designed to ensure traceable and resilient AI system behavior. The proposed control stack integrates six complementary governance layers: system-of-record version governance, evidence-based verification, decision-time explainability logging, telemetry monitoring, model drift detection, and governance escalation. Together, these layers provide a structured mechanism for preserving governance integrity across the AI lifecycle while enabling organizations to detect instability, respond to emerging risks, and maintain regulatory accountability. The architecture aligns operational governance practices with emerging regulatory and standards frameworks, including the EU AI Act, ISO/IEC 42001 Artificial Intelligence Managem

Cyber offense is moving to machine speed; cyber research itself is not. Existing AI scientist systems make end-to-end research automation increasingly plausible, but they target relatively stable scientific domains. We argue that AI-native cybersecurity is a different kind of scientific object. Its recurring units of study are security events and interaction traces, not static assets; its model and tool substrate is non-stationary, not steady-state; and credible evaluation depends on digital twins, cyber ranges, and auditable evidence rather than on a single benchmark score. We call this object the Cybersecurity AI Scientist. A practical realization is a modular, role-specialized multi-agent research system that coordinates problem framing, threat modeling, tool generation, controlled experimentation, evaluation, governance, and scientific reporting, and that anchors its concrete objectives in a four-zeros frame spanning risk, trust, incident, and energy dimensions. As a representative agenda we focus on AI-native defense, where steady-state perimeters give way to resilient agent legions and the classical category of terminal security is itself being deconstructed into agent securi

Recent advancements in generative video models demonstrate high visual fidelity, yet their integration into enterprise environments is restricted by temporal inconsistencies and severe brand misalignment. Current monolithic architectures struggle to enforce rigid brand constraints, frequently hallucinating unapproved visual assets. We introduce Genflow, a Compound AI System designed to enforce brand consistency in generative media production. Our architecture integrates a retrieval-based 'Brand DNA' extraction module to parameterize generation according to established corporate identity guidelines. Furthermore, we implement an Adversarial Multi-Agent Quality Control (QC) loop. Instead of a single-pass generation, this pipeline employs evaluator agents to iteratively critique generated frames against the extracted parameters, prompting generator models to refine outputs until a deterministic consensus is reached. By transitioning to a multi-stage, self-correcting pipeline, Genflow improved the yield of brand-compliant video generations from 42% to 89%, establishing a robust framework for scalable, enterprise-grade generative systems.

We present Claw AI Lab, a lab-native autonomous research platform that advances automated research from a hidden prompt-to-paper pipeline into an interactive AI laboratory. Rather than centering the system around a single agent or a fixed serial workflow, we allow users to instantiate a full research team from one prompt, with customizable roles, collaborative workflows, real-time monitoring, artifact inspection, and rollback/resume control through a unified dashboard. The platform also supports distinct research modes for exploration, multi-agent discussion, and reproduction, making autonomous research substantially more steerable and laboratory-like in practice. A key practical contribution of Claw AI Lab lies in its Claw-Code Harness, which connects local codebases, datasets, and checkpoints to runnable experiments and feeds execution artifacts back into the research loop. As a result, the harness improves not only execution integration, but also experimental completion and result integrity: experiments are easier to inspect, iterate on, and faithfully transfer into final papers, reducing common failure modes such as partial runs and malformed result reporting. In our internal e

AI governance frameworks increasingly emphasize fairness, transparency, accountability, and lifecycle risk management in high-stakes domains. However, many current approaches remain observational, relying on static metric reporting, post-hoc auditing, and monitoring dashboards without directly governing deployment readiness, remediation progression, escalation states, or assurance-driven deployment control. This paper introduces Operational AI Deployment Assurance (OADA), a governance framework for translating fairness disagreement, subgroup instability, threshold sensitivity, remediation outcomes, and operational uncertainty into deployment-oriented assurance decisions. Building on prior work on the Fairness Disagreement Index (FDI) and FairRisk-FDI, OADA reframes governance uncertainty as an operational concern within AI deployment pipelines rather than a byproduct of metric disagreement. The framework introduces Deployment Assurance Scores, Deployment Readiness Classifications, Threshold Stability Zones, Governance Escalation States, and remediation-aware assurance progression. These constructs support lifecycle-oriented governance decisions across high-stakes settings by connec

How software developers interact with Artificial Intelligence (AI)-powered tools, including Large Language Models (LLMs), plays a vital role in how these AI-powered tools impact them. While overreliance on AI may lead to long-term negative consequences (e.g., atrophy of critical thinking skills); underreliance might deprive software developers of potential gains in productivity and quality. Based on twenty-two interviews with software developers on using LLMs for software development, we propose a preliminary reliance-control framework where the level of control can be used as a way to identify AI overreliance and underreliance. We also use it to recommend future research to further explore the different control levels supported by the current and emergent LLM-driven tools. Our paper contributes to the emerging discourse on AI overreliance and provides an understanding of the appropriate degree of reliance as essential to developers making the most of these powerful technologies. Our findings can help practitioners, educators, and policymakers promote responsible and effective use of AI tools.

Generative AI (GenAI) systems promise to transform knowledge work by automating a range of tasks, yet their deployment in enterprise settings remains hindered by the lack of systematic quality assurance mechanisms. We present an Expert Validation Framework that places domain experts at the center of building software with GenAI components, enabling them to maintain authoritative control over system behavior through structured specification, testing, validation, and continuous monitoring processes. Our framework addresses the critical gap between AI capabilities and organizational trust by establishing a rigorous, expert-driven methodology for ensuring quality across diverse GenAI applications. Through a four-stage implementation process encompassing specification, system creation, validation, and production monitoring, the framework enables organizations to leverage GenAI capabilities while maintaining expert oversight and quality standards.

The advancement of AI capabilities compels researchers and the public to be more aware of its potential worldwide impact. A pressing near-term concern is the regulation of military AI applications. Armament manufacturers and defense contractors are increasingly investing in AI capabilities and forging partnerships with AI companies, creating a burgeoning coalition that demands military leaders, arms control diplomacy experts, and AI researchers collaborate to ensure a safer future. While AI researchers often focus on the long-term implications of superintelligent AI, this approach may not adequately address the immediate challenges posed by AI in military applications. Success requires acknowledging and mitigating the emerging risks of frontier AI models that plan to be integrated into defense applications, like military AI systems. Arms control has reduced past catastrophic risks, so lessons learned from nuclear deterrence can guide AI safety and security research towards innovations in verification and diplomacy. AI researchers, however, must assist in leading the technical research that clearly defines and alleviates instability in military settings. Given these new responsibili

Artificial Intelligence (AI) pipelines have become integral to modern research, supporting fields such as Medical Sciences, Agriculture, and Social Sciences, and enabling large-scale data analysis, predictive modeling, and the automation of complex tasks. However, designing and implementing AI solutions remains challenging for many researchers due to the expertise required in the design and development of end-to-end AI systems. To address this gap, we present Domain-Driven Adaptable AI Pipelines (DDAP), a controlled, human-in-the-loop, agentic framework that leverages large language models to guide users in a systematic construction of AI pipelines and their corresponding implementation code. DDAP structures the development process into four stages: problem definition, compute environment specification, pipeline generation, and code generation. Through this staged interaction, the framework adapts to domain context, user expertise, and resource constraints, while maintaining user control over key decisions. We evaluate DDAP across multiple datasets spanning business, biology, and health science domains by comparing its AI models against expert-developed models. The experimental res

This work establishes a foundational framework for standardizing AI evaluation RCTs (sometimes called human uplift studies). Drawing on established experimental practices from disciplines with established RCT traditions, including software engineering, economics, clinical and health sciences, and psychology, we adopt the (Shadish et al., 2002) four-validity framework and extend it with a fifth principle on transparency, repeatability, and verification adapted from the Transparency and Openness Promotion (TOP) Guidelines (Center for Open Science, 2025). We operationalize all five principles into 33 guidelines adapted for AI evaluation RCT contexts, expressed as requirements with rationales, implementation instructions, and evidence bases. We position the principles and guidelines as serving three key roles for AI evaluation RCTs: a design tool for planning studies, an evaluation rubric for assessing existing work, and a blueprint for standard setting as the field converges on norms. Our framework extends prior work by centering evaluation on human performance rather than model output alone, formalizing causal inference through RCT methodology for AI contexts, integrating heterogenei

While the increased integration of AI technologies into interactive systems enables them to solve an equally increasing number of tasks, the black box problem of AI models continues to spread throughout the interactive system as a whole. Explainable AI (XAI) techniques can make AI models more accessible by employing post-hoc methods or transitioning to inherently interpretable models. While this makes individual AI models clearer, the overarching system architecture remains opaque. To this end, we propose an approach to represent interactive systems as sequences of structural building blocks, such as AI models and control mechanisms grounded in the literature. These can then be explained through accompanying visual building blocks, such as XAI techniques. The flow and APIs of the structural building blocks form an explicit overview of the system. This serves as a communication basis for both humans and automated agents like LLMs, aligning human and machine interpretability of AI models. We discuss a selection of building blocks and concretize our flow-based approach in an architecture and accompanying prototype interactive system.